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Policies adopted under duress: A model of fiscal-policy responses to financial crises 
With application to Eurozone politics and policies following the 2008 financial crisis 
 
Ryan Luby 
The present study proposes a model, termed the hybrid model, to explain fiscal-policy 
responses to financial crises. Although it is applied throughout the present study to the Eurozone, 
the model’s geographic and substantive scope apply more broadly. Combining and building upon 
past approaches, the hybrid model proposes three independent variables: partisanship, political 
capacity, and external actors. The model builds on the literature’s three dominant approaches: 
partisan, domestic approaches; approaches that emphasize convergence; and approaches that 
emphasize divergence, represented here primarily by the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature. The hybrid model integrates the domestic emphasis of the partisan approach with the 
international emphases of the convergence and, to some extent, VoC approaches. The hybrid 
model builds on the domestic politics of the partisan approach by integrating coalition logic and 
the tension between coalition partners into the partisan approach’s political landscape. The 
model also advances the convergence and VoC approaches by providing an explanation for 
variation in the pressure of financial markets, both over time and across countries, which 
mediates the influence of external actors in the domestic affairs of sample countries. In addition, 
with respect to the dependent variable, the present study develops a disaggregated measure that 
accounts for the diverse distributional implications of fiscal policies’ various dimensions. 
With respect to empirics, the present study employs a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Broadly, the large-N results provide support for the hybrid model, 
particularly as it pertains to partisanship. Event analyses and case studies support the role of 
external actors; the empirics show the degree to which financial-market pressure mediates the 
 
 
influence of external actors. Combined, the quantitative and qualitative approaches indicate 
problems with consonance, the particular dimension of political capacity considered in the 
present study. Both quantitative and qualitative results reveal that consonance, i.e., between-
party tensions in coalition governments, provides an incomplete characterization of the factors 
influencing the political capacity of single-party and coalition governments. The case studies 
suggest that within-party tensions and party-system strength, as additional measures of political 
capacity, play key roles in shaping fiscal-policy responses. The empirics also confirm the 
importance of disaggregating fiscal policy, the dependent variable, beyond the broad measures of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and theory 
 
Outline of chapter 
Chapter 1 is divided into four sections. The first introduces the relevant literature and 
theoretical debates from which the proposed model, referred to as the hybrid model, emerges. 
The second section introduces the study’s scope conditions. The third section introduces the 
study’s three independent variables: partisanship, political capacity, and external actors. This 
section discusses the hypotheses over each that emerge from the hybrid model. In doing so, the 
section introduces the varieties of fiscal policy employed in the present dissertation. The fourth 
and final section outlines the dissertation’s remaining chapters, focusing on how they relate to, 
build on, and test the hybrid model presented in Chapter 1. 
Literature review 
Explaining variation in fiscal policy is a particularly difficult issue. Explanations can be 
roughly broken into two categories: economic and political. Economic arguments explain 
variation as function of economic efficiency. That is, the analyses consider an economic space 
and explain how the status quo is economically efficient relative to the alternatives. These 
analyses rely on there being a known, socially efficient policy. Such a condition exists in the case 
of the movement of goods and services: free trade.1 Explaining trade regimes thus amounts to an 
explanation for divergence from the efficient, free-trade regime. This is the broad approach taken 
by the literature related to the political economy of trade.2 In fiscal policy, unlike with respect to 
trade policy, there is not a known socially efficient policy. For example, the socially optimal 
                                                 
1 Free trade is identified as the socially efficient outcome as early as Adam Smith. David Ricardo refined Smith’s 
thesis to trade based on comparative, as opposed to absolute, advantage. 
2 Grossman & Helpman (1992) provides one such example. The authors propose a models of trade protection as a 
function of politicians’ private and public interests. To the degree that private interests increase in importance, the 
politicians provide socially suboptimal levels of free trade.  
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income-tax rate regime, given market imperfections that are widely recognized by economists, is 
not known. Similar logic applies for consumption-, payroll-, and corporate-tax regimes. Thus, 
arguments couched in terms of economic efficiency, particularly of the economic efficiency of 
entire fiscal regimes, are inherently political. Crucially, fiscal policies and fiscal-policy regimes 
succeed not because they are economically efficient but because they are advocated by 
politically successful actors under a particular set of circumstances. One of the dissertation’s 
goals is to examine the characteristics of successful actors and to determine the role of the wider 
political and economic context in explaining their levels of relative success.   
Unfortunately, political explanations for fiscal policy have not progressed far beyond 
basic partisan models of taxation and spending, presented here broadly under the rubric of 
domestic, partisan approaches. In these models, voters are arrayed along a left-right spectrum. 
Preference for taxation decreases with rightward movement along the continuum. The first 
models to explicitly incorporate politics and fiscal policy arose in the literature on the political 
business cycle, first proposed by Nordhaus.3 Nordhaus proposed a contested tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment, over which political actors exhibited varying preferences. 
Nordhaus’s empirics concludes that incumbent terms begin with policies of relative austerity 
(defined as reduced spending and increased taxation) that shift into periods of largesse prior to 
elections. From the perspective of the present approach, Nordhaus’s conclusion is apolitical, 
hypothesizing no differences in preferences between political parties. Hibbs advanced 
Nordhaus’s work in two principal manners.4 First, Hibbs provided an empirical test of 
Nordhaus’s theory by analyzing the behavior of post-World War II, developed economies. 
                                                 
3 Nordhaus, William D. "The political business cycle." The review of economic studies (1975): 169-190. 




Second, in a move germane to the present research agenda, Hibbs incorporated political 
preferences of economic outcomes and thereby politicized the technocratic process initially 
conceptualized by Nordhaus. Hibbs concludes that postwar governments fall into two broad 
camps: low unemployment-high inflation countries typically governed by the left and high 
unemployment-low inflation countries governed by the right. Hibbs analysis thus identifies 
variation in the cross section but not the time series. Alesina, Roubini & Cohen, an exemplum of 
the subsequent generation of political business cycle models, proposes a model that permits 
variation within countries over time and finds significant partisan effects with respect to both 
inflation, unemployment and the deficit.5  
From the perspective of broader fiscal-policy analysis, the political business cycle suffers 
from a number of key shortcomings. First, the macroeconomic aggregates that serve as the 
literature’s dependent variables are too highly aggregated for the context of political debate. 
Politicians debate the policy components that aggregate upwards and ultimately produce the 
deficit; they do not select the deficit directly. While politicians have some degree of influence of 
inflation and unemployment, they do not select these values directly. Second, the politics of even 
the more sophisticated approaches advanced by the political business cycle literature are 
rudimentary. This reflects both a lack of theoretical vision as well as dependent variables over 
which parties do not compete directly. 
From the literature on the political business cycle, two strands of literature relevant to 
explaining fiscal-policy variation emerged: the expansionary austerity literature and the 
convergence literature. In an early paper, Alesina, Perotti & Tavares argued that not all austerity, 
                                                 




defined as a reduction in the fiscal deficit, reduces growth.6 The authors argued that, while tax 
increases reduce growth, spending cuts that emphasize public-sector wages and transfers increase 
growth. In one of the first explorations of partisanship in the literature, the authors find little 
effect of partisanship on either the adoption of austerity measures or their eventual success, 
defined as leading to the policies’ remaining in place over the medium-term. Over the next ten 
years, several papers told a similar story; these papers formed the theoretical and empirical basis 
for the IMF’s position on fiscal-policy reform in recipient countries.7 In one of the final papers to 
defend the notion of expansionary austerity offered by Alesina, Roberto & Tavares, Alesina & 
Ardagna examine large fiscal adjustments and reinforce the prior findings in the literature.8 It is 
to this paper and the wider literature that Guajardo, Leigh & Pescatori (2014) directly respond.9 
The authors argue that the literature on expansionary austerity fails both theoretically and 
empirically. The authors show that, contrary to what the prior literature suggests, both 
expenditure- and revenue-centric austerity reduce growth in the short-run.  
The paper proved particularly important because of the formal participation of the IMF’s 
research department. The shifting position of the IMF proved crucial to the opening up of the 
bargaining space between bailout recipients and the Troika. Because of the outsized importance 
occupied by the changes in the IMF’s preferences in the evolution of fiscal-policy response to 
the 2008 crisis, subsequent chapters explore not only the IMF’s gradual rejection of 
expansionary austerity but also the reasons underlying the IMF’s evolution. A sub-literature 
                                                 
6 Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto and Jose Tavares. "The political economy of fiscal adjustments." Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity (1998): 197-266. 
7 Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna, Roberto Perotti, and Fabio Schiantarelli. 2002. "Fiscal Policy, Profits, and 
Investment." American Economic Review, 92(3): 571-589. 
8 Alesina, Alberto, and Silvia Ardagna. "Large changes in fiscal policy: taxes versus spending." Tax Policy and the 
Economy, Volume 24. The University of Chicago Press, 2010. 35-68. 
9 Guajardo, Jaime, Daniel Leigh, and Andrea Pescatori. "Expansionary austerity? International evidence." Journal of 
the European Economic Association 12.4 (2014): 949-968. 
5 
 
emerged to explore precisely this evolution. Some authors argued that the Washington 
Consensus formed a stable basis for the IMF’s fiscal-policy preferences.10 In general, these 
arguments for stability relied mostly on the broadly consistently neoliberal emphasis of the 
IMF’s policy prescriptions. A separate set of authors look at variation within the set of neoliberal 
policies prescribed. These authors contend that, in the early 2000’s and after the onset of the 
2008 financial crisis, the IMF’s fiscal-policy preferences and recommendations evolved in 
important and systematic ways.11 While frequently framed as diametrically opposed, the 
competing bodies of literature on the IMF’s policy preferences can be reconciled by thinking 
about the IMF’s policy advice as remaining well within the boundaries of the neoliberal policies 
prescribed by the Washington Consensus, with limited evolution in a select number of policy 
areas, including with respect to capital controls and fiscal policy. Gallagher describes the 
evolution of the former that occurred during and following the IMF-coordinated responses to the 
Latin American debt crisis in the 1980’s and the East Asian financial crises in the 1990’s.12 In 
contrast to the mandatory and complete capital-account liberalization advocated by the IMF in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, the revised view placed less emphasis on rapid and complete 
liberalization. Indeed, the view advocated for capital controls in some limited instances. In the 
context of the European financial crisis, the reform view became important in, inter alia, Cyprus, 
Greece, and Ireland. With respect to fiscal policy, the IMF’s position gradually evolved 
                                                 
10 Gabor, Daniela. "The International Monetary Fund and its new economics." Development and Change 41.5 
(2010): 805-830 & Babb, Sarah. "The Washington consensus as transnational policy paradigm: its origins, trajectory 
and likely successor." Review of International Political Economy 20.2 (2013): 268-297. 
11 Broome, André. "The International Monetary Fund, crisis management and the credit crunch." Australian Journal 
of International Affairs 64.1 (2010): 37-54. & Lütz, Susanne, and Matthias Kranke. "The European rescue of the 
Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries." Review of International 
Political Economy 21.2 (2014): 310-338. 
12 Gallagher, Kevin P. "Contesting the Governance of Capital Flows at the IMF." Governance 28.2 (2015): 185-198. 
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throughout the 2000’s and early in the crisis period. Broome13 and Ban14 document this 
evolution. The former considers fiscal policy within the broader context of the IMF’s policy 
advice and shows that fiscal policy is one of a limited number of areas in which the Fund 
demonstrated substantive change. Ban describes how the gradual rejection of expansionary 
austerity occurred as a result of a confluence of factors. A receptive Managing Director, 
Dominique Strauss-Khan, hired economists sympathetic with a neo-Keynesian framework. 
These economists, crucially, were able to undermine the basis of expansionary austerity with the 
kind of models required for credibility in macroeconomic policymaking and academic circles. 
This is the approach taken by Guajardo, Leigh & Pescatori in their successful and influential 
rebuttal of Alesina’s doctrine of expansionary austerity. 
As discussed above, two strands emerged from the literature on the political business 
cycle. The first, as already discussed, involves the doctrine and eventual repudiation of 
expansionary austerity. Second, discussed below, involves what has been called the convergence 
approach. The convergence approach represented the academic analog to a transnational 
policymaking community dominated by the Washington Consensus. With governments on both 
the left and the right seemingly adopting similar policies, represented by the rise of “third-way” 
candidates such as Labour’s Tony Blair in Great Britain and the Democrat’s Bill Clinton in the 
United States, policy ostensibly converged to a neoliberal paradigm, characterized by limited 
government involvement in economic decisionmaking. This view was seemingly reinforced by 
the limited partisan effects identified in the political business cycle literature.15 Models in the 
                                                 
13 Broome, André. "Back to basics: the great recession and the narrowing of IMF policy advice." Governance 28.2 
(2015): 147-165. 
14 Ban, Cornel. "Austerity versus Stimulus? Understanding Fiscal Policy Change at the International Monetary Fund 
since the Great Recession." Governance28.2 (2015): 167-183. 
15 For a representative example, see Alesina, Perotti & Tavares (1998). 
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convergence literature frequently followed Meltzer-Richard’s approach to left-right partisan 
competition. In this competition, capital mobility is crucial, since it provides capital owners the 
ability to withdraw taxable resources (e.g., stocks and bonds) from the domestic economy; in 
these models, capital mobility drives down the equilibrium tax rate. It is this notion of 
“footloose” capital that Rodrik16 and Garrett17 seize upon in their discussions of policy 
convergence among developed economies; this insight forms the theoretical basis from which the 
convergence approach emerges. In a world populated by states competing for footloose capital, 
the convergence school predicts capital-tax rate convergence across countries at trivially low 
rates. Although the logic is strained, primarily because of limited factor mobility, similar 
arguments apply to taxes on consumption, income, and payroll. It was this proposed convergence 
that formed the basis of the neoliberal Washington Consensus.18  
At the same time that the convergence approach gained prominence, a competing vision 
of divergence emerged. In contrast to the convergence approach’s focus on the relatively liberal 
economies of Great Britain and the United States, the divergence strand emphasized continental 
Europe. Katzenstein considers how the small western European economies remain competitive 
within the global economy without losing all market share to either lower cost areas such as East 
Asia or the more lightly regulated Anglo-Saxon economies.19 Following Katzenstein, Cameron 
presents welfare-state spending and transfers as a response to citizen demands, as economies 
become more exposed to economic competition.20 The early literature, however, fails to offer a 
                                                 
16Rodrik, Dani. "Sense and nonsense in the globalization debate." Foreign Policy (1997): 19-37.  
17 Garrett, Geoffrey. Partisan politics in the global economy. Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
18 The Washington Consensus was a term first coined by John Williamson in 1989 and referred to the set of policies 
advocated by the US and US-dominated international financial institutions following the fall of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union: Williamson, John. "What Washington means by policy reform." Latin American adjustment: How 
much has happened? (1990): Chapter 2. 
19 Katzenstein, Peter J. Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe. Cornell University Press, 1985. 
20 Cameron, David R. "The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis." American political science 
review 72.04 (1978): 1243-1261. 
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compelling vision of why welfare-state economies can maintain high levels of spending, given 
the convergent pressures identified by the convergence approach. The varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) literature, which springs from the early work of Esping-Andersen, offers one nascent 
explanation for the persistence of large welfare states in competitive global markets.21 Esping-
Andersen delineates three varieties of capitalist economies, which prefigure the dichotomy 
proposed by Hall & Soskice. Hall & Soskice describe two types of capitalist economies: liberal 
market economies (LME’s) and coordinated market economies (CME’s). 22 In the former, market 
competition facilitates coordination between actors; in the latter, the government and major 
economic actors coordinate activity in order to manage market forces. The US and the UK 
provide prototypical examples of LME’s; most continental European countries operate as 
CME’s. Theoretically, the anticipated fiscal policies in these respective regimes differs. In 
LME’s tax burdens are relatively low, as the market autonomously coordinates the actions of 
economic actors; in CME’s, where the burden of coordination lies with the government, tax 
burdens are higher. 
Both convergence and divergence approaches propose limited models of domestic 
politics. The former completely ignores domestic politics; the empirics tend to confirm the 
theoretical priors of minimal partisan effects. The latter partially incorporates them, but in a 
relatively unsophisticated manner; in general, divergence models explain domestic policy 
variation as a function of institutional variation, rather than as a function of the partisan 
occupation of those institutions. For example, Hall & Soskice emphasize the policy 
consequences of different labor-market institutions. These institutions, however, are largely 
                                                 
21 Esping-Andersen, Gosta. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton University Press, 1990. 
22 Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
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exogenous to the preferences of current politicians. A separate literature attempts to explain 
variation in policy as a function of partisanship. Such models, inspired by Meltzer-Richard 
(1981), accounts for some of the variation observed.23 Meltzer-Richard models, referred to 
throughout as partisan MR approaches, have difficulty accounting for deflationary regimes 
adopted by the left, inflationary regimes adopted by the right, and the crucial presence of the 
Troika, an institution that blends domestic and international features. As an example, consider 
the broad support, on both the left and the right, for the low level of corporate taxation in Ireland. 
In negotiating Ireland’s bailout in late 2010, the Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat-Green 
coalition government refused to increase the Eurozone-low corporate tax rate of 12.5%, despite 
the complaints of French and German policymakers who decried the unfair competition and 
race-to-the-bottom dynamic engendered by Ireland’s low rate.24 Similarly, the Fine Gael-Labour 
coalition that took office in February 2011 refused to change the corporate tax rate in exchange 
for debt relief.25 The broad-based support for a low corporate tax rate cannot be explained by an 
unreformed, partisan MR model. The convergence and VoC schools also have trouble explaining 
the Irish position, but for different reasons. The convergence literature predicts that countries 
would converge to Ireland’s tax rate, while the VoC approach predicts that the Eurozone 
economies would cleave along lines related to the strength of labor-market institutions, a 
dynamic that has not been observed in the Eurozone’s country-coalitions following the crisis. 
A maturing literature has attempted to incorporate the insights of Meltzer-Richard and 
partisan conflict into models of budget-making. This literature presents two competing visions of 
                                                 
23 Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. "A rational theory of the size of government." The Journal of Political 
Economy (1981): 914-927. 
24 “Speech long on aspiration but short on inspiration.” Irish Independent. 8 December 2010. 
25 “Kenny seeks way to avoid referendum on tough EU rules.” Irish Independent. 10 December 2011. 
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budget-making: one based on partisanship, the other based on institutions.26 While fiscal policy 
falls within the purview of budget-making, the two are conceptually distinct categories; however, 
the broad contours of the budget literature, in particular the conflict between partisan and 
institutional perspectives, speaks to similar approaches with respect to to fiscal policy. Partisan 
approaches follow Meltzer-Richard in their emphasis on the median voter. Lambertini proposes a 
model in which socially liberal governments run surpluses and conservative government run 
deficits in order to capture the median voter.27 By and large, however, these models do not focus 
on the composition of the deficit. Tabellini & Alesina provides a partial exception, in which 
competing parties have differing preferences over the composition over expenditures.28 The 
institutional approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the effect of political institutions and 
budget-making rules on the size of the deficit. Hallerberg, Strauch & Von Hagen describe two 
varieties of budgeting institutions: delegation and contracts.29 In the former, a government 
delegates budgeting authority to a relatively strong finance minister. In the latter, a government 
contracts between groups of roughly similar power, i.e., parties, govern budgeting negotiations. 
In a subsequent book that expands on their initial article, the three authors demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of these systems varies as a function of governing and party system.30 Where 
coalition governments include a small number of parties with relatively homogenous policy 
preferences, the delegation model works best. Where coalition governments include a more 
                                                 
26 von Hagen, Jürgen and Rolf Strauch. Institutions, politics and fiscal policy. Vol. 2. Springer Science & Business 
Media, 2000. 
27 Lambertini, Luisa. "On the redistributive property of budget deficits." Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy. 
Springer US, 2000. 3-18. 
28 Tabellini, Guido and Alberto Alesina (1990) "Voting on the Budget Deficit'', American Economic Review, Vol.80, 
No.1. 
29 Hallerberg, Mark, Rolf Strauch, and Jürgen Von Hagen. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in 
European Union countries." European Journal of Political Economy 23.2 (2007): 338-359. 
30 Hallerberg, Mark, Rolf Rainer Strauch, and Jürgen Von Hagen. Fiscal governance in Europe. Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
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heterogeneous collection of parties, the contract model works. Crucially, the authors fail to 
explore the degree to which the budgeting system is exogenous with respect to either the political 
system or the preferences of political actors.  
Contributions of the present model 
The hybrid model makes several contributions, both theoretical and empirical, to the 
variety of literatures and sub-literatures discussed above. First, the model’s inclusion of three 
important sets of independent variables—partisanship, political capacity, and external actors—
represents an important theoretical step forward for the literature. Hitherto, the three have not 
been integrated into a comprehensive framework. In doing so, the hybrid theory mediates 
between the domestic focus of the partisan approaches and the international focus of the 
convergence and divergence approaches.  
Second, the domestic theoretical components and their empirical analogs in the hybrid 
model disaggregate the dependent variable, fiscal policy. Some of the problems underlying 
explanations for fiscal policies in the present literature stem from mis-specified levels of 
analyses. Political actors do not act at the level of aggregate fiscal policy. Such aggregation leads 
to analysis that generates preferences over the size of government or the total levels of taxation 
and spending. By defining preferences at the level of highly aggregated fiscal policies, these 
models, to a large extent, obscure the role of politics. Where policies are determined by structural 
factors, as in the convergence school, the left and right converge on the policy implied by 
competition over footloose capital. In the VoC approach, no variation is expected within the two 
types of market economies. The present model injects political realism into the study of fiscal-
policy reform. It does so by disaggregating the dependent variable and explicitly theorizing the 
political roots of observed variation in disaggregated policies.  
12 
 
Third, the hybrid model proposes a more realistic vision of domestic politics, in which 
tensions between coalition partners influence the fiscal-policy trajectory. This vision builds upon 
the reduced-form domestic politics observed in Meltzer-Richards, Tabellini & Alesina, 
Lambertini and the descendant literature. Moreover, the dissertation presents an original measure 
of parties’ economic preferences that addresses concerns related to the bluntness of the standard 
RILE measure. While the dissertation employs manifesto statements rather than adopted policy 
positions as a measure of party policy preferences, important concerns about strategic revelation 
and revealed preferences persist. To an extent, these are unavoidable without direct access to the 
thoughts of senior politicians. Concluding remarks in Chapter 8 discuss a number of potential 
venues for future research to address the issues raised by strategic revelation of preferences. 
Fourth, with respect to the convergence school, the hybrid model emphasizes the 
circumscribed nature of market pressure as a convergent force. In contrast to the diffuse, 
decentralized, but ubiquitous pressure at work in the convergence school, convergent pressure 
arises in the present model from the interaction of sovereign-bond markets and external actors. In 
this approach, the hybrid model follows the work of Mosley, which distinguishes between 
sovereign-bond market effects in developed and developing countries.31 Kaplan advances 
Mosley’s work by exploring sovereign-bond market pressure in Latin America.32 In contrast to 
the narratives of Mosley and Kaplan, where bond markets act directly upon domestic politicians, 
the hybrid model emphasizes the role played by external actors as important mediating actors 
between the pressures of bond markets and domestic politics. Put simply, external actors with 
financial resources have the greatest influence when sovereign-bond yields are high and 
domestic alternatives are limited. Thus, the model provides an explanation for why convergent 
                                                 
31 Mosley, Layna. Global capital and national governments. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
32 Kaplan, Stephen B. Globalization and austerity politics in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
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pressures vary over space and time, even when sovereign-debt yields remain constant. 
Importantly, Mosley’s and Kaplan’s analyses have trouble accounting for such change, because, 
in their models, policy change is solely a function of sovereign-bond yields and not the 
preferences and actions of external actors. These actors, however, occupy an increasingly 
important role in managing and directing crisis-country policy responses. In understanding the 
evolving role of such institutions, the present dissertation takes as its point of departure the 
pioneering works of Broome, Ban, and Gallagher discussed in the previous section. 
Alternative approaches: Individual country studies and journalistic approaches 
There has been surprisingly little academic work conducted on the politics of fiscal-
policy responses to the 2008 financial crisis. To date, the best work on fiscal policy following the 
financial crisis arises in country-specific studies, typically written by journalists. Leahy’s work 
on Ireland traces the collapse of the Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat-Green government and 
subsequent tensions within the Fine Gael-Labour government over adjustment policy.33 Leahy’s 
work does not provide a framework to extend insights to other countries; this is understandable, 
given his professional and personal interests in Ireland. On other crisis countries in Europe, 
including the bailout recipients in particular, the Troika routinely releases descriptive work on 
adopted policies.34 As part of its continuous monitoring of bailout recipients, the Troika 
publishes quarterly updates of the economic conditions and policies adopted in recipient 
countries. The Troika’s documentation, as it is almost entirely descriptive in nature, fails to 
provide either within- or across-country explanations for the variation in policies adopted. Where 
                                                 
33 Leahy (2009) traces the collapse of the Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat-Green coalition. Leahy (2013) 
examines the tensions with the Fine Gael-Labour coalition elected in response to the financial crisis. The full 
citations, respectively, are as follows: Leahy, Pat. Showtime: The inside story of Fianna Fáil in power. Penguin UK, 
2009; Leahy, Pat. The Price of Power: Inside Ireland's Crisis Coalition. Penguin UK, 2013. 
34 As one example, see Sapir, Andre, et al. The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and 
failures. Publications Office, 2014. 
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they attempt to provide such explanations, Troika publications frame fiscal-policy developments 
as emerging from a dynamic tension between efficient Troika recommendations and inefficient 
implementation by host-country governments.  
Outside of Europe, scholarship on the US-policy response tends to focus on monetary 
policy, financial institutions, and the inadequacy of regulation prior to Lehman’s failure. Lewis 
describes the policies that produced the financial crisis: a permissive regulatory government in 
the presence of significant financial-market innovation, coupled with loose monetary policy and 
political pressure to expand home ownership domestically.35 Chinn & Frieden takes a similar 
approach and arrives at similar conclusions.36 Barofsky describes the implementation of the 
troubled-asset relief package (TARP), the $700 billion stimulus package approved by President 
Bush.37 As Barofsky’s narrative makes clear, most of the ostensibly fiscal response embodied in 
TARP related the funding of banks. While there are bank-related elements to crisis policies 
adopted in the Eurozone (with respect to Ireland and Spain, in particular), the packages tend to 
be diverse and more closely related to the real economy than in both the US case in general and 
TARP in particular. A final author, Kaiser, traces the policy failures purportedly underlying the 
financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Bill, the American response to the financial 
crisis.38  
Outside of academic circles and technocratic publications, the financial press provides the 
majority of coverage. In particular, the Financial Times offers regular coverage of crisis 
                                                 
35 The full citations, respectively, for Lewis’s works most germane to the financial crisis and subsequent policy 
responses are as follows: Lewis, Michael M. Panic: The story of modern financial insanity. WW Norton & 
Company, 2009; Lewis, Michael. The big short: Inside the doomsday machine. WW Norton & Company, 2011. 
36 Chinn, Menzie D., and Jeffry A. Frieden. Lost Decades: The Making of America's Debt Crisis and the Long 
Recovery. WW Norton & Company, 2011. 
37 Barofsky, Neil. Bailout: How Washington Abandoned Main Street While Rescuing Wall Street. Simon and 
Schuster, 2013. 
38 Kaiser, Robert G. Act of Congress: How America's Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn't. Knopf, 2013. 
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countries; the FT’s focus is primarily financial, with a discussion of fiscal policies and politics 
only insofar as they affect financial markets. In the New York Times, authors such as Paul 
Krugman offer selective and frequent criticisms of the US and European policy responses. 
Studies of individual countries and daily reporting by financial reporters are particularly strong 
in tracing the events within individual countries. Where they fail is to provide a general 
framework with which to explain variation in fiscal policy across countries.  The hybrid model 
presented here provides such an approach. 
Scope conditions 
 The present study draws on evidence from the response of Eurozone countries to the 
2008 financial crisis. The countries studied include all Eurozone countries over the period 
between 2000 and 2013.39 Since they joined the Eurozone in 2014 and 2015, respectively, Latvia 
and Lithuania are excluded. The financial press has referred to a specific subset of Eurozone 
countries as PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.40 After receiving a bailout in 
2013, observers added Cyprus to the list. Rather than perpetuating the strong normative impulse 
underlying the PIIGS acronym, the present study refers to these countries as “crisis countries.” 
The current literature informs the sample used to test the hybrid model in the preset dissertation. 
Mosley describes how financial markets respond differently to political and economic events in 
                                                 
39 Eurozone countries with year of Euro adoption in parentheses include Austria (1999), Belgium (1999), Cyprus 
(2008), Estonia (2011), Finland (1999), France (1999), Germany (1999), Greece (2001), Ireland (1999), Italy 
(1999), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2015), Luxembourg (1999), Malta (2008), the Netherlands (1999), Portugal 
(1999), Slovenia (2007), Slovakia (2009), and Spain (1999). The years listed are those in which the Euro was 
adopted as a country’s accounting currency; for early adopters, there were a number of years between accounting-
based and cash-based adoption. 
40 A small constructivist literature looks at the development and consequences of the PIIGS acronym. PIGS (first 
used in reference to Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) first appeared in the financial press in a Wall Street Journal 
article: Kamm, Thomas. “Snobbery: The latest hitch in unifying Europe—Northerners sniff as ‘Club Med’ South 
clamors to join new currency.” Wall Street Journal. 6 November 1996. For an introduction to the constructivist 
literature, see Brazys, Samuel, and Niamh Hardiman. "From ‘Tiger’ to ‘PIIGS’: Ireland and the use of heuristics in 
comparative political economy." European Journal of Political Research 54.1 (2015): 23-42. 
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developed and developing countries.41 Mosley distinguishes between the strength and scope of 
financial-market reactions. Among countries with access to foreign capital, the main 
differentiator is scope, which Mosley defines as the breadth of signals used to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of a potential debtor. Creditors consider a wider range of signals when lending 
to developing countries; by contrast, creditors consider a narrow range of signals when lending 
to developed countries. Thus, creditors consider the level of debt and deficit relative to GDP 
when evaluating creditworthiness; in the context of developing countries, however, creditors also 
consider the composition of taxation and expenditure. Mosley’s study casts the Eurozone 
economies as developed; creditors thus employ a limited number of indicators to evaluate 
creditworthiness. The line between developed and developing is arbitrary, and there is no reason 
a priori for any particular Eurozone economy to be classified as either developed or developing. 
One broad interpretation of the crisis, from the perspective of financial markets, is the gradual 
devolution of the Eurozone’s peripheral economies from developed to developing economies. 
Thus, a la Mosley’s framework, creditors gradually considered a wider range of indicators in 
their evaluation of peripheral debt and thus reacted more strongly to shifts in composition of 
taxation and spending late in the crisis period; up to that point, such composition had been 
ignored, as financial markets treated the peripheral economies as developed. Applied to the 
Eurozone crisis, however, Mosley’s conceptualization of financial markets as impersonal buyers 
and sellers of debt ignores the crucial role played by the Troika in setting standards and directing 
crisis-country policy. Indeed, whereas Mosley’s narrative would describe financial-market 
participants as gradually considering a wider breadth of political and economic indicators, the 
application of the hybrid model in Chapters 4 & 5 suggest that the Troika played an important 
                                                 
41 Mosley, Layna. Global capital and national governments. Cambridge University Press, 2003: 25-49. 
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and crucial role in guiding financial markets to consider the fiscal composition of crisis countries 
more carefully. 
The Eurozone, which is an important object of study in its own right, presents an 
illuminating example with which to study fiscal-policy responses to financial crises. The political 
steps to ensure macroeconomic convergence among a large set of countries constitute an 
unprecedented step in both political and macroeconomic relations between countries. The unique 
dynamic created by such a large currency union, without either the banking or fiscal union of 
federal polities like the United States, created problems of moral hazard and principal-agent 
accountability. The financial-market implications of the former are explored in Chapter 4’s 
analysis of sovereign bond yields. The fiscal-policy implications of the latter are explored in 
Chapters 5, 6 & 7, which deal variously with the difficulties faced by the Troika (principal) in 
shaping policy and economic outcomes in the crisis countries (agents).  
In a currency union, where monetary policy is ceded to a supranational central bank, 
individual countries cannot respond autonomously with monetary policy to macroeconomic 
developments.42 Without either monetary policy or exchange-rate interventions with which to 
respond to either financial or macroeconomic shocks, countries adjust through changes in fiscal 
policy—this represents the common distinction drawn between external adjustment (devaluation) 
and internal adjustment (austerity). The Eurozone’s limited monetary-policy autonomy of 
countries within the Eurozone parallels the situation faced by many developed countries; Chapter 
8 explores these parallels in greater depth. While countries with independent central banks 
                                                 
42 Countries can, however, lobby for the adoption of monetary policy change at the supranational level, which in the 
Eurozone’s case is the European Central Bank (ECB). This creates some room for countries to effect monetary 
policy change. This dynamic implies that the problem with ceding monetary policy authority to a supranational 
entity is not a problem, in principle, for adjustment to macroeconomic developments. Ceding policy autonomy only 
becomes a problem when there is substantial macroeconomic divergence among currency-union members. The 
difficulties posed by such divergence may be compounded by ideological differences between member states that 
attribute macroeconomic divergence to different causes. 
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outside of currency unions retain the ability to adjust with either monetary policy or devaluation, 
the convergence of monetary policies to the nominal zero-lower bound (ZLB) means that 
countries are increasingly forced to adjust through fiscal-policy. Chapter 5 explores the effects of 
the ZLB on Eurozone economies in greater depth. 
The ZLB thus provides a constraint below which conventional monetary policy is no 
longer an option. The limits to conventional monetary policy provides the basis for applying the 
hybrid model to a wider set of countries. The ZLB provides a point of contact between the 
present model and the situations of the US, UK, and Japan. The situation of these, and other, 
countries that do not interfere in currency markets at the ZLB approximates the conditions faced 
by the Eurozone’s crisis economies.  
Overview of proposed theory 
The following schematic attempts to provide an explanation for the fiscal policies 
adopted by countries during and following financial crises. Figure 1 displays the main 
independent and dependent variables employed by the hybrid model. The model proposes three 
sets of independent variables: political capacity, partisanship, and external actors. These 
variables work in concert to explain variation in the dependent variable, the fiscal policies 




Figure 1. Schematic of the hybrid model’s theoretical logic. Variables are listed in bold, additional detail 
information related to operationalization. 
Political capacity constrains the ability of governments to draft and implement 
controversial legislation. As operationalized in subsequent chapters, the model describes political 
capacity as a function of policy agreement between parties in government. It does not relate to 
conflict within parties; Chapters 3 & 7 explore the implications of this modelling decision. The 
hybrid model differentiates between two types of governments: primary-cleavage consonance 
governments (PCC’s) and primary-cleavage dissonance governments (PCD’s). In the former, 
parties in government largely agree on primary-cleavage policy; in the latter, parties in 
government disagree on primary-cleavage policy. In the context of financial crises, fiscal policy 
is assumed to be the primary-cleavage policy. This is plausible in Eurozone economies within 
the context of financial crises, when economic policy is particularly salient and where monetary 
policy and exchange-rate adjustment are constrained. Outside of the Eurozone, analogous 
approaches would need to include a wider range of economic policies, including, but not limited 
to, monetary policy and exchange-rate interventions.43 To the extent that political parties have 
                                                 
43 Examples abound of monetary policy changes and exchange-rate intervention in non-Eurozone countries in 
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preferences of particular fiscal outcomes, partisanship influences fiscal-policy outcomes. 
Whereas previous studies conceptualize parties on the traditional left and the traditional right, the 
approach taken here develops a nuanced measure of partisanship, derived particularly as it relates 
to fiscal policy, from party manifestos.  
Parties, however, are not able to implement their policy preferences directly. On the one 
the hand, a governing party is constrained domestically by political capacity and the preferences 
of current and future coalition partners. On the other hand, a governing party is constrained 
internationally by external actors, whose preferences over policies, if not outcomes, frequently 
differ from those of domestic politicians. The dashed line extending from external actors 
indicates that the constraint is not always binding. The relative influence of external actors 
depends on both demand- and supply-side conditions. On the demand side, governments resort to 
external actors when bond yields exceed either their willingness or ability to pay. On the supply 
side, the domestic influence of external actors varies as a function of the number of external 
actors, the preference homogeneity of external actors, and the prior position of the external actors 
in the domestic economy.  
Partisanship 
The present model distinguishes between parties and coalitions. Parties are sets of 
individuals, as shown in Figure 2, differentiated by primary sources of incomes: corporate, 
middle class, public sector, and working class.44 The groups appear as such when arrayed on a 
left-right spectrum: 
                                                 
reached the zero-lower bound prior to the government’s implementing wide-ranging austerity. Switzerland provides 
an example of the latter. In January 2015, the Swiss National Bank (Switzerland’s central bank) sold Swiss Francs in 
order to relieve pressure of the Frank, in response to investors buying the Frank as a relatively safe asset amid global 
turmoil.  
44 The hybrid model could accommodate a larger set of individuals. Given the pertinent cases, these groups strike a 
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Figure 2. Parties aligned along a conventional left-right spectrum. 
Coalitions are combinations of parties that form, depending on the circumstances, 
temporary or permanent alliances to either enter government or pass legislation. In principle, a 
coalition may include only a single party. This most often occurs with respect to single-party 
majority governments, as in Spain and Portugal. However, because of majority requirements for 
the passage of legislation, coalitions typically contain more than one party. Even in Spain’s 
single-party Socialist governments, the PSOE required the cooperation of regional parties to pass 
particularly controversial legislation. As the case studies of Chapter 6 & 7 underscore, politics in 
the Eurozone revolves around coalitions. 
Figure 2 displays policy preferences along a left-right scale that has been adopted in most 
of the literature. Partisan MR models produce clear hypotheses about party preferences over 
fiscal policies. In general, the public sector and the working class favor more spending and more 
taxes; corporate interests and the middle class, on the other hand, favor less spending and less 
severe taxes. In contrast to partisan models that take these preferences as given, the hybrid 
model’s policy preferences emerge endogenously as a function of the individual’s preference to 
maximize income. 45 In this framework, the partisan model’s left-right preference over tax-and-
spend policies is shown not to hold in general. When multiple categories of taxation and 
spending are considered, parties on the traditional right and left have varying preferences over 
different categories of fiscal policy. 
Hypotheses over partisanship: Preferences over the dependent variable 
                                                 
45 Hibbs, Douglas A. "Political parties and macroeconomic policy." American political science review 71.04 (1977): 
1467-1487. 
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In partisan models, the left favors increased taxes and spending, and the right favors 
decreased taxes and spending. These models have trouble accounting for a left party cutting 
spending or a right party raising taxes, actions observed in the years following the 2008 financial 
crisis. The empirical failure stems from the theoretical failure to account for the varied 
distributional implications of different taxation and spending measures. Such variation in 
distributional consequences is the motivating theoretical impulse behind the present model. 
Because left-right preferences do not arise from ideology in the hybrid model, the left does not 
necessarily favor more spending and more taxes; likewise, the right does not necessarily favor 
less spending and less severe taxes. Each of these groups favors policy changes insofar as these 
changes increase group income.  
In the hybrid model, parties seek to maximize the income of their constituencies. The 
model considers four types of taxation: consumption, income, social security, and corporate. 46  
Consumption taxes are taxes on goods and services, excluding real estate, applied at the time of 
purchase. Examples include value-added taxes, excise taxes, and general service taxes. One 
feature that makes consumption taxes politically attractive is their rapid translation into revenue, 
relative to other forms of taxation. Income taxes refer to taxes paid on personal income. 
Corporate taxes include taxes on corporate income as well as on financial instruments. Thus, 
capital-gains taxes are included as a subset of corporate taxation. These taxes are not organized 
as they would be in an accounting text. Rather, they are grouped according to their distributional 
implications. It is with these implications in mind, rather than the formal accounting definitions, 
that parties design packages of fiscal policy. Changes in each of these measures produce distinct 
                                                 
46 With both taxation and spending measures, the model could consider a wider set of policy instruments. As with 
the analysis of political parties, however, the model must balance the related concerns of empirical plausibility and 
analytical tractability.  
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distributional consequences across individuals and therefore produces different effects in 
coalition politics. 
The model distinguishes between two broad types of government spending: public-sector 
employment and social benefits.47 Once again, the model departs from accounting-based 
classifications in order to capture the distributional implications of different policies. Public-
sector spending includes wages, pensions, and social services targeted directly to the public 
sector. Social benefits include healthcare, unemployment, and social-support programs that are 
not exclusively targeted towards the public sector. As with taxes, preferences over spending 
measures are a function of the composition of income. Table 1 displays the specific hypotheses 
linking preferences of political parties with fiscal policies advocated. For example, where the 
working class is largely distinct from the public sector, the working class favors reduced public-
sector spending and increased spending on social benefits. The public sector favors spending on 
public-sector employment; where the public sector constitutes a large portion of the middle class, 
the middle class also prefers high levels of spending on public-sector employment. Social 
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47 An important extension involves bank-related spending, the importance of which varied across the sample. In 
Ireland and Spain, governments and external actors contributed significant financial resources to rescue banks. In 
other cases, including Portugal and the first Greek bailout, bank-related spending featured less prominently. 
48 Important variation in preferences over fiscal policy exists within these income groups. Mares (2003) shows the 
importance of inter-group coalitions when, for example, government intervention offers the opportunity to shift 
costs away from the private sector. Once again, however, the model ignores such heterogeneity over concerns of 
analytical tractability. For more on inter-group coalitions, see Mares, Isabela. The politics of social risk: Business 
and welfare state development. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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Public sector Social benefits 
Table 1. Policy preferences (columns) by party (rows). The first column lists the four primary constituencies 
considered in the present study: corporate, middle class, public sector, and working class. The second and third 
columns indicate opposing positions on tax increases; the fourth and fifth columns indicate opposing positions on 
spending cuts. Within each cell are particular policy measures. 
Both the parties and the policies documented in Table 1 represent ideal types. 
Empirically, overlap in parties is observed, particularly in the middle two categories: the middle 
class and public sector. Where the public sector accrues sufficient resources to enter the middle 
class, the public sector assumes the middle-class, ideal-type preferences, with the important 
exception of continued opposition to public-sector cuts. In a given election cycle, the hybrid 
model treats occupational characteristics and party membership as given. This does not hold in 
the long run, as individuals move between income strata with shifts in occupation. Various 
parties gained and lost critical masses of supporters in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Examples 
of parties that gained dramatic vote shares include Syriza in Greece; Five Star Movement in 
Italy; and Ciudadanos and Podemos in Spain. In each of these countries, emergent parties took 
vote share from mainstream parties on both the left and the right.  
The policies presented are also ideal types. While an improvement upon highly 
aggregated measures of fiscal policy,49 the typology elides tremendous within-category variation. 
In a given electoral cycle, parties design policy that deviates from the ideal-type, tax-and-spend 
measures listed in Table 1. For example, in coalition with the public sector, a middle-class party 
may design income-tax increases that differentially target either the wealthy or the poor. Such 
nuanced strategies are most apparent in the cases of income taxes and social spending, in which 
                                                 
49 Most studies of austerity politics employ measures such as government spending as a percentage of GDP. For 
representative examples, see the following: De Grauwe, Paul, and Yuemei Ji. "Panic-driven austerity in the 
Eurozone and its implications." VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal, 21 February 2013. Web. http://www.voxeu.org/article/ 
panic-driven-austerity-eurozone-and-its-implications & Krugman, Paul. (2013). “Paul De Grauwe and the Rehn of 




seemingly insignificant shifts in tax brackets and targeted populations produce stark 
distributional consequences. As these examples suggest, parties do not deal in ideal types; rather 
they tailor policy to account for voter preferences and distributional consequences. However, an 
important part of modeling requires restricting the variation to be explained; while there is a 
large amount of variation in fiscal policies left unexplained by the hybrid model, the hybrid 
model explains an important and substantial portion of existing variation. 
Connecting coalitions and preferred policies: Political capacity and external actors 
Table 1 depicts preferences over adjustment policy. These preferences, in part, drive 
fiscal-policy outcomes. Preferences, however, are not translated directly into policy. Political 
entrepreneurs face a number of constraints when they attempt to translate party preferences into 
policy. Figure 1’s schematic presents two of these constraints. The first is political capacity—
operationalized in subsequent chapters as consonance within the governing coalition—and 
operates at all times. The second constraint involves external actors, which exert varying degrees 
of pressure on domestic constituencies. Subsequent sections discuss each in turn.  
Hypotheses over political capacity 
Setting aside the preferences of political parties, the capacity of governments to 
implement policy reforms varies across space and time. The ability to implement reform, 
regardless of ideological preference, is referred to as political capacity. While a number of 
dimensions characterize political capacity, the hybrid model emphasizes the preference 
homogeneity of governing parties, i.e., consonance. Consonance refers to the relative level of 
programmatic agreement between governing parties. Primary-cleavage consonance (PCC) 
governments have parties that agree on primary-cleavage policy. Primary-cleavage dissonance 
(PCD) governments have parties that disagree on primary-cleavage policy. Table 2 shows the 
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breakdown of PCC’s and PCD’s over the sample. The left and right columns list consonant and 
dissonant governments, respectively.  
PCC governments PCD governments 
Greece’s alternating single-party 
governments between 2003 and 
2011; Portugal’s socialist 
governments between 2005 and 
2011;  Spain over the entire period;  
Greece’s grand coalition in 2013; 
Ireland FF-GR-PD coalition 
between 2007 and 2011; Italy’s 
grand coalition starting in 2013;   
Table 2. Levels of consonance for selected crisis governments. The columns indicate primary-cleavage consonance 
and primary-cleavage dissonance between governing parties. 
Single-party governments are, by definition, PCC. An example of a PCC coalition is 
Portugal’s coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Social Democratic 
Center-Popular Party (CDS-PP) elected in June 2011. PSD is a center-right party with a mass 
constituency; CDS-PP is a right party with a business constituency. In PCD’s the coalition 
partners disagree on primary-cleavage policy. An example of a PCD is the coalition government 
of Fine Gail (FG) and Labour in Ireland elected in February 2011. FG is a center-right party; 
Labour is a center-left party. Uniting parties on the left and right, grand coalitions are almost 
always PCD’s. This was the case following Greece’s 2012 elections, with a grand coalition of 
PASOK-New Democracy-Democratic Left.  
Hypothesis: Adjustment is increasing in political capacity. This stems from two related effects. 
High-consonance governments secure adjustment along lines beneficial to their respective 
constituencies. Low-consonance governments, which are typically riven by internal differences, 
implement limited reforms. Thus, in the aggregate, high-consonance governments implement 
deeper reforms than low-consonance governments. 
 Chapter 7’s case studies seek to disentangle the effects of external actors from the effects 
of the decreased consonance that accompanies grand coalitions. The relevant endogeneity poses 
a particular problem for identifying the effects of political capacity on fiscal-policy outcomes. 
Consider the case of Italy: the pressure applied by external actors drove voters away from the 
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two mainstream parties, the center-left Democrats (PD) and the center-right People of Liberty 
(PDL), and into Beppe Grillo’s anti-establishment, Eurosceptic Five Star Movement. To secure a 
majority in parliament following the February 2013 general election, the PD and PDL entered 
government as a grand coalition and limited fiscal-policy reform, amid paralysis induced by 
disagreement within the governing coalition. In that case, however, it was the pressure from 
external actors and bond markets that produced a grand coalition. Absent such pressure, and 
without the necessary acquiescence of financial markets, Grillo’s Five Star Movement would 
like have participated in Italy’s government. Thus, it is only in a proximate sense that low 
consonance drove Italy’s fiscal-policy response; but, ultimately, that consonance reflected the 
external financial context. Such endogeneity poses a particularly significant problem for Chapter 
3’s large-N analysis; Chapter 7’s qualitative approach reduce the risk of spurious influence by 
parsing the relative effects. 
Hypotheses over external actors 
In order to fund policy initiatives and distribute rents to particular constituencies, 
governments require financial resources. These resources come from three principle sources: tax 
base, capital-market borrowing, and external actors. In good economic times, almost all funds 
come from the former two; states running current-account deficits draw a relatively larger 
proportion of their income from capital markets compared with states running either surpluses or 
balanced current accounts. These two sources of funds tend to produce fewer constraints 
compared with funds provided by external actors. However, revenue from taxation and capital-
market funding are neither unlimited nor costless, particularly in turbulent economic times. On 
the one hand, the tax base is constrained both by time horizon as well as the size of the domestic 
economy. On the other hand, capital-market borrowing is constrained by prevailing interest rates. 
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When these rates exceed a country’s debt-servicing capacity, a threshold frequently passed in 
turbulent economic periods, the country is locked out of debt markets. In such circumstances, 
states may resort to external actors for the necessary funds. Insofar as external actors have 
preferences over policy that diverge from domestic policymakers, these actors introduce an 
additional constraint on domestic coalition bargaining.  
The hybrid model implies that bond yields influence fiscal-policy outcomes. However, 
bond-yield changes may be endogenous to domestic policy decisions. Policy decisions may drive 
changes in bond yields, which in turn drive a country to external actors. This is quite different 
from countries implementing reforms in response to the demands of external actors. Such 
endogeneity is what makes contagion particularly useful from an analytical perspective. This 
phenomenon, explored in Chapter 4, shows that, in many cases, the bond-yield co-movements of 
a given a country are exogenous to the policy decisions taken in that country. Instead, the yield 
movement reflects changes in another country. An example of such movement involves the 
Troika’s negotiations with Greece throughout 2011 and 2012 that drove spreads in other 
peripheral Eurozone economies. Where possible, the analysis distinguishes between bond-yield 
movements that stem from domestic (endogenous) policy decisions and international 
(exogenous) circumstances.  
Hypothesis (over demand conditions): Aggregate adjustment is increasing with bond-yield 
pressure, as domestic policymakers implement conditional reforms in exchange for funds and/or 
liquidity.  
Particularly in the first two years of the crisis, the Troika had well-defined preferences 
over adjustment policy. The Troika favored spending cuts over tax increases. Even with a unified 
Troika in the first two years, the Troika faced internal resistance to its announced policies. As 
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with respect to domestic actors, the preferences of external actors are not directly translated into 
policy. The policy influence of external actors is conditioned by the number of external actors, 
the homogeneity of their preferences, and their prior position in the crisis area. The first two 
variables affect domestic policymaking through the standard collective action logic. As Olson’s 
logic (1965) suggests, ease of cooperation among actors decreases in the number of actors and 
the diversity of preferences among these actors.50 Such difficulty may manifest through domestic 
policymakers’ playing one set of actors off of another (strategic conflicts) or through pre-existing 
conflicts of interests that impede cooperation regardless of the actions of domestic policymakers 
(structural conflicts). Chapter 5 explores how the emergent preference heterogeneity within the 
Troika beginning in the second year of the first Greek bailout. The IMF, with its emphasis on 
debt sustainability, argued that Greece’s debt load was unsustainable and had to be restructured. 
Within the context of the IMF’s charter, such sustainability is particularly important, since the 
IMF cannot lend to insolvent countries. The ECB, with primary responsibility for Eurozone 
liquidity and the near-term real economic effects of liquidity risk, argued against debt reductions, 
based on their hypothesized implications on Eurozone banks. The deal that emerged between the 
ECB and the IMF was a compromise between the two positions, with debt restructuring limited 
to the private-sector holdings of Greek debt. 
The final variable, extent of prior position in the crisis area, involves the pre-existing 
financial stake of the external actors in a particular area. The willingness of external actors to 
impose harsh terms on a country is decreasing in the extent of prior position. Returning to the 
second Greek bailout, prior positions produced important implications for the willingness of 
Troika policymakers to impose restructuring on private-sector holdings of Greek debt. Cypriot 
                                                 
50 Olson, Mancur. The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, 1965. 
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banks and companies held significant portions of Greek debt. Indeed, in relative terms, Cypriot 
banks were far more exposed to Greek bonds than were the banking systems of another major 
Eurozone economy. Notwithstanding the detrimental implications for the Cypriot position, 
Because of the limited exposure of French and German banks, the Troika was willing to impose 
losses on the private-sector holders of Greek debt. Where either external actors or dominant 
constituencies within these actors do not hold extensive positions in a target country, the external 
actor will be more willing to impose bankruptcy, as the value of the actors’ assets will be 
relatively un-affected. 
Hypothesis (over supply conditions): Aggregate adjustment decreases in the number of external 
actors, the heterogeneity of their interests, and the extent of their prior position in the domestic 
economy. 
 The discussion surrounding political capacity and external actors provides important 
insights into the role of domestic partisanship on fiscal policies adopted in response to financial 
crises. It is only in a special set of circumstances that parties translate the preferences from Table 
1 directly into policy. In particular, two conditions must be satisfied for governing parties to 
translate preferences into policy: first, the governing coalition must be PCC; second, the 
influence of external actors must be mitigated, either as a function of supply or demand 
dynamics. These conditions provide a baseline from which to expect Table 1’s preferences to be 
directly implemented in fiscal-policy outcomes. 
Hypothesis: Policy preferences are most clearly translated into policy under conditions of 
programmatic consonance and marginalized external actors. Deviation from each of these 
characteristics dilutes the translation of Table 1 policy preferences into policy outcomes. 
Outline of book 
31 
 
 The remainder of the book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents the data 
employed to measure the study’s various independent and dependent variables. In addition, the 
chapter introduces the empirical strategy used to characterize each set of relationships implied by 
Figure 1. Depending on the available sources, the characteristics of relevant variables, and the 
precedent set in prior literature, the study employs a combination of large-N regression methods, 
intermediate-N quantitative approaches, event studies (with respect to the actions of external 
actors), and case studies (with respect to individual countries and governments). Chapter 3 
presents a combination of less formal quantitative approaches and fixed-effects regressions. 
Chapters 4 & 5 address different dimensions of external-actor pressure on Eurozone countries. 
Chapter 4 employs factor analysis to explore contagion dynamics and bond-yield variation over 
the sample period. The chapter corrects important portions of conventional wisdom, particularly 
that related to the correlation of bond-yield movements within the so-called “PIIGS”—referred 
to here as a crisis countries—and between crisis and non-crisis countries. Chapter 5 employs an 
event-study approach to evaluate the effectiveness of external actors in shaping Eurozone 
member-countries’ fiscal policies. The chapter considers only a subset of the universe of actions 
taken by external actors. These include bailouts, shifts in the nominal interest rate, large-scale 
refinancing operations, and EU-wide legislation related to fiscal policy. In Chapters 6 & 7, the 
emphasis shifts away from the pressure exerted by external actors and towards the study’s 
remaining independent variables: partisanship and political capacity. Chapter 6 juxtaposes case 
studies of Spain and Portugal to explore how changes in the partisan hue of governing coalitions 
drives changes in fiscal policy. The chapter primarily relies on within-country analysis but 
concludes with a comparison of partisan politics between the two countries. As in Chapter 3, 
where unobserved heterogeneity between countries poses a concern for inferences based on 
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between-country analysis, the conclusions drawn from Chapter 6’s cross-country comparison 
should be treated as tentative. Chapter 7 juxtaposes analyses of Greece and Italy to explore how 
changes in consonance, one measure of political capacity, drive changes in fiscal policy. As in 
Chapter 6, Chapter 7 relies primarily on within-country analysis, comparing the fiscal policy 
negotiations and outputs between governments within individual countries. Both Chapter 6 & 7 
discuss the case studies in the context of Chapter 3’s statistical analyses. In particular, the weak 
statistical findings in Chapter 3, related to the role of consonance in fiscal-policy, receives 
extended attention in Chapter 7. The eighth and final chapter concludes with a reflection on how 
the various results presented in Chapters 3 through 7 validate and refine the hybrid model 
presented in Chapter 1. Importantly, Chapter 8 situates the findings of past chapters into ongoing 
debates within the literature. In addition, the concluding chapter discusses a number of possible 
extensions of the present research agenda, with an eye towards both future financial crises as 
well as countries and regions likely to face strong pressure in the medium- and long-term.
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Chapter 2: Data, methods & empirical strategy 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter 2 introduces the data, methods, and empirical strategy employed in the 
subsequent chapters. The chapter divided into three sections. The first section is a 
methodologically-motivated literature review, which discusses the literature’s prior approaches 
to studying adjustment policy and how these studies characterized and identified the effects of 
economic and political variables. The second section discusses, in turn, the three independent 
variables that form the core of the hybrid model: political capacity, partisanship, and external 
actors. The third section discusses the study’s dependent variable, fiscal policy.  
  Literature review 
The study’s empirical strategy relies on cross-country comparisons and within-country 
analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, of policymaking during and following the 2008 
financial crisis. Methodologically, the present approach draws on the early contributions of 
Garrett (1998)1, Hall & Soskice (2001)2, and Simmons (1997)3, along with the more recent 
contributions of Häusermann (2010)4 and Woll (2014).5 Simmons employs a combination of 
case studies and regressions by country-year to explore the factors influencing departure from 
the gold standard, an early example of adjustment policy. While the bulk of her study relies on 
cross-country regressions that span the decade following the Great Depression, Simmons 
                                                 
1 Garrett, Geoffrey. Partisan politics in the global economy. Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
2 Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
3 Simmons, Beth A. Who adjusts?: Domestic sources of foreign economic policy during the interwar years. 
Princeton University Press, 1997. 
4 Häusermann, Silja. The politics of welfare state reform in continental Europe: Modernization in hard times. 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 




includes a separate chapter on France’s particularly unstable period between 1924 and 1927. 
Over this period, several coalition governments presided, each with varying implications for 
adjustment policy. In the present work, Chapters 3 through 7 adopt the dual, regression and case-
study approach, of Simmons and Garrett. The closest direct analog in the present case to the 
departure from the Gold Standard is exit from the Euro. Unlike in the interwar period, in which 
countries departed from the Gold Standard, there has been fairly limited reasonable political 
discourse (the sole exception involves some discussion prior to and following the second Greek 
bailout) surrounding exit from the prevailing exchange rate system, the Euro.6 While Simmons 
restricts her substantive scope to departure from the gold standard, the present study considers a 
different dimension of adjustment policy: fiscal policy. In the most recent financial crisis, the key 
decisions facing Western European governments involved, inter alia, how to adjust fiscal 
policies to avoid sovereign default. The present study emphasizes Eurozone countries because of 
relative similarity of the broader policy space for adjustment; for these countries, external 
devaluation is not an option. In addition, the form of political intermediation—parliamentary 
politics characterized by relatively strong parties—is broadly similar across the sample. 
Woll compares bank bailouts across a handful of European countries. Woll’s particular 
substantive interest involves the relationship between financial-industry organization and 
banking-policy responses to the financial crisis. The present study follows Woll along two 
primary dimensions: the first relates to the operationalization of the dependent variable; the 
                                                 
6 There has been serious discussion of Greece’s exiting the Eurozone in the negotiations over the third bailout. These 
discussions fall outside the sample of this study which runs between 2000 and 2013 of the present study. The debate 
highlights that even exogenous factors, such as continued membership in the Eurozone, taken for granted in both 
academic and journalistic debate, are endogenous to the political process. Remaining in the Eurozone is a political 
choice that is periodically, if not continuously, reaffirmed by domestic politicians. For the purposes of the present 
study, it is enough that the Eurozone be viewed by politicians as costly to exit. This almost certainly seems to be the 
case, as all except the most extreme political parties in Eurozone’s member-countries advocate remaining in the 
Eurozone. This is not to say, however, that mainstream politicians always agree with policy consequences of 
remaining in the Eurozone. 
35 
 
second relates to the form of controlled comparisons adopted in Chapters 6 & 7. With respect to 
the dependent variable, Woll develops a framework to allow cross-country comparison by 
classifying domestic responses to financial crises into four broad categories: recapitalization, 
banking guarantees, asset relief, and other liquidity provision. Woll admits that her 
categorization is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. She argues that it does, however, 
capture a large portion of systematically important variation within a relatively tractable 
analytical framework. Chapter 3 through 7 adopt an analogous approach to fiscal policy, dividing 
it into two broad categories: taxation and spending. These are further disaggregated into four 
(consumption, income, social-security, and corporate) and two (social benefits and public sector) 
subcategories, respectively. This approach is a marked difference from past studies of austerity. 
At their most aggregated, these studies consider the deficit as a proportion of GDP. A second, 
slightly more nuanced approach, considers the two primary subcomponents of the deficit: 
taxation and spending. Importantly, some the differing conceptualizations reflect a genuine 
interest in a fundamentally different dependent variable and a different set of research questions. 
However, when applied to questions of political processes, the prevalent measures of austerity 
are demonstrably inadequate, given the diverse distributional implications of underlying policies. 
It is important to note that, as with Woll’s approach, the disaggregated measure of fiscal policy 
adopted here does not capture all possible empirical variation in the dependent variable; the 
approach taken here, however, captures a non-trivial portion of important variation within the 
context a relatively tractable analytical framework. 
The present dissertation also adopts Woll’s style of controlled comparisons. Chapters 6 & 
7 identify countries and political situations that differ along relevant independent variables and 
assess how these differences contribute to observed variation in fiscal-policy outcomes. Chapter 
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6 evaluates the role of partisanship by comparing governments in Portugal and Spain. Chapter 7 
evaluates the role of political capacity by comparing the performance of governments in Greece 
and Italy. In contrast to Woll’s approach, Chapters 6 & 7 explore variation within the individual 
countries over time to provide additional leverage with which to evaluate the model’s proposed 
explanatory factors. Crucially, this set-up does allows neither Woll’s nor the present study to 
control for all independent variables. With respect to the hybrid model presented in Chapter 1, 
there are a number of variables excluded for the pragmatic reasons of analytical tractability and 
difficulty of measurement. The concerns about endogeneity, noted in Chapter 1’s discussion of 
the independent variables, introduce a subset of these concerns. Two additional potential omitted 
variables deserve mention, particularly given their importance to past approaches in the 
literature. First, the model ignores private-sector bond holders as a separate actor.7 Although, in 
principle, these might be included as a variety of external actor, they are largely ignored in the 
present context because of the dominant role played by national governments in the sovereign-
debt crisis. In the few situations where they feature prominently, private-sector bondholders are 
effectively coerced by supranational institutions, as in the private-sector involvement in the 
second Greek bailout. Second, an expanded model might include a richer organizational 
complexity, including trade unions and employer organizations. These are stressed in 
Hausermann’s accounts of pension reform in Europe and are featured as a defining characteristic 
of CME’s in the typology of Hall & Soskice. They are excluded in the hybrid model in favor of 
an expanded model of party competition and cooperation. 
                                                 
7 Private-sector bondholders feature prominently in Aggarwal’s account of negotiations between developing 
economies negotiating to reduce their debt burden. The full citation is as follows: Aggarwal, Vinod K. Debt games: 




Notwithstanding potentially omitted variables and related concerns with endogeneity, the 
present work adopts a framework of controlled comparisons, because large-scale, socioeconomic 
phenomenon are nearly impossible to study in an experimental framework. Adopting an 
experimental approach would enslave the study to a narrow lens of identification that would 
likely only apply, albeit precisely, to a small portion of the fiscal policy space. In the larger 
trade-off between substantive importance and identification, the present approach emphasizes 
substantive importance while bearing in mind the potential pitfalls of a framework that lacks 
perfect causal identification. One way, already mentioned, that the present study deals with the 
identification problem and departs from Woll’s framework is by considering individual countries 
and shifting coalitions over time.  
In explaining fiscal-policy responses, the present dissertation emphasizes political parties 
and coalitions. The political logic and mechanisms draw on Hausermann’s exploration of 
continental welfare-state reform. In particular, Häusermann (2010) explores the importance of 
political parties, unions, and employer organizations to explain pension reform. The present 
study adopts Häusermann’s approach to coding the positions of political parties. Using party 
statements and documents, Häusermann attempts to identify party preferences. Acknowledging 
that strategic incentives may prevent parties from revealing their true preferences, Häusermann 
measures preferences well prior to the reform. Such temporal distance ameliorates, but does not 
eliminate, concerns over strategic revelation. The present case studies follow Häusermann in the 
coding of party preferences prior to bargaining periods. In particular, the present approach relies 
on the Comparative Manifesto Project as a source of party preferences.8 
                                                 
8 Volkens, Andrea, Lehmann, Pola, Merz, Nicolas, Regel, Sven, Werner, Annika with Lacewell Onawa Promise, 
Schultze, Henrike (2014): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 







The type of coalition in government produces important implications for fiscal policies. 
Subsequent chapters employ two broad approaches to conduct within-country analysis. The 
dissertation largely employs within- rather than between-country analyses, because differing 
political contexts between countries increases the risk of unmodelled heterogeneity. For 
example, consider the conservative parties of Italy and Spain. Italy’s People of Liberty is a 
diverse coalition of populist, xenophobic, Eurosceptic, and business interests. Spain’s Popular 
Party is relatively homogeneous and pro-business. While both are to the right of the respective 
left parties in each country (the Democratic Party in Italy and the PSOE in Spain), it is not clear 
in a regression context whether a “1 percent move to the right” is comparable in the two 
countries. The present dissertation conducts within-country analysis with two primary methods, 
one quantitative, and the other qualitative. First, Chapter 3 employs fixed-effects regression. 
Second, Chapter 6 introduces a set of case studies that evaluate the role partisanship over time 
within individual countries. In particular, Chapter 6 compares governments of different hues 
within Portugal and Spain. In addition to the within-country approach, there is limited between-
country analysis. The latter analysis should not be taken as the main empirical test of Chapter 1’s 
hybrid model. The broad comparison, however, is illustrative and helpful to understanding the 




 There are a number of ways to measure the preferences of political parties. The present 
dissertation relies on and derives measures from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP).9 The 
CMP codes party manifestoes released prior to elections. The manifestoes are broken down into 
a series of statements, called “quasi-sentences.” Each quasi-sentence is then coded as belonging 
to a certain category, e.g., “Free Market Economy,” “Market Regulation,” “Keynesian Demand 
Management,” etc. When aggregated, the codings of quasi-sentences, generate a number 
indicating the proportion of a given manifesto dedicated to each topic. This proportion is then 
used as indicator of the topic’s importance for a given party. 
Because their derivation is less than intuitive, this section presents an example derivation 
and then walks through an example showing how subsequent chapters employ the derivations.  
CMP’s RILE measure is the traditional indicator used to measure the RIght-LEft positions of 
political parties. As Table 1 indicates, RILE includes several policy dimensions beyond either 
fiscal policy in particular or economic policy in general. Historically, these dimensions have 
been highly correlated. However, with the opening up of the European party space with the 
arrival of the Greens and ecological movements in the 1970’s and the more recent processes of 
deindustrialization and increasing economic importance of services, these dimensions have 
become less correlated.10 Table 1 includes the RILE measure as a point of reference; however, 
the dissertation relies more heavily on the MODRILE measure. Effectively, as can be seen in the 
bottom row of Table 1, MODRILE is constructed by extracting the economic policy dimension 
from the original RILE measure. Thus, for example, “Traditional Morality: Positive” is removed 
since it is not related, in any direct sense, to preferences of fiscal policy. 
                                                 
9 Volkens, Andrea, et al. 2014. 
10 See Kitschelt (1994) for the former and Hausermann (2010) for the latter. The complete citation for Kitschelt is as 




Name of measure Derivation of measure 
CMP’s RILE (Military: Positive + Freedom and Human Rights + 
Constitutionalism: Positive + Political Authority + Free 
Market Economy + Incentives + Protectionism: 
Negative + Economic Orthodoxy + Welfare State 
Limitation + National Way of Life: Positive + 
Traditional Morality: Positive + Law and Order: 
Positive + Civic Mindedness: Positive) - (Anti-
imperialism + Military: Negative + Peace + 
Internationalism: Positive + Market Regulation + 
Economic Planning + Protectionism: Positive + 
Controlled Economy + Nationalization + Welfare State 
Expansion + Education Expansion + Labour Groups: 
Positive + Democracy) 
MODRILE (Free Market Economy + Incentives + Protectionism: 
Negative + Economic Orthodoxy + Welfare State 
Limitation) - (Market Regulation + Economic Planning 
+ Protectionism: Positive + Controlled Economy + 
Nationalization +Welfare State Expansion + Education 
Expansion + Labour Groups: Positive) 
Table 1. Measures employed to estimate party positions. The left-hand column indicates the names used to identify 
particular measures. The right-hand column indicates the combination of indicators used to calculate a given 
measure. For details of individual indicators, see Volkens, et al. 2014.  
 
Figure 1 provides an example that illustrates the presentation of the data in subsequent 
chapters. As a first take, Figure 1’s left-hand-side panel presents the CMP’s RILE measure. Each 
party is positioned at a different point along the horizontal axis and is labelled according to a 
standard abbreviation. In the Irish case, the Green and Labour parties are both labelled with their 
full names. Sinn Fein, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and the Progressive Democrats are indicated with 
SF, FF, FG, and PD, respectively. Along the vertical axes for the RILE and MODRILE graphs, 
the left-most positions are negative and the right-most positions are the most positive. In 2007, 
according to the RILE measure, the PD was Ireland’s right-most party and the Greens Ireland’s 
left-most.  
MODRILE, the economic dimension extracted from the CMP’s RILE measure, is 
presented in an analogous. Differences between RILE and MODRILE stem from the shift in left-
right positions, when non-economic dimensions are excluded from the policy space. In the 
MODRILE space, SF is the farthest left, and Green and Labour are more centrist relative to their 
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RILE positions. This indicates that SF’s divergence from the other parties is primarily along an 
economic dimension. Moreover, the MODRILE space reveals that the Green and Labour parties 
are relatively conservative along economic dimensions, an observation occluded in the more 
crowded RILE space. In addition, in a pattern observed in other crisis countries, MODRILE 
indicates a compression of the ideological space. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the 
study’s explanatory variables. MODRILE ranges from 0 to 1, with a mean of 0.49. Table 2’s 
MODRILE score is standardized for each country-election. This is achieved by dividing all 
parties’ MODRILE scores in a given election by the party’s score with the highest absolute 
value. 
  
Figure 1. The policy positions of Irish political parties in 2007 derived from the CMP measures. The left panel 
shows the CMP’s RILE measure. The right shows MODRILE, which extracts RILE’s economic component. In each 
graph, the Green and Labour parties are labelled with their full names. Sinn Fein, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and the 
Progressive Democrats are indicated with SF, FF, FG, and PD, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
MODRILE 0.49 0.5 0 1 
Consonance 0.695 0.8 0.2 1 
Bond-yields 4.463 4.111 1.552 24.723 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the study’s independent variables. The first column indicates the relevant 
independent variable. The succeeding columns indicate various summary statistics: mean, median, minimum, and 
maximum. 
    
Consonance 
Empirical strategy 
 Programmatic consonance varies both within and between countries. The empirical 




























explores within-country variation in consonance with both regression and case studies. Unlike 
with respect to partisanship, however, the limited variation in consonance limits the usefulness of 
fixed-effects regressions. Thus, the analysis of consonance, relies to a larger extent than the 
analysis of partisanship, on case studies. Chapter 7 compares government variation over time in 
Greece and Italy. In addition, as in the case of partisanship, the case-study methodology enables 
limited between-country comparison. 
Measure 
Consonance is measured with Equation 1: 
𝑪 = 𝟏 −  (𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 − 𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌𝑳𝒐𝒘)/𝑴𝒂𝒙(𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌)  (Equation 1) 
C is the programmatic consonance of a given government. To calculate the rank of a given party, 
the parties in a government are ordered and assigned integer ranks according to their MODRILE. 
The rank of the party with the lowest MODRILE score in a governing coalition is then subtracted 
from the rank of the party with the highest MODRILE score in the governing coalition.11 This 
difference is then divided by the number of parties competing in a given election, which is 
equivalent to the maximum rank.12 This result in then subtracted from 1. In this way, consonance 
is increasing in C, with 1 being the highest possible score. The equation generates a range of 
[1,0).  
This equation indicates two important features of the consonance measure. First, single-
party governments, for which, by definition, RankHigh=RankLow, generate consonance scores of 1. 
Second, the lower limit for consonance depends on the number of parties contesting an election. 
The lower limit for an election with n parties is [1-(n-1)/n]. This expression reduces to 1/n. 
                                                 
11 This difference is the core theoretical expression in the equation. The remaining terms work as scaling 
coefficients. 
12 Scaling by the maximum rank prevents countries with fewer political parties in a given election from having 
artificially higher levels of consonance.  
43 
 
Where there are two parties, thus, both maximum and minimum consonance are 0.5; in the 
sample these conditions only apply in Malta’s 2008 elections. Table 2 shows that consonance in 
the sample, which covers Eurozone economies between 2000 and 2013, ranges from a low of 0.2 
to a high of 1. The median of 0.8 shows that the data is skewed towards 1. Indeed, 47 of the 151 
observations of the sample are 1, indicating the high proportion of single-party governments (the 
vast majority of which were majority, rather than minority, governments) across the sample. This 
is important to bear in mind, particularly against the backdrop of the caricature of continental 




External actors play a potentially large role in the adjustment policy adopted by 
individual countries. As with partisanship and consonance, the present study employs both a 
large-N regression approach and a qualitative approach to explore the effects of external actors 
within the hybrid model. With respect to the former, Chapter 3’s fixed-effects regressions use 
bond yields as a proxy for external-actor influence. Because of the outsized role occupied by 
bond yields in journalistic accounts of the financial crisis and the responses of individual 
countries, Chapter 4 employs factor analysis and explores the dynamics of bond yields over the 
crisis sample. With respect to qualitative approaches, Chapter 5 presents event analyses and a 
series of case studies that focus on subset of events. Chapter 5 places particular stress on the 




 In the context of external actors, it is important to define the universe of potential external 
actors. The present study defines an external actor as an institution or country that can offer 
significant financial aid to a crisis country. The crisis country may have influence in the external 
actor (as do the crisis countries with the Troika through the European Commission and 
International Monetary Fund), but they cannot dominate, either politically or economically, the 
external actor.13 Potential external actors include, but are not limited to, the Troika, the World 
Bank, regional organizations such as NATO, and non-crisis countries that possess significant 
financial resources. The Troika, in particular, may be treated either as a single organization or as 
three different organizations: the EC, the IMF, and the ECB. Since the Troika attempts to present 
a single voice in policy discussions, the present study treats it as a single external actor. That 
said, important divisions emerged within the Troika over the life of the crisis. Chapter 5 explores 
the policymaking implications of these divisions.   











09/2008 Eurozone Homogeneous Discount rate drops from 4 percent 
in 09/2008 to a floor of 1 percent 
in 05/2009 
Legislation 02/2009 EU Homogeneous Establishes the European 
Economic Recovery Plan, a series 
of Keynesian measures to increase 




Bailout 05/2010 Greece Homogenous 1 Limited 
Bailout 11/2010 Ireland Homogenous 1 Limited 
Legislation 02/2011 EU Homogenous Implements a series of measures to 
correct deficits that exceed those 
                                                 
13 Thus, the EC/ECB are external actors with respect to all Eurozone countries, with the possible exception of 
Germany, which, to some extent, can dominate the ECB. There are, however, limits to Germany’s power within the 
ECB. These limits were shown in Mario Draghi’s implementation of OMT in September 2012, in which, over the 
explicit dissent of Bundesbank Governor Jens Weidmann, the ECB announced the large-scale purchase of sovereign 
debt from the Eurozone’s periphery. See the following article for a discussion of the debate within the ECB’s 
governing council: Steen, Michael. “Weidmann isolated as ECB plan approved.” Financial Times. 7 September 
2012. 










04/2011 Eurozone Homogenous Discount rate increases from 1 
percent in 04/2011 to a ceiling of 
1.5 through 10/2011 
Bailout 05/2011 Portugal Homogenous 1 Limited 
Nominal 
interest rate 
10/2011 Eurozone Homogenous Discount rate drops from 1.5 
percent in 10/2011 to a floor of 
0.25 percent in 11/2013 




LTRO 12/2011 Banks in 
Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, and Spain 
Heterogeneous 1 Sovereign debt 
from bailouts; 
Legislation 12/2011 EU Heterogeneous “Six-pack” enters the force 
establishing limits on both 
government debt and deficit. 




LTRO 02/2012 Banks in 
Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, and Spain 
Heterogeneous 1 Sovereign debt 
from bailouts; 
debt from prior 
LTRO 
Bailout 02/2012 Greece Heterogeneous 1 ECB’s holding 
of Greek debt 
Legislation 03/2012 EU Heterogeneous Treaty on Stability, Coordination, 
and Governance—alias “Fiscal 
Compact”—expands the EU’s 
monitoring and advisory powers 




Bailout 06/2012 Spain Heterogeneous 1 ECB’s holdings 
of Spanish 
sovereign bonds 




Bailout 04/2013 Cyprus Heterogeneous 2 Limited 
Legislation 05/2013 EU Heterogeneous “Two-pack” enters into force, 
which formalizes the oversight 
                                                 
15 “The corrective arm: the excessive deficit procedure.” EUR-Lex, 2 February 2011. Web. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1439819458086&uri=URISERV:l25020>. 
16 “Surveillance of budgetary policies.” EUR-Lex, 1 June 2012. Web. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1439819458086&uri=URISERV:l25019>. 
17 “Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union.” European Commission: 
Press Release Database, 1 February 2012. Web. <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-2_en.htm>. 
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Table 3. Relevant events involving external actors. The type of event, whether a change in the nominal interest rate 
(for the time series, see Figure 1 of Chapter 5), a bailout, a LTRO, or legislation, is noted in the first column. The 
second column indicates the month and year of the event. The third column indicates the crisis country or institution 
(in the case of bank bailouts) targeted. The fourth column indicates the relative homogeneity of the Troika in a 
particular event. The fifth column indicates the number of relevant external actors.  The sixth and final column 
indicates the prior position of relevant external actors.  
 
 There are a wide number of events that involve external actors that are potentially 
relevant to the fiscal policies adopted by crisis countries. The first column indicates a particular 
event. Table 3 lists four varieties of events: changes in the nominal interest rate, refinancing 
operations (both LTRO’s and OMT’s), bailouts, and EU-level legislation. First, central banks 
conduct conventional monetary policy by changing the nominal interest rate. With stick prices 
(either in the general price level or in wages), a change in the nominal rate passes through the 
real interest rate. Second, a large number of refinancing operations took place over the crisis 
period. However, under Mario Draghi’s leadership, the ECB expanded lending aggressively, 
increasing the maturity (from six months to three years) and the amounts available for Eurozone 
banks. Over the sample period, the ECB instituted two rounds of long-term refinancing 
operations (LTRO’s). In September 2012, in an attempt to increase the conditionality of 
purchases of sovereign debt under the Securities Market Programme (SMP), Eurozone 
policymakers replaced with the SMP with Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), which 
incorporated a policy of strict conditionality.19  
                                                 
18 “‘Two-pack’ enters into force, completing budgetary surveillance cycle and further improving economic 
governance for the Euro area.” European Commission: Press Release Database, 27 May 2013. Web. 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-457_en.htm>. 
19 The relative inflexibility caused by this move led some Eurozone policymakers to lament the dismantling of the 
SMP. This became an issue in late 2012, with increasing bond yields on Italian sovereign debt. Disbursement of 
OMT funds required that a target country have an open line of credit with either the EFSF/ESM, the EU’s bailout 
facilities. As Italy had not received a bailout, it was ineligible to receive OMT funds. For a representative article in 
the press, see the following citation: Barber, Tony and Michael Steen. “‘Whatever it takes’: the Italian determined to 
save the Euro.” Financial Times. 14 December 2012. 
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Third, bailouts refer to the transfer of funds from the Troika to target countries. Such 
transfers differ from LTRO’s, because they are extended to sovereign governments, rather than 
to Eurozone banks. Moreover, LTRO’s are orchestrated by the ECB, whereas bailouts are 
conducted by the EC, the ECB, and, frequently, the IMF. The first bailout in the sample occurred 
in Greece in May 2010. The last occurred in Cyprus in April 2013. The only bailout in the 
sample not involving Europe’s supranational institution occurred when Russia provided €2.5 
billion to Cyprus in December 2011. Bailout codings are relatively uncontroversial, with the 
exception of Spain’s in June 2012. Spain’s center-right government bargained extensively with 
the Troika to avoid the extensive fiscal conditionality required by prior bailout recipients. 
Ultimately, the Troika eschewed much of the conditionality required in prior bailouts. The 
Troika, however, refused to accede to Spain’s request that banks be bailed out directly, rather 
than indirectly through the government. As a result, the bailout of Spain combined elements of 
past bailouts (lending by the EC/ECB to a sovereign government) and LTRO’s (limited 
conditionality).  
The fourth and final type of event involves EU-level legislation that conditions the fiscal 
policy space of member countries. Such legislation is typically negotiated by the senior 
politicians present at each summer’s Eurozone summit. The first EU-level legislation involved 
an initial Keynesian response to the financial crisis. Using the European Investment Bank as the 
primary vehicle, the EC attempted to stimulate flagging demand in the face of strong financial-
crisis headwinds. After a 2010 dominated by the ad hoc response of the EC and the ECB to the 
crises in Greece and Ireland, the Keynesian impulse was reversed in 2011 and 2012 with 
successive legislation designed to strengthen both the surveillance and enforcement of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Typically, such legislation passed with limited offsetting 
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expansionary policy, such as the ECB’s rounds of LTRO. Although the ECB is nominally 
independent from the EC, the coincidence of such shifts strongly suggests the political logic of 
bundled tradeoffs as partially facilitating EU-level reform. 
 The second column in Table 3 indicates the month and year of particular events, ranging 
from the September 2008 changes in the nominal interest rate to the “Two-Pack” legislation 
adopted in May 2013. The third column indicates the targeted country, institution, or area, 
depending on the type of event. Bailouts target countries; refinancing operations target banks in 
particular countries; and legislation applies to the EU as a whole. Coding in each of these 
columns is relatively straightforward, with the exception of the refinancing operations. Because 
recipient banks did not want to be seen as weak, and the ECB did not want to cause capital flight 
from already fragile bank balance sheets, the recipient banks remained secret. Although some 
banks reported their positions, systematic data for recipient banks was not available.20 Based on 
the limited reporting in the financial press, banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, in addition 
to a number of non-crisis countries received LTRO funds.   
 The fourth column indicates the homogeneity of the Troika at the time of a particular 
policy action. The Troika consists of three organizations: the EC, the IMF, and the ECB. In the 
beginning of the crisis period, these organizations worked together relatively seamlessly. In the 
latter part of the crisis period, the working relationship between organizations deteriorated. 
Coding of homogeneity is based on the financial press. Where the financial press mentions 
significant disagreements among Troika members, the event is labelled as heterogeneous; 
otherwise, the event is coded as homogeneous. Disagreement within the Troika occurred along a 
number of axes. First, there was tension between southern European and northern European 
                                                 
20 “Which banks took up second round of LTRO.” Wall Street Journal. 29 February 2012. 
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countries. This disagreement primarily manifested in tension between the EC, with 
representation skewed towards the southern economies, and the ECB, with representation 
skewed towards the northern economies. Second, over the crisis period, the IMF, with its 
constituency beyond the EU, grew to resent what it saw as coddling of Eurozone countries, 
relative to the past treatment of IMF-member countries in the East Asian currency crisis and 
Latin American debt crisis. The former cleavage emerged earlier in the crisis period; the latter 
became a salient point of contention late in the crisis period and proved particularly important in 
the bailout of Cyprus. Chapter 5 explores the implications of evolving preference heterogeneity 
on the fiscal policies adopted in crisis countries. 
The fifth column, for bailouts and refinancing operations, indicates the number of 
external actors relevant to a particular event. Only one crisis country, Cyprus, engages with more 
than one external actor. Although it falls outside the scope of the present dissertation, Greece’s 
overtures to Russia during the negotiations over the third Greek bailout provides another 
example of a second external actor. In addition, periodic reference was made of funds from 
China providing a potential solution to the Eurozone crisis.21 In no case, however, were these 
funds discussed in either a sustained or consistent manner. The sixth and final column, for 
bailouts and refinancing operations, indicates the prior position of external actors relevant to a 
particular event. These are limited in the case of the early bailouts, when the ECB’s balance 
sheet contained few sovereign bonds. In later bailouts and LTRO’s, the ECB and Eurozone 
governments had acquired substantial positions in the debt of crisis countries. In the Russian 
case, Russian depositors held large positions in Cypriot retail banks. In the case of EU-level 
                                                 
21 Here a handful of representative citations to the periodic references made to China as a potential savior to the 
Eurozone crisis: Barber, Tony. “Greek aid role for China and Russia?” Financial Times. 29 April 2010; “East of 
Athens; Greece is wise not to spurn Chinese investment interest.” Financial Times. 17 June 2010; Barber, Tony. 
“Enter the technocrats.” Financial Times. 12 November 2011. 
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legislation, the fifth and sixth columns include a brief description of the legislation adopted; with 
respect to changes in the nominal interest rate, the fifth and sixth columns provide the floor and 
ceiling of the implemented rate change 
Susceptibility to external actors: Bond yields 
 Countries have three primary sources of funds: taxation; capital markets; and external 
actors. During a crisis period, when re-financing debt is crucial to preventing country reliance on 
external actors, countries have limited ability to collect taxes in order to cover the costs of 
refinancing. This reflects both the time horizon of revenue collection as well as the hypothesized 
adverse implications of increased taxation on economic growth. Thus, particularly during 
tranquil economic periods, countries rely on capital markets. Whether a country can draw on 
capital markets is function of the prevailing bond yield. Bond yields, thus, indirectly measure the 
pressure on sovereign governments to resort to external actors. When bond yields increase 
beyond the rate at which debt can be sustainably re-financed, governments turn towards external 
actors. The threshold bond yield depends on existing levels of debt and the macroeconomic 
forecast for a given country. While there is necessarily a level of subjective judgment involved in 
sustainability, domestic political discourse and the financial press indicates a clear relationship 
between bond yields and the pressure to seek funding from external actors. Chapter 3 explores 
the correlation structure of bond yields over the crisis sample. Such structure is particularly 
important given concerns over contagion in financial markets. Contagion has troubling 
implications for Europe’s democratic deficit. In effect, if the contagion hypothesis is correct, 
events in a neighboring country drive yields domestically. To the degree that yields are 
connected to domestic policy, events in neighboring countries drive domestic policy and thus 
further exacerbate the EU’s democratic deficit. 
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Disaggregating fiscal policy: The dependent variable 
 Adjustment policy consists of a wide array of policy measures. The present study focuses 
on fiscal-policy measures. It follows De Grauwe & Ji (2013) and disaggregates fiscal policy into 
taxation and spending.22 However, subsequent chapters go beyond these authors and 
disaggregate taxation into four subcomponents and spending into three subcomponents. The 
study considers consumption, income, social-security, and corporate taxation; on the spending 
side, the study considers social benefits and public-sector compensation. Those data are collected 
from a variety of sources, including the OECD’s iSTAT database and TradingEconomics 
proprietary data.  
Dependent variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
DEFICIT -0.0286 0.0466 -0.3171 0.0591 
EXPENDITURE 0.4579 0.0891 0.2534 0.9057 
REVENUE 0.4292 0.0748 0.2834 0.6850 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 0.1898 0.0448 0.0721 0.2912 
COMPENSATION 0.1052 0.0241 0.0650 0.1899 
Table 4. Summary statistics for aggregate fiscal environment and expenditure items. The first column indicates the 
relevant fiscal category; the second column indicates the mean; the third column indicates the standard deviation; 
finally, the fourth and fifth columns indicate the minimum and maximum, respectively.  
  Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
INCOME RATE 45.7975 7.6354 19.0000 60.6000 
REVENUE 8.1923 2.7235 2.2520 14.0310 
CONSUMPTION RATE 19.3937 2.1453 15.0000 24.0000 
REVENUE 11.1388 1.2714 6.8380 14.5960 
SOCIAL SECURITY RATE 36.7581 10.7746 12.8000 55.5300 
REVENUE 11.8094 2.9417 3.6560 16.7510 
CORPORATE RATE 29.3911 7.1281 12.5000 51.6000 
REVENUE 2.9122 1.1574 0.5820 7.7840 
Table 5. Summary statistics for categories of revenue. The first column indicates the relevant fiscal category; the 
row indicates either a rate or revenue, with the latter measured as a percentage of GDP; the second column indicates 
whether the third column indicates the mean; the fourth column indicates the standard deviation; finally, the fifth 
and sixth columns indicate the minimum and maximum, respectively.  
 
                                                 
22 De Grauwe, Paul, and Yuemei Ji. "Panic-driven austerity in the Eurozone and its implications." VOX, CEPR’s 




Tables 4 & 5 present summary statistics for the subcomponents of fiscal policy examined 
in subsequent chapters. Over the sample, governments run average deficits of about 2.9% of 
GDP. This results from government expenditures worth 45.8% of GDP combined with revenue 
that amounts to 42.9% of GDP. Disaggregating the spending, governments spend an average of 
19.0% of GDP on social benefits and 10.5% on public-sector compensation. For all of these 
statistics, there is wide variation across the sample, both within countries over time and between 
countries.  
Two types of data shown in Table 5 are collected with respect to disaggregated 
components of taxation: rates and revenue. Tax rates refer to the politically determined tax 
charged on some activity (e.g., earning income, consuming goods). Revenues represent the 
macroeconomic aggregate of microeconomic decisions made by individuals that consider, inter 
alia, tax rates. Because they are determined directly through a political process, rates provide a 
more relevant test of the political hypotheses implied by the hybrid model. Revenues, which 
reflect a wider set of political and non-political considerations, are a less direct test of the 
explicitly political process described in Chapter 1. While the subsequent analysis discusses 
results in the context of both rates and revenues, changes in the former more closely reflect the 




Chapter 3: Large-N approaches to studying fiscal-policy responses to the financial crisis 
 
Introduction 
The present chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines the time 
series and summary statistics of the aggregate adjustment data. This section is primarily 
descriptive and suggests trends underlying the data. The second section presents t-tests and 
fixed-effects regressions that test the political and economic hypotheses derived from the hybrid 
model.  
The time series of adjustment paths 
Aggregate fiscal variables 
 Table 1 presents the summary statistics first introduced in Chapter 2’s discussion of data. 
Dollar figures, both revenues and expenditure, are expressed as a proportion of GDP. This 
facilitates comparison between countries but also complicates interpretation. Changes in fiscal 
variables relative to GDP may reflect either changes in the fiscal variables or GDP. Table 1 
shows that the average deficit across Eurozone countries between 2000 and 2013 was about 
2.9% of GDP. The average Eurozone government between 2000 and 2013 spent 45.8% of GDP 
and collected 42.9% of GDP in revenue from taxation. For each of these aggregate fiscal 
characteristics, there is substantial variation in both the cross-section and the time series, as 
indicated by the standard deviations, minima, and maxima. Figures 1 & 2 delve into the time-
series variation of Table 1’s summary statistics. 
Dependent variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
DEFICIT -0.0286 0.0466 -0.3171 0.0591 
EXPENDITURE 0.4579 0.0891 0.2534 0.9057 
REVENUE 0.4292 0.0748 0.2834 0.6850 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 0.1898 0.0448 0.0721 0.2912 




Table 1. Summary statistics for aggregate fiscal environment and expenditure items. The first column indicates the 
relevant fiscal category; the second column indicates the mean; the third column indicates the standard deviation; 
finally, the fourth and fifth columns indicate the minimum and maximum, respectively.  
 
 Figure 1 presents the time series of the percent changes in deficit (upper panel), 
expenditure (lower-left panel), and revenue (lower-right panel). The vertical line in each panel 
indicates the year of Lehman Brother’s failure, 2008, which is used to mark the beginning of the 
financial crisis. The straight horizontal line in each panel is used to indicate the threshold where 
zero change in the relevant fiscal variable occurs. Above the line, countries increase the relevant 
fiscal variable; below the line, countries decrease the relevant fiscal variable. The red dots 
indicate the study’s crisis countries: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. The red dots 
contrast with the blue dots which indicate non-crisis countries. The curved lines are generated by 
LOWESS regressions with a bandwidth of 0.6; the LOWESS regression lines present a summary 
of the data, weighting both variation within and across years. The red LOWESS line indicates 
the weighted average of the crisis countries; the blue LOWESS line indicates the weighted 





































   Expenditure     Revenue 
Figure 1. Aggregate adjustment statistics for Eurozone countries over the study’s sample between 2000 and 2013. 
The top panel shows the year-on-year percent change in the deficit as a percent of GDP. The bottom-left panel 
shows the year-on-year percent change in expenditure as a percent of GDP. The bottom-right panel shows the year-
on-year percent change in revenue as a percent of GDP. Red dots indicate crisis countries: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, and Spain. Blue dots indicate non-crisis countries. In each panel, LOWESS regression lines with a 
bandwidth of 0.6 show a smoothed average of the relevant dependent variable; the red and blue lines indicate the 
weighted averages for crisis- and non-crisis countries, respectively. 
 
 In their changing deficits, crisis and non-crisis countries display broadly similar patterns. 
Prior to the crisis, on average, both sets of countries ran small deficits. In 2008, with the 
beginning of the financial crisis, the trend shifts sharply, as increasing deficits emerge across 
both sets of countries. The increase in deficits, which extended through 2009, purportedly 
constituted an initial Keynesian response to the financial crisis. At the EU-level, this impulse was 
captured by the European Economic Recovery Plan,1 which sought to restore flagging demand 
with investment projects funded by the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EU’s initial 
response has often been forgotten in the caricatured aftermath of Troika policy dominated by 
conservative policymakers in Berlin.  
With respect to domestic policies, the Keynesian spirit is captured by a Financial Times 
article published in late 2008, “The undeniable shift to Keynes,” which describes the leftward 
                                                 
















































































shift against the economic orthodoxy captured in the Washington Consensus.2 While the 
financial press hailed the Keynesian impulse as averting a repeat of the Great Depression, it is 
important to note that the pervasive increases in deficit did not result from the classical 
Keynesian vision of increased spending on the public sector to replace depressed consumption 
and investment.3 The bottom two panels of Figure 1 indicate that the increase in deficits 
following the financial crisis did not reflect Keynesian orthodoxy. The increase in deficits 
reflected collapsing revenue to a far greater extent than increasing expenditure. This is a crucial 
point, given the conventional wisdom surrounding the crisis response. While the EIB 
implemented limited Keynesian measures, the response of Eurozone governments was not 
expansionary. Moreover, the bottom two panels underscore a fundamental difference between 
crisis and non-crisis countries. Prior to the crisis, crisis and non-crisis countries displayed similar 
behavior, with crisis countries increasing spending at a slightly higher pace than non-crisis 
countries. With the onset of the crisis, expenditure trends diverged, with crisis countries 
increasing spending at a slower pace and ultimately reducing spending in contrast to the 
relatively expansionary environments of non-crisis countries. The shift in spending and 
divergence between the sets of countries emerged as a response to the crisis. This is not the case 
with respect to revenue. The bottom-right shows that the divergence in government revenue 
emerged prior to the crisis. The divergence began in 2008, with crisis-country revenues 
increasing at a slower pace in 2008 and declining in 2009. While there was a partial recovery in 
the revenue generated by crisis-country governments after 2010, the crisis-country trends 
remained below that of the non-crisis countries.  
                                                 
2 Giles, Chris, Atkins, Ralph & Krishna Guha. “The undeniable shift to Keynes.” Financial Times. 29 February 
2008. Online. 





These aggregate characteristics present an important empirical frame, consisting of three 
main points, that contrasts with the conventional wisdom surrounding how countries responded 
to the crisis. First, from the perspective of fiscal deficits, crisis and non-crisis countries looked 
remarkably similar prior to the financial crisis. To some extent, such similarity may be 
responsible for the post-accession convergence in bond yields analyzed in Chapter 4.4 Second, 
the similarity in deficits, however, belied important differences in the fiscal environments of 
crisis and non-crisis countries. The former consistently spent and generated a larger portion of 
GDP from taxation. These twin tendencies offset each other in the aggregate but created a 
relatively fragile financial context in crisis countries, which rendered them particularly sensitive 
to the emergence of sovereign credit. Third, following the onset of the crisis, governments did 
not respond with classical Keynesian measures. While they may have been hailed as such in the 
financial press, the increased deficits stemmed from collapsing revenues rather than from a 
broad-based increase in government expenditure.  




As the discussion turns to different subcomponents of fiscal policy, it is important to bear 
in mind the empirical frame characterized by Figure 1. Figures 2 through 6 disaggregate the 
adjustment statistics further and demonstrate important heterogeneity among the sub-components 
of taxation and spending. Table 1 indicates that, on average, Eurozone countries spend 19.0% of 
GDP on social benefits and 10.5% of GDP on public-sector compensation. While the specific 
figures vary widely across the Eurozone, the high average values indicate a substantial 
                                                 
4 It is difficult to distinguish to proportion of convergence attributable to the similarity in fiscal environments and 




commitment of Eurozone governments to redistribution through employment and entitlements.  
This commitment is a hallmark of CME’s in the typology of Hall & Soskice.5 
 
Figure 2. Disaggregated expenditure statistics for Eurozone countries over the study’s sample between 2000 and 
2013. The left panel shows the year-on-year percent change in spending on social benefits as a percent of GDP. The 
right panel shows the year-on-year percent change in public-sector compensation as a percent of GDP. Red dots 
indicate crisis countries; blue dots indicate non-crisis countries. In each panel, LOWESS regression lines with a 
bandwidth of 0.6 show a smoothed average of the relevant dependent variable; the red and blue lines indicate the 
weighted averages for crisis- and non-crisis countries, respectively. 
 
Figure 2 presents the percent change in disaggregated components of government 
expenditure: the left panel indicates the year-on-year percent change in expenditure on social 
benefits, and the right panel indicates the year-on-year percent change in expenditure on public-
sector compensation. Both expenditure subcomponents are standardized by GDP. With respect to 
social benefits as well as public-sector compensation, crisis and non-crisis countries behaved 
differently both prior to and following the crisis. Crisis countries were both more expansionary 
prior to the crisis and more contractionary following the crisis relative to non-crisis countries. 
These trends roughly map onto that observed in the bottom panels of Figure 1. The divergence 
between the two sets of countries is more apparent, both prior to and following the crisis, in the 
disaggregated components. Since these two subcomponents of expenditure constitute, on 
average, 64% of government expenditure over the sample, it is reasonable to assume that the 
                                                 
5 Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 





































































































expenditure trends in Figure 1 are driven primarily by changes in social benefits and public-
sector compensation. 
Revenue 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics for a variety of different tax-related subcomponents. 
The table provides information related to income taxes, consumption taxes, social-security 
contributions, and corporate taxes. Together, these four categories constitute the vast majority of 
revenue collected by Eurozone governments. Table 2 provides two kinds of statistics related to 
each category of taxation: rate and revenue. As with the subcomponents of expenditure, tax 
revenues are standardized by GDP; rates are not standardized. Tax rates refer to the politically 
determined tax charged on some activity (e.g., earning income, consuming goods). Importantly, 
the partial equilibrium effect of a rate change may differ dramatically from the general 
equilibrium effect.6 Revenues represent the macroeconomic aggregate of microeconomic 
decisions made by individuals and companies that consider, inter alia, tax rates. Because they 
are determined directly through a political process, rates are a more direct test of the political 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1. Revenues, which reflect a wider set of political and non-
political considerations, are a less direct test of the explicitly political process described in 
Chapter 1.  
On average, the highest marginal income-tax rate across Eurozone countries is 45.8%, the 
average consumption-tax rate is 19.4%. Revenues from these types of taxation generate, on 
average, 8.2% and 11.1% of GDP, respectively. The taxes that hit employers directly—social-
security contributions and corporate taxes—are similarly high. Average social-security 
contributions are 36.8%, and average corporate-tax rates are 29.4%. Revenues from these types 
                                                 
6 For example, tax rate cuts may increase output through their increase in demand. This, in turn, increases the 




of taxation generate, on average, 11.8% and 2.9% of GDP. These revenue figures provide a 
rough guide to the fiscal importance of each type of taxation to central governments across the 
Eurozone. Consumption and social security taxes, followed closely by income taxes, generate the 
most revenue. Corporate taxes, on the other hand, generate a small proportion of government 
revenue. These broad differences are important to bear in mind when interpreting the substantive 
importance of tax-rate changes in subsequent sections. 
  Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
INCOME RATE 45.7975 7.6354 19.0000 60.6000 
REVENUE 8.1923 2.7235 2.2520 14.0310 
CONSUMPTION RATE 19.3937 2.1453 15.0000 24.0000 
REVENUE 11.1388 1.2714 6.8380 14.5960 
SOCIAL SECURITY RATE 36.7581 10.7746 12.8000 55.5300 
REVENUE 11.8094 2.9417 3.6560 16.7510 
CORPORATE RATE 29.3911 7.1281 12.5000 51.6000 
REVENUE 2.9122 1.1574 0.5820 7.7840 
Table 2. Summary statistics for categories of revenue. The first column indicates the relevant fiscal category; the 
row indicates either a rate or revenue, with the latter measured as a percent of GDP; the third column indicates the 
mean; the fourth column indicates the standard deviation; finally, the fifth and sixth columns indicate the minimum 
and maximum, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3. Income-tax statistics for Eurozone countries over the study’s sample between 2000 and 2013. The left 
panel shows the year-on-year percent change in the income-tax rate for individual countries. The right panel shows 
the year-on-year percent change in revenue generated by income taxes within individual countries. See Figure 2’s 
caption for further description. 
 
Figure 1 shows that, in the aggregate, revenue as a proportion of GDP in both sets of 























































































above the horizontal axis in the bottom-left panel of Figure 1. Following the crisis, revenue in 
crisis countries dropped below that in non-crisis countries. Figures 3 through 6 present the 
constituent components that drive these aggregate trends. The left panel in Figure 3 shows that 
prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers, both crisis- and non-crisis countries implemented 
expansionary income-tax programs,7 with both sets of countries reducing the top marginal 
income-tax rates. The crisis countries, on average, reduced income taxes by slightly less than 
non-crisis countries prior to the crisis. A more substantial difference emerges following the 
financial crisis, when crisis countries, on average, increased income-tax rates steadily. The right 
panel’s revenue data underscores and provides nuance to the left panel’s rate data. Although the 
divergence in rates predated the financial crisis, revenues of crisis and non-crisis countries 
diverged only starting in 2010.  
 
Figure 4. Consumption-tax statistics for Eurozone countries over the study’s sample between 2000 and 2013. The 
left panel shows the year-on-year percent change in the consumption-tax rate for individual countries. The right 
panel shows the year-on-year percent change in revenue generated by consumption taxes within individual 
countries. See Figure 2’s caption for further description. 
 
 Figure 4 shows the consumption-tax statistics over the sample. The left panel shows a 
clear regime change following the financial crisis in crisis countries. In non-crisis countries, rates 
                                                 
7 See Romer for a discussion of the canonical neoclassical model and the neo-Keynesian synthesis. In the former, 
tax cuts have no effects because of Ricardian equivalence. In the latter, with the introduction of uncertainty over the 
future path of the economy and, by extension, tax rates, unexpected changes in tax rates can have real economic 





























































































remained roughly the same following the crisis; in crisis countries, following the financial crisis, 
governments raised consumption-tax rates. Unlike with income- and corporate-tax rates, which 
declined prior to the financial crisis, consumption tax rates remained relatively constant prior to 
the crisis. On the right panel, the post-crisis divergence was not apparent in revenue, 
underscoring the weak fiscal positions of crisis governments with respect to consumption taxes. 
To collect comparable revenues to non-crisis countries, crisis countries raised consumption-tax 
rates relative to those in non-crisis countries. 
  
Figure 5. Corporate-tax statistics for Eurozone countries over the study’s sample between 2000 and 2013. The left 
panel shows the year-on-year percent change in the corporate-tax rate for individual countries. The right panel 
shows the year-on-year percent change in revenue generated by corporate taxes within individual countries.  See 
Figure 2’s caption for further description. 
 
 Figure 5 shows the corporate-tax statistics over the sample. The left panel’s rate statistics 
show that the pre-crisis trends in corporate-tax rates mirror the income-tax reductions observed 
in both crisis and non-crisis countries. Following the crisis, however, where income tax rates 
increased, corporate tax rates remained constant in both crisis and non-crisis countries. The right 
panel’s revenue data show that revenues vary more than rates, although the percent changes 
remain centered on zero. When combined with Figures 2, 3 & 4, the corporate-tax burden in 
Figure 5 demonstrates clear distributional implications, in which the burden of adjustment shifts 
from corporate interests to the working and middle classes. This trend is apparent across the 























































































countries. These trends provide some support for the convergence school of Garrett and Rodrik, 
in which the tax burden is shifted from mobile factors of production (capital) on to less mobile 
factors (labor). 
 
Figure 6. Social-security contribution statistics for Eurozone countries over the study’s sample between 2000 and 
2013. The left panel shows the year-on-year percent change in the social-security contribution rate for individual 
countries. The right panel shows the year-on-year percent change in revenue generated by social-security 
contributions within individual countries. See Figure 2’s caption for further description. 
 
Figure 6 shows the social-security contribution statistics over the sample. The left panel 
shows the relative stasis of social-security contribution rates. The relative stasis of rates contrasts 
sharply with the right panel’s revenue data. The relative stability of rates relative to revenue 
suggests the outsized importance of macroeconomic, rather than political, factors in shaping 
social-security revenue relative to the revenue generated by other forms of taxation. 
Theoretical implications 
 Figures 1 through 6 reveal important heterogeneity in the domestic adjustment regimes 
adopted following the financial crisis. Viewed in isolation, Figure 1 demonstrates the inadequacy 
of considering deficit as a sole measure of adjustment. The purported Keynesian response, 
identified by many observers appears, supported by the increased deficit in 2009. The bottom 
panels of Figure 1, however, show that the increased deficit resulted more from collapsed tax 
revenue than from increased expenditure. Further, the bottom two panels illustrate crucial 













































































































aggregate deficit data. The higher levels of spending and revenue in non-crisis countries rendered 
their position more precarious with respect to financial markets, in the case that sovereign credit 
risk emerged. This distinction between crisis and non-crisis countries meant that external actors 
and financial markets had an outsized effect in crisis countries relative their role in non-crisis 
countries. With tax rates already higher than in their non-crisis counterparts and a Laffer-curve 
dynamic likely to set in with further tax increases, crisis countries were particularly likely to face 
a fiscal crisis and require emergency funding from external actors. The variation in external-actor 
influence is a key theoretical point emphasized by Chapter 1’s hybrid model and is explored in 
greater depth in Chapters 4 & 5. 
The analytical bluntness that characterizes the initial domestic responses as Keynesian 
gives rise a similarly unsophisticated view that characterizes all austerity as identical, from both 
economic and political perspectives. Indeed, Figures 2 through 6 demonstrate a variety of ways 
to implement austerity. While the revenues responded in a relatively uniform manner, the 
political responses, in the form of changes in rates, varied sharply across Eurozone countries. 
Prior to the crisis, governments tended to reduce income and corporate tax rates while 
maintaining consumption and social-security rates. Following the crisis, however, while 
corporate and social-security rates remained constant, income- and consumption-tax rates 
increased across the sample. While there is important variation across countries and over time, 
on average, these data suggest that countries adjusted on the tax side primarily through changes 
in income- and consumption-tax rates. Figure 2 shows that, on the spending side, governments in 
crisis countries tended to reduce both social benefits and public-sector compensation following 
the onset of the crisis. In non-crisis countries, social benefits and public-sector compensation 




uniformity of responses among crisis countries illustrates central problems with the approaches 
of the convergence and VoC literatures. In both literatures, there is no attempt to account for 
variation in pressure of external economic forces over either time or space. In the convergence 
school, footloose capital places unrelenting pressure on capital-market regimes, producing 
similar economic-policy outcomes in all open economies. The convergence school thus has 
trouble explaining the differences in policy regimes between crisis and non-crisis governments. 
In a world governed by the dictates of footloose capital, all governments should respond 
similarly. Clear differences, however, emerged between crisis and non-crisis countries. In the 
VoC tradition, countries make the political choice to accept market forces (LME’s) or to reject 
market forces (CME’s). Within CME’s, market forces play a marginal role. Thus, not only 
should there not be variation observed within CME’s, but CME”s should also be insulated from 
financial-market shocks. Neither of these conditions hold over the crisis sample. A more realistic 
vision of the interaction between political actors, financial markets, and the production of fiscal 
policy is presented with Figure 7’s hybrid model, which reproduces Figure 1 from Chapter 1. 
The model stresses the time-varying role of financial markets and, by extension, external actors 
in fiscal policymaking. Such variation helps to explain variation observed between crisis and 
non-crisis countries (a problem for convergence approaches) and within the CME crisis countries 
(a problem for VoC approaches). 
Large-N inferential methods 
The time-series trends suggest a clear distributional basis for adjustment following the 
2008 financial crisis: income- and consumption-tax increases coupled with cuts to social benefits 
and public-sector compensation. These effects are primarily driven by policies adopted in crisis 




Or were bond yields so high that policy convergence occurred with respect to left and right 
governments within crisis countries? Proponents of an unreformed Meltzer-Richard model would 
answer yes to the former; proponents of the convergence literature would answer yes to the 
latter. The hybrid model suggests that the influence of external actors—an important driver of 
convergence—varies with financial-market pressure.  
  
Figure 7. Schematic of the hybrid model’s theoretical logic. Variables are listed in bold, with associated dimensions 
in parentheses.  
 
While the examination of the time series of the fiscal variables reveals important 
variation, the narrative exploration of these series does not provide direct tests of the political 
and economic hypotheses that derived from the hybrid model. In the following sections, two 
direct tests of the hypotheses are introduced. First, t-tests display significant differences in the 
data. These t-tests consider the effect on fiscal policy of a single covariate at a time, thus having 
the disadvantage not controlling for covariates. They have the advantage, however, of being 
transparent in their implementation and requiring minimal assumptions regarding the 
specification of political and economic relationships. Second, by imposing further structure on 
the specification of the political and economic relationships over the sample, fixed-effects 
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covariates. The relevant variation is dramatically reduced compared with the t-test approach, 
because fixed-effects regression identify effects on the basis of within-country variation over 
time. Thus, the between-country variation leveraged with t-tests remains unexploited. Each 
approach generates specific advantages and disadvantages, which should be borne in mind when 
interpreting the subsequent results. 
Partisan hypotheses: t-tests 
  Left Right 
Convergence Hypothesis t-stat p-value Dependent 
variable 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Deficit -2.6112 0.5110 -3.0349 0.4757 L=R L != R 0.5929 0.5540 
Expenditure 46.5594 0.9822 45.2581 0.9058 L=R L > R 0.9545 0.1706 




19.5861 0.4511 18.5696 0.4742 L=R L > R 1.4865 0.0695 
Public-sector 
compensation 
10.6497 0.2599 10.4373 0.2481 L=R L > R 0.5756 0.2828 
DISAGGREGATED TAXATION 
Income 46.1506 0.9074 45.5770 0.7121 L=R L < R 0.5040 0.3074 
Revenue 8.7244 0.3580 7.8862 0.2316 L=R L < R 2.0551 0.0207 
Consumption 19.0684 0.2493 19.6574 0.2001 L=R L < R -1.8612 0.0322 
Revenue 10.9556 0.1647 11.2475 0.1122 L=R L < R -1.5182 0.0654 
Corporate 31.6038 0.6292 27.5993 0.7325 L=R L > R 3.9580 0.0001 
Revenue 2.9504 0.1220 2.8722 0.1208 L=R L > R 0.4430 0.3292 
Social 
security 
39.2018 1.1358 34.8383 1.0567 L=R L > R 2.7761 0.0030 
Revenue 12.750 0.2084 11.1850 0.3310 L=R L > R 3.6143 0.0002 
Table 3. Difference-in-means tests for hypotheses related to partisanship. All tests are one-tailed except for that 
related to the aggregate deficit. Table 3 is divided into three sections: aggregated fiscal measures; disaggregated 
expenditure measures; and disaggregated taxation measures (with the latter two indicated by bold headers). The first 
column indicates the relevant dependent variable. The next four columns indicate the mean and standard error of 
estimates by variety of partisanship. The sixth column indicates the hypotheses implied by the convergence 
literature. The seventh column indicates the hypotheses implied by the hybrid model. The eighth and ninth columns 
indicate the t-statistic and p-value from t-tests.  
 
 The first set of hypotheses relates to the aggregated fiscal statistics. The sixth and seventh 
columns of Table 3 state the hypotheses implied by a number of different theoretical 




Convergence theories anticipate no differences across fiscal categories. The symmetry with 
respect to partisanship effects stems from the capital mobility posited by the literature and the 
closely associated phenomenon of footloose capital. These dynamics drive all countries to adopt 
similar fiscal environments. The seventh column indicates the hypotheses implied by Figure 7, 
when combined with the distributional logic of Table 1 from Chapter 1, reproduced here as Table 
4.  Table 4 presents the preferences over fiscal policies exhibited by different groups of 
individuals, differentiated on the basis of primary source of income. These groups, in turn, form 















Public sector, social 
benefits 
NONE 




Public sector, social 
benefits 
NONE 




NONE Public sector, social 
benefits 




Public sector Social benefits 
Table 4. Policy preferences (columns) by party (rows). The first column lists the four primary constituencies 
considered in the present study: corporate, middle class, public sector, and working class. The second and third 
columns indicate opposing positions on tax increases; the fourth and fifth columns indicate opposing positions on 
spending cuts. Within each cell are particular policy measures. 
The hybrid model—the schematic version of which is reproduced in Figure 7—implies a 
number of hypotheses. Figure 7’s model is agnostic on the deficit but predicts higher levels of 
expenditure under left governments than right governments. This stems from the preferences, 
shown in Table 4, of the core constituencies of left parties. The working class and public sector 
favor spending on both social benefits and public-sector compensation. With respect to revenue, 
Figure 7’s prediction is driven by left government’s higher demand for expenditure. However, 
particularly given the low post-accession interest rates analyzed in Chapter 4, much of current 
expenditure is financed with capital-market borrowing. A simple accounting identity illustrates 




particularly in the pre-accession period, expenditure is not constrained by revenue. The capital-
market constraints bind to a larger extent following financial crises when bond-yield spreads 
increase. The hybrid model seeks to explicitly account for the variation in capital-market 
pressure, an important step forward compared with past approaches to the study of fiscal policy. 
The distributional logic of Table 4 suggests that left parties favor a relatively higher burden of 
revenues constituted by corporate taxes and social-security contributions; right parties favor a 
relatively higher burden of revenues constituted by consumption and income taxes.  
The data largely support these hypotheses. Left governments spend more than right 
governments (46.6% of GDP compared with 45.3% of GDP), although the difference is not 
statistically significant at the 10%-level (p-value of 0.171). On the revenue side, to cover their 
higher expenditures, left governments collect significantly (p-value of 0.066) more taxes than 
right governments (43.9% of GDP compared with 42.2% of GDP). In the aggregate, there is not 
a statistically significant difference in the deficit. This is an important corrective to the 
conventional wisdom that left governments run larger deficits than right governments. Such 
indeterminacy results from one of the key insights of the hybrid model, which implies that 
governments do not have direct preferences over the size of the deficit. Rather, governments 
have preferences over components of the deficit; the effect of partisanship on the deficit depends 
on how preferences over the various subcomponents aggregate.  
 Below the aggregated fiscal statistics, Table 3 displays hypotheses related to 
disaggregated measures of expenditure. The results, to some extent, confirm the hybrid model’s 
hypotheses. On the one hand, left governments spend significantly (p-value of 0.070) more than 
right governments on social benefits (19.6% of GDP compared with 18.6% of GDP). On the 




amounts on public-sector compensation (10.6% of GDP compared with 10.4% of GDP). The 
disaggregated expenditure helps to explain the insignificance of the aggregate expenditure results 
related to partisanship. The sharp division between parties on social-benefits expenditure is 
diluted by the similarity between parties with respect to public-sector compensation. The 
insignificance of partisanship’s effect on public-sector compensation may reflect the right’s co-
optation of the public sector in particular countries over the sample period.8 Chapters 6 & 7 of 
Portugal & Spain and Italy & Greece, respectively, explore this variation in greater depth. 
 The final section of Table 3 presents results related to disaggregated revenue statistics. 
The hybrid model implies different outcomes over the various subcomponents of government 
revenue. Table 4 implies that, while left governments collect more taxes in the aggregate than 
right governments, left governments favor lower income and consumption taxes. In addition, 
right governments favor lower corporate taxes and social-security contributions. Table 3, subject 
to a number of caveats, bear out these hypotheses. Contrary to conventional accounts, left 
governments do not have significantly (p-value of 0.307) higher income-tax rates than right 
governments (46.2% of income compared with 45.6% of income); this null result is particularly 
problematic for the conventional, because the measure employed here is the highest marginal 
income-tax rate. According to partisan MR logic, left governments should display 
unambiguously higher income-tax rates than right governments. A fortiori, the MR logic applies 
to the highest marginal income-tax rate. On average, however, left governments generate 
significantly (p-value of 0.021) more revenue from income taxes than right governments (8.7% 
of GDP compared with 7.8% of GDP). As the theory predicts, consumption-tax rates are 
                                                 
8 Portugal is alone among crisis countries in having right governments spend significantly (p-value of 0.001) more 
on the public sector than left governments (12.8% of GDP compared with 10.8% of GDP). When Portugal is 
excluded from the sample, left governments spend significantly (p-value of 0.091) more on public-sector 




significantly (p-value of 0.032) higher under right governments (19.7% of purchase price 
compared with 19.1% of purchase price). These higher rates, in turn, generate significantly (p-
value of 0.065) higher revenues from consumption taxes under right governments (11.2% of 
GDP compared with 11.0% of GDP).  
 Table 3 next presents those taxes expected to be higher under left governments than right 
governments: corporate taxes and social-security contributions. Left governments set 
significantly (p-value of 0.000) higher corporate-tax rates (31.6% of corporate profits compared 
with 27.6% of corporate profits). These higher rates generate more revenue (2.95% of GDP 
compared with 2.89% of GDP), but the difference is not statistically significant (p-value of 
0.329). Left governments also assess significantly (p-value of 0.003) higher social-security 
contributions compared with right governments (39.2% of the wage bill compared with 34.8% of 
the wage bill). These higher rates, in turn, generate significantly (p-value of 0.000) more revenue 
(12.8% of GDP compared with 11.2% of GDP. 
 Overall, Table 3’s t-test results support the hybrid model. Both the model and the 
empirical results show governments with nuanced preferences over fiscal. Crucially, these 
governments do not have direct preferences over the size of the deficit. Rather, governments 
have preferences over different components of the deficit which, in turn, shape preferences over 
the deficit. In contrast to the convergence approach, significant variation over fiscal-policy 
outcomes emerges with respect to partisanship. This stands in contrast to a world in which 
partisan differences are competed away in an attempt to attract footloose capital.  
Partisan and political-capacity hypotheses: Fixed-effects regressions 
The results in Table 3 illuminate a picture of fiscal adjustment more nuanced than that 




hybrid model underscores two relevant conditioning variables: programmatic consonance and the 
bond-yield environment. A simple comparison-of-means, as performed in Table 3, ignores both 
of these conditioning variables. Table 5’s analysis takes both conditioning variables into account. 
The section first presents findings within consonance groupings before turning to differences 
between consonance groupings. Finally, the discussion turns to the effect of the bond-yield 
environment on fiscal policy. A more thorough examination of the bond-yield environment, 
however, is reserved for Chapter 4 & 5. 
Table 5’s fixed-effects regressions control for covariates are ignored in Table 3’s t-tests. 
However, the regressions rely only on within-country variation to identify effects. Tables A1 & 
A2, presented in the appendix to this chapter, display the study’s core regression results. In all 
specifications, GDP is included to capture differences in the macroeconomic environment 
between countries and over time. MODRILE, which extracts the economic component from the 
CMP’s RILE measure, is the primary measure of partisanship. CONSONANCE is used as a 
measure of programmatic consonance and captures the degree of difference among parties in 
government with respect to MODRILE. MODRILE*CONSONANCE is an interaction term of 
the two variables that captures the effect of partisanship at different levels of programmatic 
consonance. BOND-YIELD is a continuous variable that captures the effect of financial-market 
pressure on governments.   
Consonance reflects the policy agreement among political parties within a governing 
coalition. Where consonance is high, parties agree on economic policy; where consonance is 
low, parties disagree on economic policy. High-consonance governments tend to be single 
parties or coalitions of closely aligned political parties.9 Low-consonance governments tend to be 
                                                 
9 Spain’s post-crisis, PP-led government provides an example of the former; Portugal’s post-crisis, PSD-CDS/PP-led 




large coalitions of parties, in which governing parties expressing substantial differences on 
economic policy.10 Thus, there is a structural relationship between consonance and partisanship, 
which can be seen in Figure A1 of the appendix to this chapter. Where the partisanship of a 
governing coalition is located at either end of the political spectrum (either left or right), 
consonance tends to be high. Where partisanship is located in the middle of the spectrum, 
consonance tends to be low. The collinearity induced by the structural relationship makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to separately identify the effects of the two variables. Interpreting the 
regression results in Tables A1 & A2 requires taking the structural relationship between 
consonance and partisanship into account. Thus, Table 5 presents the marginal effects of 
partisanship for different levels of partisanship. The subsequent analysis closes with an extended 
discussion of unconditional marginal effects that disregard the structural relationship between 
consonance and partisanship. 






0.046 (0.047) 0.337 0.038 (0.135) 0.780 
Expenditure 
-0.111 (0.066) 0.048 -0.071 (0.189) 0.354 
Revenue 
-0.065 (0.037) 0.041 -0.034 (0.106) 0.377 
 
    
Social benefits 
-0.054 (0.030) 0.038 -0.030 (0.087) 0.365 
Public-sector compensation 
-0.018 (0.013) 0.079 -0.012 (0.036) 0.366 
 
    
Income 
-2.370 (2.224) 0.144 -0.556 (4.382) 0.500 
Revenue 
-0.115 (0.524) 0.413 -0.227 (1.064) 0.416 
Consumption 
-0.503 (0.844) 0.276 0.687 (1.712) 0.344 
                                                 





-0.720 (0.458) 0.059 0.024 (0.929) 0.490 
Social-security 
contributions 
-1.045 (0.581) 0.037 -0.770 (1.178) 0.257 
Revenue 
-0.147 (0.407) 0.359 -0.085 (0.826) 0.459 
Corporate 
6.090 (2.994) 0.022 2.880 (6.075) 0.318 
Revenue 
0.388 (0.546) 0.239 0.108 (1.107) 0.461 
Table 5. Marginal effects on various fiscal-policy variables of a shift in partisanship of government differentiated by 
levels of consonance. The first column indicates the relevant dependent variable. The filled-in cells separate the 
table by the study’s three sets of dependent variables: aggregated fiscal policy; disaggregated expenditure 
components; and disaggregated revenue components. The second column indicates the marginal-effect estimates for 
low-consonance political contexts; roughly, this corresponds to the difference between a socialist-led coalition 
government and a conservative-led coalition government. The fourth column indicates the marginal-effect estimates 
for high-consonance political contexts; roughly, this corresponds to the difference between a socialist single-party 
majority and a conservative single-party majority. In the second and fourth columns, mean estimates are presented 
with standard errors in parentheses. The third and fifth columns indicate the p-values for the hypothesis tests; all are 
one-tailed, except with respect to the aggregate deficit, which is two-tailed. 
 
Low-consonance results 
Table 5 displays the marginal effect on a variety of fiscal-policy dependent variables of 
shifting from a left to a right government. The first column lists the relevant dependent variables; 
the second and fourth indicate marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses, for low- and 
high-consonance governments, respectively.11 Among low-consonance governments, center-
right governments run 4.6 percentage point (ppt) lower deficits than center-left governments, 
                                                 
11 The low-consonance marginal effect of a shift in partisanship is calculated with the following equation: 
MARGINAL EFFECT = (0.5*MODRILE + 0.25*CONSONANCE + 0.5*MODRILE*0.25*CONSONANCE) – 
(0.25*CONSONANCE) = (0.5*MODRILE + 0.5*MODRILE*0.25*CONSONANCE). The two parenthetical terms 
represent estimates of fiscal policy under right and left governments respectively. Subtracting the two thus gives an 
estimate of the marginal effect of partisanship on a given type of fiscal policy. The 0.5’s in the first parenthetical 
term reflect the structural relationship between consonance and partisanship. In a low-consonance setting, 
partisanship scores are closer to the mean partisanship score of 0.50 than in high-consonance settings, when 
partisanship scores are distributed at the peripheries near 0 and 1. Scaling MODRILE by 0.5 in low-consonance 
settings thus reflects that a shift in partisanship in the low-consonance context would be a shift from center-left to 
center-right, rather than a shift from left to right. Similarly, scaling CONSANANCE by 0.25 reflects the low-
consonance environments. The marginal effect of a shift in partisanship in a high-consonance setting is calculated 
with the following equation: MARGINAL EFFECT = (1.0*MODRILE + 0.75*CONSONANCE + 
1.0*MODRILE*0.75*CONSONANCE) – (0.75*CONSONANCE) = (1.0*MODRILE + 
1.0*MODRILE*0.75*CONSONANCE). In contrast with the low-consonance estimate, MODRILE is not scaled, 
because a shift from left to right in the high-consonance context would correspond to a shift between left 
(MODRILE=0) and right (MODRILE=1), rather than between center-left (MODRILE=0.25) and center-right 




although the difference is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.337). This complements the t-
test’s lack of partisanship-decisiveness with respect to the deficit. As in Table 3’s t-tests, the 
difference in deficits reflects both significantly lower expenditures and revenues among center-
right governments. A shift from a center-left to a center-right government reduces expenditures 
by 11.1 ppt’s (p-value of 0.048) and revenue from taxation by 9.0 ppt’s (p-value of 0.041). The 
difference in expenditures between center-left and center-right governments is driven both by 
lower expenditures on social benefits and public-sector compensation under center-right 
governments. A shift from center-left to center-right government reduces spending on social 
benefits by 5.4 ppt’s (p-value of 0.038) and public-sector compensation by 1.8 ppt’s (p-value of 
0.079). Both effects are statistically and substantively significant. These results reinforce and 
refine the t-test results. Controlling for bond-yields, consonance, and GDP, spending on social 
benefits remains robustly significant and spending on public-sector compensation becomes 
significant.  
The difference in revenues among low-consonance governments is driven by a 
combination of effects. Low-consonance, center-left governments assess significantly higher 
income taxes, consumption taxes, and social-security taxes, although only the effect of 
partisanship on social-security taxes is significant. A shift between center-right and center-left 
governments increases income taxes by 2.4 ppt’s (p-value of 0.144), consumption taxes by 0.5 
ppt (p-value of 0.276), and social-security contributions by 1.0 ppt (p-value of 0.037). 
Problematically, a shift to the center-left reduces corporate taxes by 6.1 ppt’s (p-value of 0.022). 
Subsequent section discuss the anomalous findings with respect to corporate taxes. These 
differences in rates correspond to differences in revenue in the expected directions: higher 




generate lower revenue. However, the only significant revenue effect is with respect to 
consumption taxes (p-value of 0.059).  
High-consonance results 
As in the case of low-consonance governments, right governments in high-consonance 
settings run lower deficits than left governments; the difference between the two types of 
governments is roughly 3.8 ppt’s. Right governments spend 7.1 ppt’s less than left governments. 
In concert with the differences in expenditure, right governments generate 3.4 ppt’s less revenue 
than left governments.  With respect to social benefits, on average, right governments spend 3.0 
ppt’s less than left governments. With respect to public-sector compensation, right governments 
spend 1.2 ppt’s less than left governments. On the tax side, in high-consonance settings, income 
taxes and social-security contributions are lower under right governments. Consumption and 
corporate rates are higher under right governments. In the aggregate, these differences in tax 
burden in high-consonance settings lead to higher aggregate revenue among left governments. In 
contrast to the broad-based statistical significance observed in the low-consonance context, none 
of the high-consonance marginal effects are significant. Thus, the significance of the findings in 
the aggregate, as shown in Tables A1 and A2, are driven by significant effects in low-
consonance settings. The final section explores both the reasons for and the implications of the 
difference in statistical significance between the two settings. 
External actors 
In addition to the hybrid model’s hypothesized effects of partisanship and consonance, 
the model suggests that external actors play a significant role in shaping fiscal-policy outcomes. 
In this chapter, bond yields measure the influence of external actors and captures the degree to 




higher probability that governments will resort to external actors for funding. In the regression 
context, however, bond yields are included only as a control. As Figure 7’s schematic suggests, 
the influence of external actors depends on complicated mixture of supply- and demand-side 
factors, which are difficult to capture in a regression framework. The remaining chapters, 
through a variety of quantitative and qualitative approaches, evaluate the effects of bond-yield 
pressure, and thus external actors, on fiscal-policy outcomes.    
Theoretical implications 
 The various preferences in Table 4 manifest in different fiscal policies adopted by 
different types of political parties in response to financial crises. These varying responses 
underscore problems with each of the three dominant approaches to characterizing fiscal policy: 
partisan MR; convergence; and VoC.  Left and right governments behave in distinct manners, as 
implied by a partisan MR model. The results in Chapter 3 suggest that Chapter 1’s hybrid model 
outperforms an unreformed MR model, because the hybrid model incorporates insights borrowed 
from both the convergence and VoC approaches. From the former, the hybrid model incorporate 
the importance of external actors, as mediated by financial markets. From the latter, the hybrid 
model incorporates a more sophisticated understanding of domestic politics with respect to 
coalition politics. Such dynamics are particularly important in the context of the Eurozone’s, 
predominantly parliamentary, politics. The time-series analysis, t-tests, and fixed-effects 
regressions grant an increasingly refined picture of how governments respond to crisis using 
fiscal policy. The remaining two subsections discuss two potentially problematic findings for the 
hybrid model: the limited significance of consonance in the fixed-effects regressions and the 
marginal effect of partisanship on corporate-tax rates.  




 Contrary to theoretical expectations, consonance appears to have little conditioning effect 
on partisanship’s shaping of fiscal-policy outcomes. The hybrid model predicts that an increase 
in consonance should intensify the effect of partisanship on fiscal-policy outcomes; Table 5’s 
results, however, display no such effects. There are a number of potential explanations for 
consonance’s broad insignificance. Two of the most important are mismeasurement and 
misspecification. Mismeasurement would be a problem, even if the theoretical relationship 
between partisanship, consonance, and fiscal policy is correctly specified in the hybrid model. As 
discussed, the structural relationship between consonance and partisanship renders the separate 
measurement of the two variables particularly difficult. By definition, consonance is high when 
partisanship adopts extreme values; consonance is low for intermediate values of partisanship. 
The collinearity between the two renders identification of separate effects particularly difficult.  
The insignificance of consonance may also stem from misspecification. Indeed, Figure 
7’s emphasis on the distinction between left/center-left and right/center-right may be overstated. 
For example, there may be little difference in the fiscal-policy outcomes between left and center-
left governments, if left parties hold the relevant fiscal-policy portfolios in either case. Coalition 
governments would produce similar policy to single-party governments of the same partisan hue, 
if each minister operated with relative independence over either his or her portfolio.12 Moreover, 
even when coalition partners take significant fiscal-policy portfolios, their views may be ignored. 
This has been the case in Ireland’s post-crisis Fine Gael-Labour coalition government. The 
Labour party held two important portfolios related to fiscal policy: Public Expenditure and 
Reform; and Social Protection. Notwithstanding their possessing key portfolios, Leahy 
                                                 
12 The relative autonomy of ministers with respect to their portfolio is a common assumption in the literature on 
parliamentary politics. For a representative example, see the following: Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
eds. Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies. Cambridge 




documents Labour’s frustration in systematically being ignored and boxed out of discussions 
over and discussions related to fiscal policy.13 Similar tension occurred in Ireland’s three-party 
pre-crisis coalition government. Fianna Fail dominated fiscal-policy decisions. Such unilateral 
domination eventually led to the Green Party’s departure from the coalition and February 2011’s 
general elections. 
An anomaly: Higher corporate-tax rates under right governments? 
 The findings with respect to corporate taxation appear to contravene the hypotheses by 
Table 4 motivated by the distributional consequences of fiscal policy. Table 5 ostensibly 
suggests that a shift to the right increases corporate-tax rates. However, in interpreting Table 5’s 
results, it is important to bear in mind the trends identified in Figure 5, which shows the time 
series of changes in corporate-tax regimes. Figure 5 shows a broad-based, pre-crisis reduction in 
corporate-tax rates. Following the crisis, corporate-tax rates remained steady. Because right 
governments came to power as a result of post-crisis, anti-incumbent sentiment, a 
decontextualized interpretation of Figure 5 and Table 5’s regression analysis implies that right 
governments impose higher corporate taxes relative to left governments. Instead, a more 
sophisticated reading suggests that the results in Table 5 reflect the expansionary pre-crisis 
financial environment, in which left parties implemented broad-based expansionary measures. In 
the post-crisis period, right parties held corporate taxes in place to the relative benefit of 
corporations; this contrasts with the elevated taxes targeted towards other constituencies. Thus, 
right governments favored corporations in the post-crisis period, even though, by comparison, 
they appeared to treat corporations unfavorably compared with pre-crisis left governments which 
operated under a different set of financial constraints. This interpretative difficulty underscores 
                                                 




the broader problem of relying only on large-N, quantitative approaches that either ignore or 
obscure political context. Chapters 5, 6 & 7 foreground qualitative approaches that reduce the 






Appendix to Chapter 3 
  
 DEFICIT EXPENDITURE REVENUE SOCIAL 
BENEFITS 
COMPENSATION 
GDP (in billions of Euro) -0.000151** 0.000546*** 0.000395*** 0.000256*** 0.0000947 
t-statistic -2.33 6.01 7.72 6.13 5.51 
MODRILE 0.118 -0.297*** -0.179*** -0.148*** -0.0472**  
t-statistic 1.58 -2.85 -3.06 -3.09 -2.39 
CONSONANCE 0.0906** -0.233*** -0.143*** -0.107*** -0.0352*** 
t-statistic 2.01 -3.7 -4.02 -3.69 -2.95 
MODRILE*CONSONANCE -0.107 0.302*** 0.194*** 0.157*** 0.0467**  
t-statistic -1.33 2.66 3.05 3.02 2.18 
BOND-YIELD -0.00399* 0.00428 0.00029 0.00205 -0.0000821 
t-statistic -1.73 1.32 0.16 1.38 -0.13 
CONSTANT 0.0239 0.202** 0.226*** 0.0645* 0.0627*** 
t-statistic 0.4 2.42 4.8 1.68 3.96 
OBSERVATIONS 152 152 152 152 152 
Table A1. Regression of aggregated adjustment measures and expenditure subcomponents on theoretical measures 
discussed in Chapter 1. Dependent variables are listed across the columns in the first row; independent variables are 
listed along the rows. The panel regression employs robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Asterisks 
indicate varying levels of significance: *, p < 0.10; **, p < 0.05; and ***, p<0.01. 
 
 INCOME  CONSUMPTION SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
 CORPORATE 
 RATE REVENUE RATE REVENUE RATE REVENUE RATE REVENUE 
GDP -0.0130*** 0.00211** 0.00904*** -0.000993 -0.00113 0.000933 -0.0438*** -0.000601 
t-statistic -3.33 2.33 6.22 -1.26 -1.13 1.33 -8.48 -0.64 
MODRILE -6.833 -0.232 -1.853 -2.171** -2.750** -0.398 16.83*** 1.109 
t-statistic -1.52 -0.22 -1.11 -2.39 -2.39 -0.49 2.83 1.02 
CONSONANCE -6.704** -0.238 -2.942*** -1.657*** -0.804 -0.737 12.47*** 0.452 
t-statistic -2.48 -0.38 -2.91 -3.02 -1.16 -1.51 3.47 0.68 
MODRILE* 
CONSONANCE 
8.370* 0.00649 3.387* 2.926*** 2.640** 0.418 -18.60** -1.335 
t-statistic 1.72 0.06 1.87 2.97 2.11 0.48 -2.89 -1.14 
BOND-YIELD 0.816*** 0.0567* 0.221*** 0.00741 0.0765** -0.0200 -0.281 -0.00836 
t-statistic 6.19 1.83 4.48 0.28 2.26 -0.84 -1.61 -0.26 
CONSTANT 59.81*** 6.842*** 13.35*** 13.13*** 40.30*** 11.81*** 56.08*** 2.805*** 
t-statistic 16.96 8.33 10.12 18.37 44.43 18.59 11.78 3.28 
OBSERVATIONS 156 154 156 155 156 155 156 154 
Table A2. Regression of disaggregated revenue measures on theoretical measures discussed in Chapter 1. Dependent 
variables are listed across the columns in the first row; independent variables are listed along the rows. The panel 
regression employs robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate varying levels of 





Figure A1. MODRILE and consonance over the sample. Extreme values of MODRILE (either high or low) tend to 
be associated with high levels of consonance. Intermediate values of MODRILE tend to be associated with 




















Chapter 4: Bond yields, correlation structure, and the financial crisis 
 
Introduction 
 The present chapter details important indirect evidence related to adjustment policy in the 
Eurozone. Bond yields are a measure of domestic politicians’ susceptibility to the pressure of 
external financial actors. In the context of Figure 1, bond yields capture the degree to which the 
dashed arrow acts as a binding constraint on domestic governments. Yields indicate the cost of 
funds on capital markets; when these rates are prohibitively high, governments either adjust 
internally or turn to external actors. With the relatively long time horizon of internal fiscal 
adjustment (i.e., the fiscal gains from tax increases and spending cuts take time to materialize) 
and the immediate threat of default, bond yields provide a rough measure of domestic 
policymakers’ demand for funds from external actors. This chapter thus documents the variation 
in pressure faced by domestic policymakers across the crisis sample.  
  
Figure 1. Schematic of the hybrid model’s theoretical logic. Variables are listed in bold, with associated dimensions 
in parentheses.  
 
 In addition, Chapter 4 formally addresses the ubiquitous notion of a homogenous 
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present chapter demonstrates that financial markets treated each of the countries with a 
remarkable degree of nuance. While correlation between debt yields fluctuated throughout the 
crisis, reflecting variable degrees of contagion risk, bond markets differentiated between 
sovereigns to a far greater extent than is recognized by the popular press. Such differentiation 
appeared particularly prominent late in the crisis period. 
 The remainder of Chapter 4 is divided into four sections. The first section provides an 
overview of the role of bond yields in and following the crisis. In particular, the section presents 
explanations found in the literature on financial crises and fiscal policy. The second section 
presents summary statistics of bond-yield data over the study’s sample. The third section 
contains the empirical core of the chapter and presents factor analyses of bond yields over the 
entire period along with a variety of subsamples. The fourth section concludes the chapter and 
emphasizes how the analytical results differ from the conventional narrative produced by the 
media. 
Overview 
Bond yields are important for a variety of reasons. Not least, because politicians pay 
close attention to them. This is particularly the case during periods of economic turmoil, when 
economies rely on debt markets to fund expenditures. During such periods, politicians prefer to 
draw on debt markets rather than requesting the aid of external actors because of the conditions 
attached to funds provided by external actors. That said, some actors are more willing to resort to 
external actors if they are able to extract resources without granting substantial concessions. This 
has been the case with Italy and Spain, which reap the benefits of the supply-side advantages 
implied by the hybrid model and shown in Figure 1. Too large to bail out, Italy and Spain 





supply-side advantages, extensive conditionality typically accompanies funds. Chapters 5, 6 & 7 
explore the comparative dynamics of bond-market access for small and large economics in great 
depth. 
 
Figure 2. Bond yields over the crisis countries with German yields presented as a baseline. The vertical axis presents 
bond yields between 0 and 40 percent. The horizontal axis ranges from 2000 to 2014, although the study’s sample 
only covers 2000 to 2013. County names are indicated near the country’s maximum yield over the period. Each 
country’s yield is color-coded: Germany (green); Greece (yellow); Ireland (light blue); Italy (dark blue); Portugal 
(gray); and Spain (red). 
 
The creation of the European Union led to an unprecedented convergence of sovereign-
debt yields among Eurozone economies.  Figure 2 shows that yields on peripheral debt declined 
towards the German bund, as investors assumed that, in joining the Eurozone, countries in crisis 
would have access to, inter alia, Berlin’s deep fiscal coffers. Nouriel Roubini, writing in the 





















“convergence trade.”1 Troublingly, the financial-market convergence occurred without either the 
fiscal or banking union required to transfer resources in response to a hypothetical crisis. Chapter 
5 discusses how the lack of such a framework inhibited the initial Eurozone-wide responses to 
the 2008 financial crisis, exacerbated financial-market uncertainty, and ultimately both fueled 
and deepened the crisis. Importantly, the lack of either a fiscal or a banking union reflected a 
conscious political choice by the Eurozone’s member countries. Such unions would have 
required the prospective transfer of resources that the wealthy, primarily Northern, core proved 
unwilling to countenance. 
The tight convergence had three primary implications for the politics of adjustment 
policy. First, the convergence effectively eliminated country-specific risk in sovereign-debt 
markets. Between 2000 and the middle of 2008 the spread between the German bund and the 
yields of crisis countries was effectively zero. One way to interpret the contagion and turmoil 
that followed the 2008 financial crisis is the process through which bond markets began to price 
in country-specific risk. Second, before country-specific risk emerged on bond markets in mid-
2008, the yield convergence allowed peripheral governments to sustainably finance large budget 
deficits. As a result, the dashed line in Figure 1 from external actors to domestic policy was not 
binding and thereby reduced the influence of external actors on domestic policy. Third, country-
specific risk emerged gradually and haltingly. Bond traders did not begin to price country-
specific risk efficiently overnight. In Figure 2, spreads increase in mid-2008 with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, but crisis-country yields do not separate from one another until 2010. In the 
interim, bond market continued treat countries in groups, regardless of substantial differences in 
with respect to both politics and fiscal sustainability. It was this grouping that gave rise to, and 
                                                 





encouraged, the misleading acronym of “PIIGS” to flourish. However, on the bond markets, this 
group appeared as an aggregate, homogenous phenomenon only briefly—roughly from the 
middle of 2008 through the beginning of 2009. After this period, significant spreads emerged, 
even though there were periods of significant and positive correlation (during the negotiations 
over the first and second Greek bailouts). In contrast to misleading and homogenizing analyses, 
the governments and economies in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain confronted 
problems substantially different from one another and possessed disparate sets of political tools. 
With a limited number of exceptions, these differences tended to be treated differently by 
lenders, particularly late in the crisis period, as reflected in the divergent movements of 
sovereign-debt yields. The degree to which the press reflected this divergence lagged behind the 
financial-market nuance. 
A large academic literature explores the dynamics of bond yields in general and within 
the Eurozone in particular. Most of these studies seek to identify either the determinants of 
sovereign-bond spreads or how these determinants change over time. Ejsing & Lemke (2009) 
performs both of these tasks and finds that the value of credit default swaps (CDS on sovereign 
debt increase following the onset of the financial crisis.2 The authors also find increased CDS 
sensitivity to fiscal policy in Eurozone countries following the onset of the financial crisis. 
Sgherri & Zoli (2009) identify a time-varying, common factor in Eurozone spreads.3 The authors 
catalogue a number of distinct regimes, but their analysis is restricted between the creation of the 
Euro in January 1999 and April 2009. Bernoth & Erdogan (2010) model the time-varying 
                                                 
2 Ejsing, Jacob, and Wolfgang Lemke. "The Janus-headed salvation: Sovereign and bank credit risk premia during 
2008–2009." Economics Letters 110.1 (2011): 28-31. 





common component explicitly and largely confirm the results of Sgherri & Zoli.4 Bernoth & 
Erdogan advance the discussion of Sgherri & Zoli by including variables to explain country-level 
changes in bond yields. In addition to the common factor identified by previous studies, Bernoth 
& Erdogan finds that a country’s level of debt explains variation in bond yields. As is the case 
with the common factor, however, the individual country-effect is time-varying. 
In contrast to previous studies that analyze data through the first year of the financial 
crisis, at the latest, Chapter 4’s analysis includes bond yields through the end of 2013. As in 
previous studies, the present chapter identifies a number of regimes in which bond yields 
displayed distinctive behavior. The present  bond-yield analysis traces the post-accession 
convergence trade through the gradual emergence of country-specific risk following the financial 
crisis. The chapter identifies three distinct periods that differentiate behavior of bond markets: 
pre-accession; pre-crisis but post-accession; and post-crisis.  
Country Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Germany 5191 4.096 1.499 1.146 7.755 
Finland 4814 4.110 1.375 1.286 7.970 
Netherlands 5166 4.243 1.402 1.339 7.874 
France 5176 4.350 1.413 1.542 8.431 
Belgium 5167 4.540 1.376 1.537 8.680 
Spain 5172 5.291 2.021 2.541 12.559 
Ireland 4678 5.346 1.802 2.244 14.079 
Italy 5173 5.457 2.253 2.704 13.753 
Portugal 4326 5.490 2.112 3.160 17.393 
Greece 4237 7.654 6.021 3.230 37.101 
Table 1. Summary statistics of Eurozone bond yields between 1994 and 2014. The first column indicates the 
relevant country; the second column indicates the number of observations available for a given country over the 
sample; the third column indicates the mean bond yields; the fourth column indicates the standard deviation of the 
bond yields; the fifth and sixth columns give the minimum and maximum bond yields over the sample, respectively.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
                                                 
4 Bernoth, Kerstin, and Burcu Erdogan. "Sovereign bond yield spreads: A time-varying coefficient 





Table 1 summarizes bond-yield data from selected countries in the Eurozone. Data is 
taken from Bloomberg and includes all crisis countries in addition to all other Eurozone 
members for which data is available.5 The data runs from 1994 to 2014. Particular dates of 
interest over this time include the creation of the Eurozone on 1 January 1999 and the failure of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. The latter is used to mark the beginning of the financial 
crisis in Europe.  
 Table 1 reveals a number of important features of the bond-yield data. First, the time 
series for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are noticeably shorter than for the remaining countries. 
Data collection began in February 1997 for Portugal and March 1998 for Greece. Irish debt, on 
the other hand, stopped trading between October 2011 and March 2013.6 Second, and most 
relevant to the present analysis, the mean and standard deviation data divides the countries 
roughly into two categories. In the first, low-volatility category, which includes Germany, 
Finland, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium, bond yields are below 4.5% with standard 
deviations below 1.5. In the second, high-volatility category, which includes Spain, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Greece, bond yields are above 5% with standard deviations closer to and 
above two. Even in the high-volatility category, Greece is a relative outlier in both mean and 
standard deviation with an average bond yield of 7.7% and a standard deviation of six. The 
ranges similarly reflect these low- and high-volatility categories.  
Regime analysis 
Methodology 
                                                 
5 Data on Slovakia was available but not included because it entered the Eurozone relatively late in the sample. 
Thus, Slovakia would introduce post-accession currency risk not present in any other sample countries. Whereas 
regression-based approaches enable controlling for Eurozone entry, factor analysis does not permit such flexibility.  





 Previous studies employ a variety of methods to analyze Eurozone bond yields. Most of 
these methods leverage the cross-section and time-series variation in extended financial time 
series. One set of studies employs regression frameworks to identify the determinants of bond-
yield spreads. The other set of studies employs multivariate methods to characterize the 
interrelationship between bond yields. The present chapter discusses the former method but 
exclusively applies the latter. The former approach specifies models of bond yields as a function 
of macroeconomic fundamentals and fiscal characteristics. Haugh, Ollivarud & Turner (2009)7 
and Sgherri & Zoli (2009) fall into this category. The papers differ on the basis of the sample 
considered, but both identify significant effects of debt-burden on bond yields. The two papers 
emphasize the relative importance of credit to liquidity risk in spreads.8 While there are 
important advantages to the approach taken in the first set of studies, they rely on an 
underdeveloped theoretical framework. While a fully specified, general equilibrium model for 
sovereign bond yields is unrealistic, it is unclear whether and how important political events such 
as elections and coalition conflicts influence bond yields, independent of the macroeconomic and 
fiscal characteristics already identified in the present studies. 
 While both papers note that the effects of fiscal and macroeconomic characteristics are 
time-varying, a second set of papers models the temporal dependence more explicitly. This 
second set of studies searches for more general trends in the data. In the process, these papers 
avoid the identification concerns implied by the general-equilibrium criticism of the first set. In 
doing so, however, the second set forgoes the opportunity to identify the effect of discrete events 
                                                 
7 Haugh, David, Patrice Ollivaud, and David Turner. "What Drives Sovereign Risk Premiums?" OECD Working 
Paper. (2009). 
8 Credit risk is the risk of default based on insolvency. Liquidity is the risk that arises from default based on cash 
flow and generally arises because of mismatch in the term (i.e., time horizon) of assets and liabilities. An example of 
liquidity risk involves the long-term, relatively illiquid assets held by banks compared with their relatively short-





on bond spreads. Bernoth & Erdogan (2010) employs a semiparametric, time-varying coefficient 
model to formalize the regime analysis. The authors find that the effects of fiscal characteristics 
on bond yields vary across time.  Geyer, Kossmeier & Pichler (2004) identifies two latent factors 
that explain the majority of variation in Eurozone spreads.9 Because of its publication date, 
however, the study does not include data from the 2008 financial crisis. Ejsing & Lemke (2009) 
proxy for a common risk factor using the iTraxx index of non-financial CDS premia. The iTraxx 
index is a financial index of credit default swaps. Their results are robust to employing a 
common factor constructed using factor analysis, the approach adopted in the present chapter. 
Ejsing & Lemke find that the amount of variation explained by the common factor varies over 
time, with a clear structural break at the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis. The present paper 
follows Ejsing & Lemke in identifying a common risk factor. The present chapter, however, 
departs from past literature in several main ways. First, Chapter 4 extends the sample of past 
studies, which terminate, at the latest, after the first year of the financial crisis. Second, the 
chapter employs factor analysis. Third, the chapter emphasizes cross-section, as well as time-
series, variation in the interrelationship of bond yields. Factor analysis provides a tractable 
method to study both types of variation.  
 Factor analysis reduces the dimensionality of large datasets. Through the reduction, 
factor analysis identifies common elements and distinguishes features across series. The 
following discussion draws heavily on Tsay (2010).10 Suppose a sample contains observed bond 
yields, Yct, of C countries over T time periods. A general factor model then assumes the 
following form: 
                                                 
9 Geyer, Alois, Stephan Kossmeier, and Stefan Pichler. "Measuring systematic risk in EMU government yield 
spreads." Review of Finance 8.2 (2004): 171-197. 





Yct = α c + βc1*f1t + … + βcm *f mt +  ct, c=1,…,C; t=1,…,T,  (Equation 1) 
where α c is a country-specific constant that does not vary over time; {fjt|j=1,…,m} are m 
common factors; βcj is the factor loading for country c on the jth factor, and ct is the specific 
factor of country c at time t. The parameters of primary theoretical interest are the coefficients on 
the common factors. Also important is the proportion of bond-yield variation explained by each 
common factor. There is not a “correct” number of common factors. In general, Chapter 4 
presents the first three factors but analyzes only the first two. Typically, the first two factors 
explain more than 95% of the observed variation in bond yields. The next section applies factor 
analysis to the aggregated data; subsections perform factor analysis on particular subsamples 
with an eye towards characterizing different regimes of bond-yield behavior. 
Aggregate 
 Table 1’s summary statistics mask important variation, both in the cross-section and time 
series. Factor analysis is first applied to the aggregate data before being applied to different 
subsamples of data. In each of the factor analyses, tables present the factor loadings for the first 
three factors, except in Table 6, for which only two factors are presented due to data limitations. 
In the context of Equation 1, the first three factors correspond to βc1, βc2, and βc3, respectively, 
where c indicates a particular country. The bottom two rows of each table indicate the proportion 
of variance explained and eigenvalues for each factor.11 These measures indicate the relative 
importance of the various factors. 
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Belgium 0.994 -0.019 0.070 
Finland 0.965 -0.249 0.058 
France 0.975 -0.216 0.025 
                                                 
11 Like the proportion of variance explained, the eigenvalue provides a measure of each factor’s relative importance. 
The two expressions are mathematically related. The proportion of variance explained by a given factors is equal to 
the factor’s eigenvalue divided by the number of variables, which in the present context, correspond to the number 





Germany 0.943 -0.305 0.073 
Greece -0.171 0.943 -0.006 
Ireland 0.316 0.827 0.332 
Italy 0.875 0.387 -0.259 
Netherlands 0.965 -0.255 0.048 
Portugal 0.132 0.966 -0.011 
Spain 0.778 0.562 -0.183 
Proportion 0.640 0.334 0.023 
Eigenvalue 6.209 3.240 0.227 
Table 2. Factor analysis of Eurozone bond yields between 1994 and 2014. The first column indicates the relevant 
country. The second, third, and fourth columns indicate the factor loadings. The two bolded rows at the bottom of 
the table indicate the proportion of variance explained by a given factor and the factor’s eigenvalue. 
 
Table 2 displays the results of factor analysis on the aggregate data, spanning all 
countries in the dataset from 1994 to 2014. The results reinforce the intuition with respect to 
high- and low-volatility categories implied by Table 1’s summary statistics, with two important 
caveats. The first factor indicates the degree to which Greece is an outlier. First, explaining 
nearly two-third of the variation in yields, the first factor indicates the exceptional position of 
Greece, whose negative loading contrast with the positive loading on each remaining country. 
While Portugal’s and Ireland’s loadings are relatively close to Greece’s, the first factor can be 
interpreted as the extent to which countries are not like Greece. Second, with respect to the first 
factor, Italy and Spain appear more similar to the low-volatility countries than those in the high-
volatility countries. However, underscoring Table 1’s key stylized fact, the second factor, which 
explains approximately a third of the variation in the dataset, divides the countries into the same 
low- and high-volatility groups found in Table 1. 
 To examine variation over time, subsequent analysis divides the sample into three sub-
samples. First, Table 3 presents the results of factor analysis on bond-yield data prior to the 
creation of the Euro, on 1 January 1999; this subsample is referred to as the pre-accession 
subsample. Next, Table 4 presents the results of factor analysis on bond yields after the creation 





here as the failure of Lehman on 15 September 2008; this subsample is referred to as the post-
accession, pre-crisis subsample. Finally, Table 5 presents the results of factor analysis on bond 
yields after the onset of the financial crisis; this subsample is referred to as the post-crisis 
subsample.  
The pre-accession subsample 
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Belgium 0.990 -0.088 -0.062 
France 0.994 -0.006 -0.075 
Germany 0.985 -0.160 0.051 
Ireland 0.993 0.002 0.102 
Italy 0.979 0.199 0.016 
Netherlands 0.991 -0.128 -0.015 
Spain 0.981 0.185 -0.016 
Proportion 0.980 0.018 0.003 
Eigenvalue 6.826 0.123 0.023 
Table 3. Factor analysis of Eurozone bond yields between 1994 and 1 January 1999, the creation of the Euro. See 
Table 2 for further explanation. 
  
Table 3 presents the factor analysis of the pre-accession subsample. Finland, Greece, and 
Portugal are excluded from the analysis in Table 3, because data collection on these countries did 
not begin until after the subsample. Table 3 introduces nuance to the intuition implied by Table 
1. The second factor differentiates between groups. However, it explains only 2% of the 
variation in bond yield data. The overwhelming importance of Factor 1 indicates the successful 
progress on economic convergence that preceded the adoption of the Euro. The relative 
dominance of the first factor also reflects the exclusion of Greece and Portugal, the two countries 
identified as most distinctive in Table 2’s aggregate analysis. Notwithstanding the exclusion of 
Greece and Portugal, the tight relationship of yields is surprising given that the subsample 
includes country-specific currency risk, which was not formally limited until the introduction of 





financial markets, as actors anticipated the consequences of the Euro’s creation and drove 
spreads near zero prior to the formal introduction of the currency. 
The post-accession, pre-crisis subsample 
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Belgium 0.999 -0.013 -0.025 
Finland 0.998 -0.007 0.042 
France 0.999 -0.044 0.023 
Germany 0.994 -0.073 0.075 
Greece 0.869 0.332 0.006 
Ireland 0.995 -0.032 -0.002 
Italy 0.994 -0.068 -0.066 
Netherlands 0.999 -0.037 0.025 
Portugal 0.998 -0.014 -0.051 
Spain 0.999 -0.021 -0.026 
Proportion 0.986 0.013 0.002 
Eigenvalue 9.703 0.125 0.017 
Table 4. Factor analysis of Eurozone bond yields between 1 January 1999, the creation of the Euro, and 15 
September 2008, the onset of the financial crisis. See Table 2 for further explanation. 
 
Table 4 analyzes the span of time after the formation of the Euro (post-accession) but 
before the financial crisis (pre-crisis). It includes those countries, Finland, Greece, and Portugal, 
excluded from Table 3’s analysis. Following the convergence process that accompanied 
accession to the single currency, the first factor explains 97% of the variation in debt yields. 
Interestingly, this suggests that the formal introduction of the Euro did little to push spreads 
together. The financial-market implications had been internalized in the years prior to the Euro’s 
introduction. The second factor explains a similarly small proportion of variation as in the pre-
accession subsample. The second factor’s effect, however, is dominated by Greece, which had 
been excluded from Table 3’s analysis. This provides empirical corroboration of Greece’s outlier 
mean and standard deviation in Table 1. Moreover, it shows that prior to the crisis, the so-called 
“PIIGS”—referred to here as crisis countries—were not all treated similarly. Bond yields in 





Europe than the already precarious Greek position. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it 
became conventional to refer to these as behaviorally, economically, and financially similar. 
Table 4 underscores how these similarities, at least from the perspective of financial markets, 
were not present prior to the financial crisis. The similarity in financial position among the crisis 
countries emerged only following the onset of the crisis, as a comparison of Tables 4 & 5 
indicates.  
The post-crisis subsample and the emergence of country-specific risk 
 
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Belgium 0.981 -0.118 0.033 
Finland 0.873 -0.481 0.029 
France 0.910 -0.410 0.003 
Germany 0.867 -0.476 0.082 
Greece 0.215 0.935 0.114 
Ireland 0.738 0.552 0.299 
Italy 0.785 0.456 -0.370 
Netherlands 0.875 -0.480 -0.008 
Portugal 0.372 0.902 0.053 
Spain 0.672 0.654 -0.147 
Proportion 0.605 0.361 0.028 
Eigenvalue 5.866 3.498 0.272 
Table 5. Factor analysis of Eurozone bond yields following 15 September 2008, the onset of the financial crisis. See 
Table 2 for further explanation. 
 
Table 5 analyzes the span of time after the financial crisis (post-crisis), dated as the 
failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. Table 5 reveals a number of important 
characteristics of the post-crisis period. In contrast to the previous two tables, the second factor 
in Table 5 explains a significant proportion of variation. In Table 2, which aggregates all data 
over time, the second factor explains a third of the variation in bond-yield data. In Tables 4 & 5, 
the second factors explain a trivial proportion of variation. Thus, a comparison of Tables 3, 4 & 5 
indicates that the significance of the second factor, which can be interpreted as the emergence of 





financial crisis, the second factor explains more than a third of the variation, while the first factor 
explains less than two-thirds. Compared with the data from the pre-crisis periods, the first and 
second factors from the post-crisis period indicate the divergence of economic fortunes in 
contrast to the homogeneity implied by the pervasive positive correlations displayed in Tables 2, 
3 & 4. As in the post-accession, pre-crisis subsample, the second factor in the post-crisis 
subsample distinguishes low- from high-volatility countries, with similarly signed weightings on 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. However, the loadings on the first factor in the post-
crisis subsample hint at more subtle variation within the set of crisis countries. The loadings on 
Greece and Portugal are noticeably lower than those on all other countries, both those in low- 
and high-volatility categories. Table 6 delves further into this variation. 
Post-accession, pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Country Factor 1 Factor 2 
Greece 0.874 0.247 Greece 0.868 -0.406 
Ireland 0.993 -0.051 Ireland 0.852 0.079 
Italy 0.994 -0.106 Italy 0.823 0.375 
Portugal 0.998 -0.039 Portugal 0.943 -0.250 
Spain 0.999 -0.021 Spain 0.931 0.228 
Proportion 0.985 0.016 Proportion 0.919 0.100 
Eigenvalue 4.729 0.077 Eigenvalue 3.913 0.426 
Table 6. Factor analysis of Eurozone bond yields in subsets of risis countries. The left-hand-side of the figure 
displays post-accession, pre-crisis results. The right-hand-side of the figure displays post-crisis results. The column 
and rows correspond on both the right- and left-hand-sides correspond to those in Table 2; see Table 2 for further 
explanation. 
 
Table 6 analyzes the subset of high-volatility countries. The left-hand-side displays post-
accession, pre-crisis results; the right-hand-side displays post-crisis results. The analysis reveals 
a number of important characteristics of bond yields in high-volatility countries. First, the first 
factor explains the majority of variation, as in all the previous tables. Moreover, the convergence 
factor is stronger before the crisis than after the crisis when financial markets began to price in 





particularly in the pre-crisis period, as underscored by Greece’s positive second factor loading on 
the left-hand-side of the table. Interestingly, the right-hand-side of the table indicates that Greece 
is less of an outlier once the crisis begins. This likely reflects the effects of contagion. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, around the time of each successive Greek bailout, spreads on Irish and 
Portuguese debt increased. The effect is particularly salient with respect to Portugal. In addition, 
the second factor in the post-crisis subsample also groups Ireland, Italy, and Spain together, 
highlighting the similarity of their treatment by bond markets following the financial crisis. 
Ireland’s loading, however, is substantially lower than the loadings on both Italy and Spain. 
While still closer to the loadings on Italy and Spain than those on Portugal and Greece, Ireland’s 
intermediate value indicates that Ireland’s treatment by bond markets combined elements of both 
groups of countries. This dynamic is clear in Figure 2, with Ireland’s close co-movement with 
Portugal and Greece until the middle of 2011. Towards the end of 2011 and prior to the second 
Greek bailout, Ireland permanently separated itself from the bond yield trajectories of both 
Greece and Portugal. Chapters 6 & 7 explore the reasons for the observed separation. 
Conclusions and theoretical implications 
 Tables 1 through 6 offer an enormous amount of information related to the movements in 
bond yields before, during, and following the financial crisis. While the empirical and theoretical 
implications of these results are numerous, the differences between low- and high-volatility 
countries are particularly important for the present analysis. There are, broadly speaking, two 
categories of countries, termed low- and high-volatility countries. These categories map onto the 
categories of non-crisis and crisis countries. The remaining three points indicate problems that 
emerge from viewing the crisis countries as a cohesive category and as fundamentally distinct 





the convergence factor—from Tables 2 through 6 indicate, the dominant economic trend is one 
of convergence across the entire Eurozone, not within either the low- or high-volatility countries. 
While the importance of the convergence factor decreased following the financial crisis, it still 
explained nearly two-thirds of the variation in bond yields in the post-crisis subsample. Second, 
the results overall, and Table 6 in particular, confirm the heterogeneity of bond yields within the 
high-volatility countries. Not all crisis-country bond yields exhibited identical behavior. Greek 
and Portuguese yields moved more closely with one another than did the yields of other 
countries. Third, there is clear heterogeneity not only within categories of countries but also over 
time. The notion that high-volatility countries have exhibited consistently different bond market 
behavior from the mid-1990’s through the financial crisis is not true. While Greece has always 
been an outlier, the remaining crisis countries resembled the low-volatility countries prior to the 
financial crisis. Only after the failure of Lehman and a number of related events did bond 
markets begin to treat these two sets of countries differently. 
 Returning to the hybrid model’s schematic displayed in Figure 1, the results in Chapter 4 
have important implications for the relationship between external actors and fiscal-policy 
outcomes. Bond yields provide an indirect measure of the demand for financial resources from 
external actors. When bond yields are high, domestic actors are more likely to resort to external 
actors for funds and submit to the concomitant conditionality. However, the ability of yields to 
expose individual countries and governments to pressure from external actors requires that 
financial markets price in country-specific risk. In the pre-crisis periods, as the convergence 
trade drove bond spreads across the Eurozone to zero, country-specific credit risk disappeared. 
Thus, in addition to instantiating widespread moral hazard, the convergence dynamics 





crisis period.12 However, with the emergence of country-specific credit risk in the post-crisis 
period, the influence of external actors increased dramatically. Chapter 5 explores the role played 
by external actors throughout the sample in greater depth. Moreover, throughout Chapter 5’s 
analysis, it is important to bear in mind the financial-market dynamics characterized by Chapter 
4.
                                                 
12 In a sense, the convergence trade can be interpreted as reducing the democratic deficit within the European Union. 
By reducing the influence of external actors in domestic policymaking, the convergence trade shifted the balance of 
power between Brussels and member-state capitals. Problematically, however, the reduction is democratic deficit 
gained in the pre-crisis period was predicated upon a fundamentally unsustainable macroeconomic context, shaped 





Chapter 5: External actors and fiscal policy 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter 5 is divided into three sections. The first section presents an overview of the 
relevant external actors in the context of the Eurozone and the 2008 financial crisis. The second 
section discusses the various sources of funding available to governments, describes the 
particular paths of influence between external actors and governments, and describes the 
universe of relevant actions of external actors. The third and final section concludes with a series 
of case studies, which illustrate important features of the relationship between external actors and 
fiscal policy.  
Institutional overview 
The European Central Bank 
The Troika is made up of the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission 
(EC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ostensibly, the three act in concert, each 
drawing on different organizational strengths in order to return troubled countries to some 
combination of financial and fiscal health. The strength of both the ECB and IMF is technocratic, 
with the ECB’s knowledge shaded towards financial markets and the IMF’s towards fiscal policy 
and debt sustainability.1 The two organizations differ in their constituent geographic areas of 
responsibility. The ECB is responsible for the monetary policy of the Eurozone, with some 
marginal responsibility for non-Euro countries in the EU. The ECB’s Executive Board (EB), 
consisting of a President, a Vice-President, and four other members, includes members appointed 
by member states in consultation with the European Parliament and the ECB’s Governing 
                                                 
1 The conditions for granting aid reflect these expertise. In the appendix to Chapter 5, Table A1 presents the 





Council (GC) for eight-year, non-renewable terms. The GC includes the governors of the 
national central banks of Euro-area governments and the members of the Executive Board. The 
EB implements the policy formulated by the GC.2   
Because of the ECB’s eight-year terms, the ECB’s leadership remained relatively 
constant, following the 2008 financial crisis, particularly when juxtaposed with the national 
parliaments that cycled through multiple governments. France’s Jean-Claude Trichet served as 
the ECB President through 2011, when Italy’s Mario Draghi assumed the helm. Some observers 
hoped that Draghi’s Southern European origin would influence policies adopted as the head of 
the ECB. And while Draghi experimented with heterodox policies, particularly in the context of 
long-term refinancing operations (LTRO’s), the ECB’s political independence and Draghi’s 
conservative track record as an Italian central banker proved far more influential in shaping the 
Bank’s policies. 
In contrast to the dual mandate—for full-employment and price stability—of the US 
Federal Reserve, the ECB’s sole objective is to maintain price stability. The ECB defines price 
stability as the “year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for 
the Euro area below 2%.”3 In conducting monetary policy and in coordinating fiscal-policy 
responses, the European Central Bank is primarily concerned, in the near-term, about liquidity. 
Unlike the IMF, which requires solvency as a condition for the disbursement of funds, the ECB 
is more willing to grant funds in order to help a government regain solvency. In constructing 
post-crisis policy, the ECB reflects the preferences of the Northern European economies, which 
contribute the majority of bailout funds. Thus, the ECB favors expenditure-centric austerity, with 
                                                 
2 Hodson, Dermot. "Economic and monetary union." Policy-Making in the European Union, 6th ed.(Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press 2010) pp (2010): 159-165.  






the majority of adjustment coming from decreasing public expenditure, rather than increased 
taxation. 
When combined with the Eurozone’s set-up as a currency union with neither fiscal nor 
banking components, the ECB’s single mandate leaves the Eurozone without an area-wide, 
institutional response to sharp changes in either the financial or real economies. This set-up 
means that, in the face of financial or fiscal crisis, responsibility for response resides with 
national governments rather than a supranational authority.4 This complicated the response to the 
2008 financial crisis when national governments adopted individual responses without regard for 
neighbors’ policies.5 The European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) was established only after 
the May 2010 bailout of Greece,6 when the EU policymakers recognized the need for an 
institution that could draw on collective resources of EU governments without facing the 
crippling collective action problem of coordinating the actions of several domestic governments, 
each with a distinct set of distributional preferences.  
 
                                                 
4 Hodson (2010), p. 165. 
5 Dinan, Desmond. Ever Closer Union, 4th edition. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010, and 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010: p.158. 


























































































Figure 1. Main monetary policy rates in US, Eurozone, and the United Kingdom. These rates are the federal funds 
target rate, the main refinancing operations bid rate, and the official Bank rate, respectively. Data taken from the 
Fed, ECB, and BOE, respectively.  
 
Initially, in the crisis period, the ECB adhered closely to the single mandate. Policies 
adopted later in the crisis, including extensive bond purchases and long-term refinancing 
operations—detailed in Table 1—are more difficult to justify within the context of a strict single 
mandate. Notwithstanding such policy innovations, by comparison, the ECB remained far more 
detached from the real economy than the US Federal Reserve. This can be seen in Figure 1, at 
the onset of the crisis,7 when the ECB took months longer than either the Fed or the BOE to 
reach its rate-floor. Moreover, the ECB’s policy rate-floor remained a full point higher than the 
Fed’s and a half point higher than the BOE’s. Finally, at the first sign of pick-up in the real 
economy, over fears of pent-up inflation and under the relatively conservative governorship of 
Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB raised rates in early 2011. The ECB’s monetary policy was thus 
more conservative to the Fed’s, governed by a dual mandate, and the BOE’s, governed by a 
single mandate. Notably, divergence between ECB/BOE monetary policies may also reflect the 
wider scope, both geographic and financial, governed by the former. In addition, the ECB is 
alone among major central banks in governing a currency area without concomitant banking and 
fiscal unions. This places the ECB in an awkward position, when banking or fiscal crises 
threaten price stability, the ECB’s charter-determined province. The uncertainty engendered by 
the ECB’s mismatch of mandate and authority played an important role in both deepening and 
propagating the crisis. 
The International Monetary Fund 
                                                 
7 Lehman’s failure on 15 September 2008 is used to mark the beginning of the financial crisis. For further 





In contrast to the EC and the ECB, the IMF possesses a much larger geographic portfolio, 
including all countries in the EU, and extending throughout the world. Indeed, as of 2012, 188 
countries belonged to the IMF.8 The IMF has a lending portfolio of more than $300 billion, 
which it can lend to member-countries facing balance-of-payment deficits.9 Importantly, as 
Table A1 shows, the IMF lends only to countries facing liquidity, as opposed to solvency, 
problems.10 Prior to the receipt of IMF funds, a country must demonstrate fiscal solvency. This 
insistence has led to some friction between the IMF and EC/ECB, when the IMF supports either 
restructuring of debt burden or additional, credible reform in crisis environments when the 
EC/ECB prefer the immediate disbursement of funds. In addition, similar to the ECB, the IMF 
advocates expenditure-centric austerity, although the preference arises from a technocratic belief 
more than a preponderance of power within the Fund belonging to an individual country or set of 
countries that advocates such policy. The preferences of the IMF are not set in stone. Instead, as 
technocratic beliefs, they are susceptible to insights provided by new data. As is explored in 
subsequent sections, such flexibility played an important role in shaping the IMF’s crisis over the 
sample. 
Two bodies dominate IMF policymaking: the Board of Governors (BOG) and the 
Executive Board.11 The BOG is comprised of a single member appointed by each member state. 
In addition, the BOG only meets once per year. Thus, most decisions throughout the year fall 
into the hands of the Executive Board, which consists of 24 executive directors appointed by 
                                                 
8 “List of Members.” International Monetary Fund, 13 June 2012. Web. <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/ 
memdir/ memdate.htm>. 
9 Oatley, Thomas H. International political economy. Boston: Longman, 2012: p. 310. 
10 This is related to the distinction between credit and liquidity risk discussed in Chapter 4. Solvency risk reflects a 
mismatch in value between assets and liabilities. Liquidity risk reflects cash-flow risk. Importantly, in many cases, 
the difference is one of degree, rather than kind. Solvency risk can be viewed as liquidity risk with illiquid assets. 
This is particularly the case in context of well-developed financial markets in the context of a crisis where asset 
values drop sharply as a result of a collective sell-off.  





member governments. Eight countries12 appoint directors directly; the remaining 16 executive 
directors represent groups of countries. As the Executive Board’s make-up implies and, in 
contrast to the ostensibly egalitarian set-up of the BOG, IMF policy is primarily formulated by 
the world’s largest and/or politically most important economies. This asymmetry is further 
reinforced by the Fund’s weighted voting scheme that accords votes on the basis of financial 
contributions to the fund. Thus, the US controls 17% of the Fund’s votes; while Palau, the 
smallest member country in terms of contribution, controls 0.01% of the Fund’s votes.13  
Early in the crisis period, organizational differences between the Europe-centric 
institutions (EC/ECB) and the IMF did not create problems. In May 2010, however, non-
European IMF member countries voiced concerns about the lenient treatment granted to 
European states relative to the past IMF-brokered deals in Latin America and East Asia. 14 
Despite such frustration, no state sought to veto the aid initial aid package extended to Greece. 
Moreover, until relatively late in negotiations over the first Greek bailout, the EC and ECB were 
opposed to the involvement of the IMF. The Europe-centric institutions feared the precedent that 
would be set by transferring fiscal sovereignty outside of the Eurozone. Financial-market 
observers, however, welcomed the IMF’s involvement, largely because of the organization’s 
technocratic expertise and experience in orchestrating fiscal adjustments.15 The differing 
constituencies also help to explain the organizations’ different preferences over bondholder 
losses. The IMF consistently advocates the restructuring of debt as a mean to improve debt 
sustainability. Indeed, the IMF pushed for expansive private-sector involvement in negotiating 
                                                 
12 China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia 
13 More information on the IMF can be found in Oatley (2011), pp. 310-2. 
14 Brown, Kevin, Oliver, Christian and Tim Johnston. “Asia irked by IMF ‘leniency’ to Greece.” Financial Times. 1 
May 2010. 
 





Greece’s second bailout. The EC/ECB, on the other hand, reacted strongly against private-sector 
involvement with large portions of Greek debt held by Eurozone banks, which fell under the 
ECB’s regulatory purview.16 
Both the ECB and IMF are hierarchical organizations dominated largely by single 
individuals. Policy change with respect to either typically accompanies changes in leadership. 
Whereas Draghi’s election as President of the ECB signaled policy changes, albeit short of a 
monetary-policy regime shift, leadership change in the IMF coincided with increased preference 
heterogeneity within the Troika. This was apparent in the negotiations over the second Greek 
bailout, in which the IMF’s increasingly strident position accompanied a change in leadership, 
with Christine Lagarde’s taking over as Managing Director in July 2011.17  
The European Commission 
Because of their hierarchical organizations, the ECB and the IMF are less hampered by 
the collective action problems that confront the European Commission, which is constituted by a 
single commissioner from each member-country, appointed for five-year terms. While a single 
president is elected from among these commissioners, the president’s role is sharply constrained 
by the need to maintain consensus within the Commission.18 Presidents, like Commissioners, are 
elected for five-year terms. Beginning in 2004, and for most of the crisis period, Jose Manuel 
Barroso, Portugal’s former Prime Minister, served as the Commission’s President. Although 
outside the scope of the present study, in July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s former 
Prime Minister, was elected as the Commission’s President. Each Commissioner has a separate 
                                                 
16 Spiegel, Peter. “Merkel warned on bail-out impasse.” Financial Times. 15 July 2011. 
17 Through the early part of the crisis, French politician Dominque Strauss-Khan served as the Managing Director of 
the IMF. In July 2011, following revelations of sexual misconduct by Strauss-Khan, Christine Lagarde took over as 
Managing Director. 
18 Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair. Representative government in modern Europe. McGraw-Hill, 





policy portfolio. Most relevant to the politics of fiscal policy, the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Portfolio has been particularly controversial since the onset of the financial crisis. It is this 
individual, more than any other within the EC, who is identified with the policy conditionality 
required by the Troika. Between 2004 and 2010, Spain’s Joaquin Almunia served in the position, 
followed by Finland’s Olli Rehn between 2010 and 2014. Latvia’s Valdis Dombrovskis began 
his term as Commissioner in 2014. Both the EC President and the Commissioner for Economic 
and Financial Affairs are positions contested between European factions. Olli Rehn, in particular, 
was viewed as the face of Northern European-imposed austerity on struggling Southern 
economies. The shift from Almunia to Rehn in 2010 was thus seen as a victory for the pro-
austerity camp, as was the shift from Barroso to Juncker as the Commission’s President in 2014. 
Nationality, however, is not an entirely reliable indicator of preference over fiscal policy. In 
contrast to the fears of Northern countries, the EC oversaw extensive austerity conditionality 
with Portugal’s Barroso at its helm; similarly, at the ECB, Italy’s Draghi continued to pressure 
Southern economies to implement reforms after he replaced France’s Jean-Claude Trichet in 
2011. 
While the IMF is dominated by those countries that provide the majority of funds and the 
ECB is dominated by Northern economies (in particular, Germany), the EC is the only 
institutional member of the Troika, in which Southern countries are distinctly represented. This 
increases the democratic legitimacy of the Troika and also establishes a potential, and crucial, 
veto point for Southern economies which have limited representation elsewhere. As Table A1 
suggests, this produces a different preference structure in the EC compared with that in either of 
the Troika’s other two institutions. The EC’s preferences are driven by the preferences of 





of Northern representatives in key EC posts during the financial crisis (e.g., Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs). In addition, the large number of Commissioners, each from a 
different country and grouped into a wide set of party families, makes concerted action difficult. 
As originally drafted, the Treaty of Lisbon would have ameliorated the collective action problem 
facing the EC by reducing the number of Commissioners form 27 to 18. Inter alia, fearing loss 
of representation, Irish representatives lobbied against the Lisbon Treaty, leading to its defeat in 
the June 2008 popular referendum.19 The version of the Treaty that eventually passed maintained 
the number of Commissioners at 27, leaving the collective action problem facing the EC 
unaddressed. Because of the collective-action problem facing the EC, representatives from the 
ECB and IMF exercise decisive authority in Troika negotiations; in this sense, the EC functions 
most effectively as a veto point, rather than as an institution with a consistent and coherent 
agenda. 
Responding to financial crisis 
Anatomy of the crisis-response framework 
The Troika is not mentioned in the founding charters of the European Union; nor is it 
mentioned in subsequent treaties. The Troika emerged, as an informal institution, in response to 
the financial crisis. The funding institutions employed by the Troika, which entered the 
colloquial lexicon following the bailouts of Greece and other Eurozone members, did not exist 
until after the Greek bailout in May 2010. The European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) was 
established in June 2010 in response to the financial crisis. The lack of an institution to provide a 
fiscal stopgap, let alone an extended response, in the context of the financial crisis reflected the 
prior decision to establish the Eurozone as a monetary union without a fiscal union. In this 
                                                 





context, coordinating a fiscal response proved difficult for member countries. And the haphazard 
amalgamation of institutions following the financial crisis reflected the prior structural decisions 
made by Eurozone policymakers. At its inception in June 2010, the EFSF had a lending capacity 
of €440 billion, an additional €60 billion available from the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM), and €250 billion from the IMF. 20 Combined, these produced a lending 
capacity of €750 billion. Importantly, the EU and the IMF did not pool funds, and the members 
of the Troika remained institutionally distinct. Thus, in principle, a Troika-led bailout could 
proceed, as it did with respect to Spain in June 2012, with funds provided by the EC/ECB but not 
the IMF. In March 2011, with bailouts underway in Greece and Ireland, Eurozone leaders 
expanded the lending capacity of the EFSF and agreed to create a permanent rescue mechanism, 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which came into operation in October 2012. 
Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union, the text that 
produced the ESM reinforced the conditionality favored by the Northern constituency.21 The 
ESM’s lending capacity of €500 billion, matched that of the EFSM and the EFSM combined. 
The EFSF and ESM operated concurrently between October 2012 and June 2013, when the 
EFSF ceased extending loans. The EFSF will remain in operation until all outstanding loans have 
been repaid.22 Once again, however, the ESM remained institutionally, and financially, 
independent of the IMF.  
                                                 
20 “About EFSF.” European Financial Stability Facility. Web. <http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm> & 
“European Financial Stability Facility.”  European Financial Stability Facility. Web. <http://www.efsf.europa.eu/ 
attachments/faq_en.pdf>. 
21 The full text of the ESM amendment reads: “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.” For 
an analysis of how the amendment fits into the wider Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, see De 
Witte, Bruno. "The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism." (2011). 





The evolution of bailout institutions illustrates two important features of the 
supranational response to the financial crisis. These features reflect the institutional distinctness 
of Troika members, the piecemeal construction of the crisis-response institutional framework, 
and the manifest cleavages in preferences between national constituencies over institutional 
design and powers. First, as noted in the discussion of the EFSF, the ESM, and the IMF, the 
major actors within the Troika remained institutionally distinct, even within the subscribed 
context of bailouts. The ESM and the IMF both drew on funds from the EU member states, but 
each organization operated independently in response to financial crises. Early in the crisis, this 
presented less of a problem than later, when preference heterogeneity emerged within the IMF, 
the ECB, and EC. 
Second, the institutional response was, and continues to be, ad hoc and piecemeal. The 
cleavages that characterized Troika policy throughout the financial crisis emerged in the prior 
debate over institutional form and powers. The European Monetary Union is first and foremost, 
what its name implies, a monetary union. Without a pre-existing framework to monitor, 
discipline, and respond to fiscal developments in the Eurozone, Troika policymakers created 
institutions piecemeal only after the onset of the crisis. These institutions were fiercely contested, 
both in terms of institutional design and policy authority. A cleavage emerged between the 
Northern economies, led by Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands, and the Southern 
economies, led by Italy and Spain.23 Voters in the Northern Bloc applied pressure on their 
representatives to not appear too lenient towards purportedly profligate Southern governments. 
This political logic underscored the ascendance of strong nationalist movements in, inter alia, 
France and Finland, where the National Front and True Finns gained substantial representation, 
                                                 
23 Early in the crisis, the Financial Times termed the former the Northern Bloc. For the originating article, see Peel, 





respectively. In more mainstream conservative political parties, such as Germany’s CDU-
CSU/FDP coalition, Angela Merkel spent consider political capital convincing voters and 
politicians to approve a number of Troika policy measures, including bailouts and extensive 
liquidity operations.24 Throughout the various bailout negotiations, the CSU’s conservative 
constituency, the ruling party in Bavaria and coalition partner to the more moderate CDU, acted 
as a powerful electoral force, which circumscribed Merkel’s policymaking authority. At times, it 
appeared that the CSU was in explicit conversation with Greece’s politicians. In the negotiations 
following the second Greek bailout, Greek officials issued statements related to the Germany’s 
failure to pay reparations following the Second World War. When Merkel visited Athens, 
Swastikas and fascist references met her in Greece’s popular press. When Merkel resisted 
French, IMF, and debtor-country demands to write down sovereign debt in October 2012, she 
received a standing ovation from the CSU’s membership.25 This conservative impulse was 
similarly strong in other Northern economies. In the Netherlands, during the negotiations over 
Greece’s second bailout, Prime Minister Mark Rutte proposed empowering the newly created 
“commissioner for budgetary discipline” with the power to eject delinquent countries from the 
Eurozone.26 Rutte’s proposal also reflected the pressures of leading a minority government with 
an ascendant far-right party, the Party for Freedom, led by the controversial Geert Wilders.  
France consistently played a crucial role in moving between Northern and Southern 
camps. In mid-2011, amid negotiations over the sustainability of Greek debt, French politicians 
advocated a Brady-bond like swap, which would extend the maturity of Greek debt to 30 years.27 
                                                 
24 Peel, Quentin. “Bail-out revolt simmers in Germany.” Financial Times. 13 May 2011. 
25 Peel, Quentin. “Bavarian sister party backs Merkel’s balancing act; EU austerity.” Financial Times. 22 October 
2012. 
26 Spiegel, Peter and Matt Steinglass. “Dutch premier calls for EU enforcer with power to eject euro miscreants.” 
Financial Times. 8 September 2011.   
27 Jenkins, Patrick, Milne, Richard and Rachel Sanderson. “French lenders lead deal to roll over Greek debt for 30 





After Hollande’s election in May 2012, France increasingly sided with the Southern economies. 
Hollande’s support for the South was neither consistent nor constant, however, as is explored 
later in this chapter and in the case studies of Chapters 6 & 7. As marginally heterodox policy 
failed to produce significant economic growth, Hollande’s position gradually shifted France back 
towards the Norther Bloc. While outside the temporal scope of the study, Hollande’s integration 
into the Northern Bloc culminated with the appointment of Emmanuel Macron as France’s 
Finance Minister in August 2014. 
In the March 2011 agreement between Eurozone leaders that eventually produced the 
ESM, the Northern and Southern camps debated the prospective institution’s policy tools. The 
Northern economies argued for a more proscribed role; the Southern economies argued for a 
more expansive role.28 The Northern camp favored indirect bond purchases through the 
government, and the Southern camp favored direct bond purchases on the open market. The 
former strategy would contain risk in the peripheral economies, while the latter strategy would 
transfer risk from the peripheral economies to the Eurozone as a whole. The Grand Bargain that 
emerged favored the Northern economies with limited concessions to the Southern camp.29 The 
Grand Bargain expanded the lending authority of the ESM in a concession to the Southern camp. 
The ESM, however, was only capable of indirect bond purchases through sovereign 
governments; this ensured that risk remained within the peripheral economies. In a final boon for 
Northern economies, the summit produced additional movement on Eurozone fiscal regulation 
that would monitor and regulate levels of deficit and debt in member countries.  
Sources of financing 
                                                 
28 Peel, Quentin and Peter Spiegel. “Northern Exposure.” Financial Times. 10 March 2011. 





Governments of developed economies have three primary sources of revenue: tax 
revenues, bond markets, and external actors. In the context of financial crises, taxation’s time 
horizon may prevent governments from using taxes to fill fiscal coffers. Not all taxes, however, 
pose similarly difficult problems in terms of time horizon. Consumption taxes on the purchases 
of goods and services are easy to implement and increase revenue immediately; income taxation 
or corporate taxation take at least a year after passing through the legislature to produce increases 
in revenues. Thus, in addition to the distributional logic motivating consumption-tax rates, their 
relatively high near-term elasticity of revenue encourages politicians to increase consumption 
taxes in crisis situations. In addition to the time-horizon problems facing the various types of 
taxation, with high prevailing rates on a number of economic activities, diminishing marginal 
returns to taxation may set in. These are the Laffer-curve like dynamics mentioned in Chapter 3. 
The dynamic of diminishing marginal returns presents a relevant problem in the Eurozone, given 
the relatively high tax burdens prevailing through most of Western Europe in general and the 






Figure 2. Bond yields over the crisis countries with German yields presented as a baseline. The vertical axis presents 
bond yields between 0 and 40 percent. The horizontal axis ranges from 2000 to 2014, although the study’s sample 
only covers 2000 to 2013. County names are indicated near the country’s maximum yield over the period. Each 
country’s yield is color-coded: Germany (green); Greece (yellow); Ireland (light blue); Italy (dark blue); Portugal 
(gray); and Spain (red). 
 
Borrowing on capital markets is constrained by the prevailing interest rate, referred to as 
a sovereign-bond yield. Sustainable bond yields are a function of pre-existing debt and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, debt loads in crisis economies 
had increased significantly since the inception of the Euro. As Chapter 4 discusses, country-
specific sovereign risk did not emerge until well after the onset of the financial crisis. Thus, early 
in the sample period, which begins in 200, governments funded fiscal deficits with capital-
market borrowing. While the sustainable bond yield for refinancing debt relies on lenders’ 
subjective perceptions of a sovereign’s ability to repay, some yields are manifestly unsustainable. 





















baseline. Greece’s and Portugal’s yields near 37 and 18%, respectively, are manifestly 
unsustainable. Shortly after reaching these levels, the Troika restructred Greece’s debt in an 
attempt to ease bond yields. Against the spectacular precipices of Greek and Portuguese debt, 
Irish yields around 12% appear nearly pedestrian. Over an extended period of time, particularly 
for the smaller European economies, yields in excess of 7.5% are not sustainable.  
With tax increases limited by either time horizon or diminishing marginal returns and 
capital-market yields above sustainable yields, countries in a currency union have one remaining 
source of funds: external actors.30 In the case of EU members, the Troika—and its constituent 
actors—served as the relevant external actor. In principle, other external actors could have 
provided funds; for a variety of reasons, however, alternative external actors played a minimal 
role. Subsequent sections address the limited cases in which viable, alternative external actors 
emerged.  
Demand- and supply-side dynamics 
Figure 1 in Chapter 1, reproduced here as Figure 3, lays out the theoretical logic relating 
external actors with fiscal-policy outcomes. The figure identifies two broad sets of factors, 
demand- and supply-side, that govern the translation of the preferences of external actors into 
domestic policy. The demand-side primarily reflects the relative scarcities of the three sources of 
funding outlined in the previous section. In the short-run, when the tax base is relatively inelastic 
and bond yields exceed the servicing capacity of the sovereign, countries resort to external 
actors. Thus, the preferences of external actors are most directly translated into domestic policy 
in periods of elevated bond yields. Figure 2’s bond yields identify the periods in which domestic 
                                                 
30 Assuming that debt is denominated in domestic currency, countries outside of a currency union could print money 
as an additional source of funds. Such devaluation would reduce the real debt burden. Such an avenue, however, was 





policymakers should be most susceptible to the policy preferences of external actors. These 
demand conditions are most clearly satisfied, unsurpsingly, prior to each of the Troika’s bailouts.  
  
Figure 3. Schematic of the hybrid model’s theoretical logic. Variables are listed in bold, with associated dimensions 
in parentheses.  
 
On the supply side, preference homogeneity, the number of external actors, and the prior 
position of dominant actors influence the translation of external-actor preferences into domestic 
policy. Where the constituent members of the Troika largely agree over policy, little policy space 
is available in which for domestic policymakers to negotiate. Disagreements within the Troika’s 
members emerge, as with the tension between the ECB and the IMF beginning in mid-2011, and 
provide domestic policymakers with room to extract concessions from external actors. These 
dynamics were most clearly present in the negotiation over Greece’s second bailout, in which the 
Troika imposed losses on private bondholders, a policy anathema to the ECB in all prior 
negotiations. The second supply-side dynamic involves the introduction of a second external 
actor. In 2011, Cyprus negotiated for a €2.5 billion bailout from Russia in order to avoid the 
extensive conditionality required by Troika policymakers. Moreover, while it outside the scope 
of the present study, Tsipras’ Syriza government made overtures to Russia in 2015 in an attempt 
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of dominant actors, which helps to explain, inter alia, the evolving positions of the ECB as it 
amassed increasingly large positions in peripheral sovereign debt over the crisis period.  
The set of policy actions available to external actors and their translation into member-
countries’ fiscal policies 
 Table 1, first introduced as Table 3 in Chapter 2, documents the Troika’s involvement 
over the crisis sample. The table presents a limited number of Troika actions. An effectively 
limitless number of relevant events could be selected from among the summits, policy 
proclamations, and press conferences of different Troika representatives. This chapter focuses on 
four types of events: changes in the nominal interest rate, bailouts, significant refinancing 
operations, and EU-wide legislation related to fiscal policy. These events involve both the 
policymaking power of the Troika in addition to points of tension between the Troika’s 
constituent actors.  
Bailouts 
Over the sample, the formal bailout powers have been activated six times: Greece 
(twice), Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus. Spain is also coded as having received a bailout. Spanish 
policymakers argued at length with Troika representatives in early 2012 in order to avoid the 
extensive fiscal-policy conditionality that accompanied the prior bailouts of Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal. Spanish policymakers succeeded in restricting the Troika’s policy conditionality to 
financial-sector reform.31 Because of the restriction, Troika representatives did not classify the 
Spanish aid as a bailout, in the sense of Greece’s, Ireland’s, and Portugal’s. In contrast to this 
position, Table 1 lists Spain as having received a bailout; subsequent sections in this chapter as 
well as Chapter 6 examine how Spanish policymakers emerged with limited conditionality. The 
                                                 






strategic ambiguity adopted by the Troika with respect to Spain reflects the larger ambiguity of 
the Troika’s relationship with the larger European economies. While the ECB and, to a lesser 
extent, the IMF function as a lenders of last resort to the Eurozone economies, it is unlikely that, 
as currently constituted short of either a fiscal or a strong banking union, the Troika commands 
the requisite financial resources to bail out any of the Eurozone’s four largest economies: 
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. In late 2011, with bond yields increasing on Italian and 
Spanish debt, Finland’s Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen stated that it was difficult to envision that 
“Europe would have the resources to take a country the size of Italy into the bail-out 
programme.” At the time private-sector economists estimated that a bail-out program for Italy 
would require €650 billion.32 Put another way, the requisite aid to Italy would have totalled more 
than the sum of the Troika’s bailout programs between 2010 and 2013, even with the bailout of 
Spain’s financial sector included.  











09/2008 Eurozone Homogeneous Discount rate drops from 4 percent 
in 09/2008 to a floor of 1 percent 
in 05/2009 
Legislation 02/2009 EU Homogeneous Establishes the European 
Economic Recovery Plan, a series 
of Keynesian measures to increase 




Bailout 05/2010 Greece Homogenous 1 Limited 
Bailout 11/2010 Ireland Homogenous 1 Limited 
Legislation 02/2011 EU Homogenous Implements a series of measures to 
correct deficits that exceed those 
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04/2011 Eurozone Homogenous Discount rate increases from 1 
percent in 04/2011 to a ceiling of 
1.5 through 10/2011 
Bailout 05/2011 Portugal Homogenous 1 Limited 
Nominal 
interest rate 
10/2011 Eurozone Homogenous Discount rate drops from 1.5 
percent in 10/2011 to a floor of 
0.25 percent in 11/2013 




LTRO 12/2011 Banks in 
Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, and Spain 
Heterogeneous 1 Sovereign debt 
from bailouts; 
Legislation 12/2011 EU Heterogeneous “Six-pack” enters the force 
establishing limits on both 
government debt and deficit. 




LTRO 02/2012 Banks in 
Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, and Spain 
Heterogeneous 1 Sovereign debt 
from bailouts; 
debt from prior 
LTRO 
Bailout 02/2012 Greece Heterogeneous 1 ECB’s holding 
of Greek debt 
Legislation 03/2012 EU Heterogeneous Treaty on Stability, Coordination, 
and Governance—alias “Fiscal 
Compact”—expands the EU’s 
monitoring and advisory powers 




Bailout 06/2012 Spain Heterogeneous 1 ECB’s holdings 
of Spanish 
sovereign bonds 




Bailout 04/2013 Cyprus Heterogeneous 2 Limited 
Legislation 05/2013 EU Heterogeneous “Two-pack” enters into force, 
which formalizes the oversight 




Table 3. Relevant events involving external actors. The type of event, whether a change in the nominal interest rate 
(for the time series, see Figure 1 of Chapter 5), a bailout, a LTRO, or legislation, is noted in the first column. The 
second column indicates the month and year of the event. The third column indicates the crisis country or institution 
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(in the case of bank bailouts) targeted. The fourth column indicates the relative homogeneity of the Troika in a 
particular event. The fifth column indicates the number of relevant external actors.  The sixth and final column 
indicates the prior position of relevant external actors.  
 
Conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
The ECB conducts extensive monetary-policy operations within the Eurozone. In the 
context of the financial crisis, most of these operations aimed to ensure systemic liquidity and to 
prevent bond contagion between member countries. Chapter 4 examines the latter phenomenon 
is explored more formally and in greater depth. Four sets of measures constituted the ECB’s 
policy measures over the sample: changes in the discount rate; Security Market Programme 
(SMP), Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), and long-term refinancing operations 
(LTRO’s). The first constitutes conventional monetary policy and refers to ECB’s control of the 
overnight, interbank lending rate. By manipulating the rate, the ECB intends to influence the 
money supply and, by extension, inflation. The second, third, and fourth measures refer to 
unconventional monetary policies, which the ECB employs at the nominal zero-lower bound 
(ZLB), i.e., the limit of conventional monetary policy.  
SMP and OMT refer separately to programs of sovereign-bond purchases. Through these 
programs, the ECB acquires sovereign debt. Sovereigns would then use the borrowed funds to 
shore up stressed financial institutions. The key difference between the SMP and OMT involves 
conditionality. Historically, SMP facilities could be accessed without conditionality. To access 
the OMT facility, however, target countries need to have an open line of credit with either the 
EFSF or the ESM. Effectively, this requires target countries to have opened bailout programs 
with the Troika’s institutions. To increase the power of creditor institutions, the conditionally-
focused OMT replaced with SMP in September 2012. A subsequent case study in this chapter 





LTRO’s refer to a specific, significant, and politically controversial activity. Typical 
liquidity operations by central banks around the world involve the exchange of creditworthy 
collateral for cash for a short period of time, often overnight. LTRO’s differed in both the quality 
of collateral accepted and the length of the loan. As collateral for LTRO’s, the ECB accepted 
asset-backed securities (including the mortgage-backed securities central to the beginning, and 
transmission, of the financial crisis) and sovereign bonds.38 The ECB’s standard for creditworthy 
collateral shifted with the intensity of the crisis. For example, in May 2010, with Greek banks 
facing massive withdrawals, the ECB suspended the minimum crediting rating for Greek bonds 
used in liquidity operations.39 Moreover, in contrast to the brief terms of standard liquidity 
operations, bonds refinanced by LTRO’s matured in three years. In addition to the technical 
differences distinguishing LTRO’s from standard liquidity operations, LTRO’s dwarfed liquidity 
operations in terms of sheer size. The two rounds of LTRO conducted in December 2011 and 
February 2012 totaled nearly €1 trillion.40 Table A2 in the appendix to this chapter provides a 
sense of scale for the size of the LTRO’s relative to the ECB’s balance sheet; prior to the start of 
the LTRO’s, the ECB’s balance sheet contained €2.5 billion worth of assets. 
From the Troika’s perspective, LTRO’s are exceptional in their blurring of the line 
between monetary and fiscal policy. This is also the case with SMP, and later OMT, that either 
implicitly or explicitly target the bond yields of particular Eurozone countries in contrast to the 
Eurozone’s formal mandate of price stability. The ECB’s right to conduct fiscal policy veiled as 
monetary policy is contested, and, once again, juxtaposes Northern countries that advocate for a 
more restricted role with Southern countries that argue for a more expansive ECB role with 
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respect to fiscal policy. Often, the ECB’s fiscal-lite policy occupies an acceptable middle ground 
between the two camps. The unconventional monetary policies confine risk to sovereigns by 
purchasing troubled bonds indirectly through governments rather than directly from distressed 
financial institutions. Northern politicians can return to their constituencies and announce that 
they have not bailed out peripheral debtors. The Southern economies favor the limited relief on 
sovereign yields to the alternative of inaction. The fundamental problem with LTRO’s as fiscal-
lite policy is that markets realize that LTRO’s are monetary policy, masquerading as fiscal 
policy, which stem from a basic cleavage between Northern and Southern economies. At the 
limit, financial markets recognize that this cleavage prevents a complete fiscal union and that, 
notwithstanding Draghi’s determination to “do whatever it takes,” the ECB is fundamentally 
constrained to reduce the fiscal burden of Eurozone member countries. 
EU-level legislation 
The final set of policies included in Table 1 involve EU-wide policy changes. The 
primary means by which they influence the fiscal policy of Eurozone member states is through 
the disbursement of funds by such institutions as the European Investment Bank (and other EC-
led institutions) and the application of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the text in the 
founding charters of the European Union that limits the debt of member states. The disbursement 
of funds characterized the early EC-led response. Later in the period, the Troika relied almost 
exclusively on refining and enforcing the SGP. SGP-related policies fall broadly into two 
categories. Regulations in the first camp clarify and strengthen the precepts of the SGP. Among 
other things, these measures encouraged member states to make balanced-budget amendments to 
their constitutions. Short of constitutional amendments, the regulation encouraged the 





disciplinary mechanisms to the SGP framework. These measures allow for the imposition of 
fines of member countries consistently in violation of the SGP. Much of the debate over both 
types of regulation involved the application of policy in exceptional economic circumstances. 
The SGP itself, and subsequent regulation, allowed for deficits and debts in excess of the 
nominal targets during economic recessions. The applicability of this regulation remains a 
persistent source of financial-market uncertainty and, once again, reflects the tension between 
Northern and Southern camps. Enmeshed with the political tension over SGP-related 
enforcement, the Troika faces a credibility program when enforcing the SGP, particularly in the 
context of a financial crisis. It is unclear whether the Troika would add to the fiscal burden of a 
country facing severe fiscal problems.41 
One of the primary obstacles to the influence of EU-level legislation on domestic politics 
is that amendments to EU treaties require approval in domestic legislatures. Significant changes 
to the EU’s role in the fiscal policy of member states typically requires a treaty amendment, 
given the sensitives surrounding the “bailout clause” in Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty.42 In 
practice, this means that, after Eurozone ministers approve area-wide legislation, senior ministers 
need to return home to secure their domestic constituencies’ approval. The method of ratification 
varies by country. In some countries, such as Ireland, popular referenda are required to approve 
any major changes to Ireland’s relationship with the EU. In Germany, on the other hand, a two-
thirds majority of parliament is required. This tension was apparent in the debate over the fiscal 
compact negotiated by Eurozone ministers in late 2011 and early 2012. The subsequent extended 
debate into domestic legislatures. Seen as a relatively conservative piece of legislation that 
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strengthened the surveillance and enforcement of the ECB, even a conservative Chancellor 
Merkel struggled through the summer to secure the Bundestag’s approval.43 Conservative 
members of the governing coalition feared that the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism, the quid pro quo for the Southern economies in exchange for strengthening of the 
SGP, would exacerbate problems of moral hazard, seen by the Northern economies as the 
primary risk emanating from policies adopted in response the crisis.44 
Six vignettes: The Troika and the financial crisis 
From the supply-side perspective of Figure 2, the bailout process worked relatively 
smoothly in the cases of the first Greece’s first bailout, Ireland’s, and Portugal’s. While 
extensive public, and occasionally violent, unrest emerged in response to the Troika’s 
stipulations,45 the Troika consistently acted as a homogenous unit. In these instances, crisis 
countries were not able to take advantage of divisions between organizations within the Troika. 
This is one advantage, from the perspective of the Troika, of grouping potential aid organizations 
into a single organization. So long as the Troika maintains a unified front, it can project a single 
voice in the affairs of crisis countries. On the basis of this organizational perspective, two 
potential developments would threaten the hegemony of the Troika: divisions within the Troika’s 
organizations and the arrival of alternative funding organizations. Both of these contingencies 
emerged over the crisis period and produced distinct organizational and policy responses on 
behalf of the Troika. These changes in turn altered the constraints applied by the Troika within 
crisis countries. The following six vignettes explore both of these supply-side dynamics. The 
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first examines the relatively homogenous preferences within the Troika over the first three 
bailouts. The second analyzes the role of preference heterogeneity as a result of changes in the 
technocratic preferences of the IMF in mid-to-late 2011. In addition, the vignettes explore Figure 
2’s third and final supply-side dynamic that relates to the prior position of funding institutions, 
particularly in sovereign-debt markets. The third vignette explores how the ECB and creditor 
governments behaved differently towards crisis countries, once the creditor institutions had 
amassed significant positions in the sovereign debt of crisis countries. The fourth vignette then 
explores the central credibility problem facing the Troika with respect to large economies such as 
Italy and Spain. The vignette suggests that, adapting Sorkin’s terminology, such economies are 
“too-big-to-bail.” The fifth vignette explores how creditor countries reasserted themselves 
following ostensible concession to Southern economies at the 2012 Eurozone Summit. Creditor 
countries protected their financial positions by replacing the SMP’s unconditional bond-purchase 
program with the OMT’s stringent conditionality. The sixth and final vignette analyzes the 
arrival of Russia in bailout negotiations with Cyprus (and, to a lesser extent, Greece) and the 
consequences of a second external actor for fiscal-policy adjustment at crisis countries. 
Vignette #1- Preference homogeneity: The first three bailouts 
As a piecemeal organization, constructed in the context of conflict between the Northern 
and Southern economies, the Troika presented a remarkably unified front in the first years of the 
crisis. Roughly, this unity was apparent in the first several policy actions listed in Table 3, as 
indicated by the homogenous coding in the table’s fourth column. In May 2010, the Troika 
orchestrated the first bailout of Greece. With the increasing awareness of its incumbent financial 
responsibilities, in June 2010, the Troika established the EFSF. In October 2010, Ireland became 





Greek and Irish debt increasing unabated, as displayed in Figure 2, the Troika expressed an 
intention to buy sovereign bonds through the ECB’s SMP facility in order to ease capital-market 
pressures on peripheral economies. The central coalitions and heterogeneous preferences within 
the Troika first manifested in discussions over the mechanics of SMP’s bond purchases. A 
coalition of Northern European countries—Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland—pushed for 
indirect purchases. In an indirect purchase, the ECB lends money, i.e., buys bonds, to the central 
governments, which then purchase the debt of troubled domestic institutions, e.g. banks, pension 
funds, etc. Thus, indirect purchases largely contain financial risk within the crisis countries; in 
doing so, such purchases limit the moral hazard facing Southern economies and, more 
controversially, financial contagion. A group of primarily Southern European countries, 
including those most directly affected by the financial crisis, advocated for direct purchases. In a 
direct purchase, the ECB purchases the bonds of troubled crisis-country institutions directly on 
the open market. Such direct transactions would reduce the risk of default by transferring some 
risk to the wealthier North. This is a much easier argument to sell in a technocratic setting 
dominated by policy experts, compared with a democratic setting populated by parties and 
voters. Even had Northern-country politicians preferred direct purchases, it would have been 
difficult for Northern voters to countenance assuming the financial risk that stemmed from the 
profligate “PIIGS” behavior. The Financial Times detailed the pressure faced by Angela Merkel 
from the conservative wing of her governing coalition.46 What emerged in March 2011 as the 
Grand Bargain aligned closely with the preferences of the Northern European countries. The 
lending authority of the EFSF expanded but only in the context of indirect purchases. Risk thus 
largely remained within crisis countries.  
                                                 





The insulation of risk in crisis countries proved the key point around which Northern 
economies cohered as preference heterogeneity emerged later in the crisis period. In a similar 
vein to the SMP-related discussion, proposals emerged for Eurobonds that would be jointly 
issued by the Eurozone economies.47 Such bonds, at least partially, would take the place of 
sovereign debt. Commentators argued that, without a significantly closer political union, 
Eurobonds would further instantiate moral hazard and create incentives for Southern economies 
to borrow without adopting domestic reforms. From the perspective of Northern economies, 
Eurobonds proposals presented less credit than financial risk that would spread to other areas of 
the economy. Such spillover was observed in the accession-related, convergence trade, shown in 
Figure 2, that produced the property bubbles in Ireland and Spain as well as the increasing 
public-sector employment burden48 across peripheral economies (but in Greece, in particular).  
Even with the homogeneous preferences early in the crisis period, the Troika’s 
preferences were not directly translated into domestic policy. The contrast of Ireland and Greece 
provides a case in point. In exchange for indirect bond purchases, enabled by March 2011’s 
Grand Bargain, the Troika required that Ireland raise its corporate-tax rate of 12.5%, which was 
viewed as unfairly competitive by policymakers in Berlin and Paris. Ireland rejected the Troika’s 
offer, paving the way for the ECB purchases of Greek, but not Irish, sovereign debt.49 Tension 
over corporate-tax reform constituted the key stumbling block between Dublin and Brussels 
policymakers throughout the sample. Moreover, it illustrates the limits of the Troika’s influence 
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in the fiscal policy of crisis countries, particularly when confronted with a unified set of political 
parties. 
While dissent emerged between Northern and Southern economies in debates over the 
Troika’s approach in the first three bailouts, the expenditure-driven austerity approach advocated 
by Northern countries dominated. Coupled with the elevated bond rates that prevented extensive 
capital-market borrowing by crisis-country governments, the unity of the Troika provided a 
relatively hard constraint on domestic politicians. While domestic coalitions had discretion on 
the type of fiscal adjustment adopted, they had little choice that adjustment would proceed. Such 
flexibility contrasts with the period of depressed bond yields immediately following the failure 
of Lehman Brothers. Without the hard funding constraint produced by being locked out of 
capital-markets, crisis countries, with the exception of Greece, enacted inflationary policies. The 
variation in bond-yield pressure thus mediates the influence of external actors in the affairs of 
target countries. 
Vignette #2- Emergent preference heterogeneity: Heterodox policy and the IMF’s personnel 
changes  
As the Greek bailout extended into its second year with little foreseeable prospects for 
economic growth, a number of important voices challenged the Troika’s fiscal orthodoxy. By 
this point, it was becoming increasingly clear that Greece would need a second bailout, either in 
the form of another round of funds or debt restructuring. In July, a lead article in the Financial 
Times50 advocated a Brady-bond-like swap for Greece. In 1989, during George H.W. Bush’s 
administration, Secretary of the Treasury Thomas Brady replaced much of the sovereign debt 
from several Latin American economies with bonds denominated in US dollars. The associated 
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restructuring reduced the real debt burden of Latin American economies. Moreover, the debt’s 
denomination in US dollars eliminated the possibility of Latin American governments printing 
money to further reduce the real debt burden. 
The Brady-bond parallel was imperfect for two primary reasons. First, because of their 
existing in a currency union without control over either monetary policy or exchange-rate 
interventions, the Eurozone’s peripheral countries remained unable to affect the real debt burden 
through the primary means employed by the Latin American economies in the late 1980’s. In 
other words, monetary-policy credibility was never at issue for Eurozone economies. Second, 
little political will existed for debt restructuring in the primary creditor economies, i.e., Germany. 
In the case of Brady bonds, the United States offered generous terms to private-sector 
bondholders that participated in the bond swap. Germany, for a variety of reasons, which were 
primarily political, was unwilling to play an analogous role.  
By the middle of 2011, notwithstanding the debates over relatively heterodox policy, 
Ireland and Greece exhibited signs of austerity fatigue. Bond yields continued to escalate in 
Ireland, Portugal, and Greece, as incumbent governments fell in February, June, and November 
of 2011, respectively. A number of important policy and personnel changes within the Troika 
fueled the deteriorating consensus over austerity. The emergent policy heterogeneity was clear in 
the contrast of the successive rate increases by the ECB with a research paper produced by the 
IMF. After consecutive meetings in April and July 2011, as shown in Figure 1, the ECB raised 
its main policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to 1.25% and 1.5%, respectively.51 These rate 
increases occurred concurrently with negotiations over Portugal’s May 2011 bailout. The 
contractionary policy trajectory of the ECB remained in place until November 2011, when Mario 
                                                 





Draghi replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as the head of the ECB. As the ECB doubled down on its 
conservative position, the IMF’s position evolved to reflect both new leadership as well as 
additional research. On the personnel side, with the revelations of sexual misconduct by 
Dominique Strauss-Khan, Christine Lagarde took over as Managing Director of the IMF in July 
2011. The shift in leadership arrived at a critical time for the IMF, in which two sources of 
discontent gathered strength. The first derived from the IMF’s diverse geographic constituency; 
the second involved the increasing empirical evidence undercutting arguments for the variety of 
expansionary austerity advocated by the ECB. Unlike the EC and the ECB, with constituencies 
exclusively within Europe, the IMF’s membership includes developing and developed 
economies from around the world. Founded following the Second World War, the IMF oversaw 
and conducted extensive reforms following the Latin American debt crises in the 1980’s and the 
East Asian currency crises in the 1990’s.52 Following the 2008 financial crisis, these countries 
increasingly felt that the IMF, at the behest of its European partners in the Troika, were lenient 
with European debtors compared with the historical treatment of the Latin American and East 
Asian countries. In an interview with the Financial Times, Paulo Batista—a member of the 
IMF’s Executive Board, who represented Brazil and a number of other countries—questioned 
whether Lagarde could “transcend her European origins.”53 In September 2011, partly in 
response to the growing resentment and prior to the disbursement of Troika aid to Greece, the 
IMF formally expressed dissatisfaction with Athens’ movement on its budget deficit. While the 
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European partners in the EC, with the partial exception of Germany and the Netherlands, were 
largely satisfied with Athens’ progress, the IMF refused to disburse further loans.54  
In addition to the constituency-related tension, heterodox voices within the IMF gained 
an important ally with the publication of an IMF working paper that challenged the empirical 
groundings of expansionary fiscal austerity.55 The authors argued that previous estimates of the 
macroeconomic effects of austerity had been biased upwards, because they failed to control for 
changes in the macroeconomic environment correlated with the adoption of austerity policy. 
Once the authors controlled for these changes, they showed that fiscal austerity produced adverse 
macroeconomic consequences in the short-run. These contractionary effects were contrary to the 
salutary dynamics implied by the Washington Consensus. Viewed as an isolated working paper, 
the document was not particularly important. However, when considered as indicative of the 
IMF’s growing equivocation over the effectiveness of continued austerity, the working paper 
gained importance. Whereas the Troika began as a unified organization, the July 2011 working 
paper indicates the emerging splits within the Troika, splits that crisis countries would soon be 
able to exploit. 
With the Eurozone’s increasing public-debt burdens, and the growing empirical evidence 
of austerity leading to diminished economic growth, at least in the short-term, the primary policy 
platform espoused by the technocratic IMF shifted to debt reduction. The relative flexibility of 
the IMF’s policy positions, relative to the ECB’s, reflected differences in the preference 
formation of the respective organizations. The ECB’s preference arose from Germany’s 
insistence on expenditure-centric reform; the IMF’s arose from a technocratic belief that 
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expenditure-centric austerity produced superior economic outcomes. When research and 
empirical reality challenged the expenditure-centric paradigm, the IMF’s preferred policy 
changed, from expenditure adjustment to debt relief. The ECB’s, dependent on the political 
conditions in creditor countries more than technocratic beliefs, remained constant.  
Vignette #3- Implications of growing prior positions: Policy shift at the ECB 
As Lagarde’s replacement of Strauss-Khan signaled a policy shift at the IMF, Mario 
Draghi’s replacement of Trichet in November 2011 signaled a policy shift by the ECB. Bond-
yield spreads skyrocketed, as shown in Figure 2, following the ECB’s successive rate increases 
in April and July 2011. As with Lagarde’s replacement of Strauss-Khan, there were questions 
about the influence of national origin on the direction of policy.56 Except, whereas Lagarde had 
reigned from France, Draghi hailed from Italy. Replacing the austerity champion Trichet, many 
observers saw in Draghi a chance for the ECB to shift course. And, in a limited sense, Draghi’s 
ascendance did signal a change in course. Figure 1 shows the main policy rates from the Fed, the 
ECB, and the BOE. Draghi gradually reduced rates beginning in November 2011 but only 
reached the BOE’s level in May 2013. At the same time as Draghi announced lower target rates, 
the ECB implemented successive rounds of LTRO’s. These large-scale asset purchases in 
December 2011 and February 2012 shifted nearly €1 trillion in collateral onto the ECB’s balance 
sheet. The relatively expansionary conventional and unconventional monetary policies 
implemented under Draghi contrasted with the more conservative position taken by the ECB 
under Trichet. In a concession to the Northern Bloc, however, bond purchases under the auspices 
of LTRO’s remained indirect and thus largely confined risk to national balance sheets. In 
addition to the evolution in monetary policies, the ECB also temporarily shifted its position on 
                                                 





fiscal policy with respect to debt restructuring. In the aftermath of the IMF’s repudiation of 
expansionary austerity, IMF economists pushed for debt restructuring as a mean of gaining fiscal 
solvency for crisis economies in general and Greece in particular. And, whereas in prior bailouts, 
the ECB had been reluctant to impose losses on private-sector bondholders, the Troika imposed 
losses on private bondholders in the second bailout of Greece. 
While the shift in the IMF’s position and the consequent preference heterogeneity 
contributed to the Troika’s policy change, a second supply-side dynamic characterized by Figure 
3, applied in the second Greek bailout. The first extensive bond purchases made under the SMP 
and LTRO’s built up the ECB’s positions in the liabilities of peripheral economies. While, prima 
facie, the debt reduction appeared an unmitigated victory for the IMF, the ECB restricted debt 
restructuring to private-sector holdings. Private-sector holdings accounted for €206 billion of 
outstanding Greece’s roughly €350 billion in outstanding debt. Thus, the ECB protected its large 
prior position in the sovereign debt market while partially satisfying key constituencies within 
the IMF. 
Vignette #4- Credibility: 2012 Eurozone summit and the “bailout” of Spain 
 During the first four bailouts conducted by the Troika—in Ireland, Portugal, and twice in 
Greece—policymakers expressed concerns about contagion between crisis countries and non-
crisis countries. Chapter 4’s discussion of bond yields explored the dynamics of contagion 
explored in greater depth. Here, it is important to note that Troika policymakers, particularly 
those at the EC/ECB, were primarily concerned with creating a “firewall” around peripheral 
European economies. Later in the crisis period, the Troika was primarily concerned that, if bond 
yields escalated in Italy and Spain, Troika institutions would not command sufficient resources 





with the smaller European economies and the continent’s largest economies: Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain. The latter are “too-big-to-bail.” This provided policymakers from larger 
economies with leverage, resembling a game of chicken, vis-à-vis the Troika.  
In 2012, as bond-yield spreads declined in peripheral economies following the 
restructuring of Greek debt, the Spanish spread started to increase, primarily over fears for the 
collective health of cajas, Spain’s under-regulated regional banks. The June 2012 Eurozone 
Summit highlighted the central credibility problem facing Troika policymakers in negotiations 
with the indebted, larger European economies. Prior to the Summit, the Spanish government 
requested €100 billion with which to recapitalize its banks. Crucially, the Spanish government 
requested that bank debt be purchased directly rather than indirectly by the Troika.57 Spanish 
policymakers hoped that direct purchases would transfer risk away from Spain and thereby 
reduce the upward pressure on Spain’s sovereign-bond yields. At the Summit, tension increased 
between Northern economies (led by Germany) and the IMF over precisely the issue of direct 
ECB involvement in Spain’s banking crisis. By the Summit’s end, policymakers had produced 
an agreement that combined €120 billion in growth measures with an agreement for the ECB to 
recapitalize banks directly. Chapters 6 & 7 explore the associated negotiations and their 
implications for fiscal policies adopted in crisis countries. 
However, in the following months, as Northern leaders tried to sell these policies to their 
domestic constituencies, two key provisions changed. 58 First, direct purchases of bonds would 
only occur in response to formal requests to the Troika by crisis countries and subject to Troika 
conditions. This arrangement, in all but name, reproduced the conditionality of bailouts. Second, 
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Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland announced that the banking agreement would not apply 
to legacy assets. ECB recapitalization would apply only to assets acquired from the date of the 
Summit onwards. Assets acquired prior to the Summit, including almost all of the toxic debt on 
bank balance sheets, would not be subject to the agreement. This posed a significant problem for 
Spain’s cajas that possessed significantly overvalued assets that had not been marked-to-market 
since the onset of the financial crisis. These two measures largely reversed the Southern camp’s 
purported gains. Moreover, these measures indicated the importance of domestic politics in both 
crisis and non-crisis countries in the Troika’s decision-making, and the wide gap between 
Summit proclamations and domestic passage. In the fallout from the redesigned agreement, the 
split between the IMF, the EC/ECB, and dominant creditor countries became clear. In the final 
agreement, the IMF did not participate in the bailout of Spanish banks. Moreover, dissent 
increasingly emerged within senior IMF leadership. Peter Doyle, a former division chief of 
IMF’s European Department, resigned from his position, citing the both the broad failure of the 
Fund’s leadership to provide policy alternatives to austerity as well as the Fund’s pervasive 
European bias.59 
Vignette #5- Affirming conditionality: From the SMP to OMT 
Following his appointment as President of the ECB, Mario Draghi committed the ECB to 
maintaining the Eurozone intact. In a July 2012 speech, Draghi stated that “the ECB is ready to 
do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro.” Draghi went on to reassure his audience, saying 
“believe me, it will be enough.”60 In September 2012, with yields on peripheral debt increasing, 
following extended electoral uncertainty in Greece and Monti’s declining political credibility in 
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Italy, Draghi introduced Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT’s), which would purchase the 
debt of troubled countries in exchange for conditional reforms.61 The OMT replaced the ECB’s 
prior Securities Markets Programme (SMP). The primary difference between OMT and 
LTRO/SMP was that the OMT explicitly institutionalized conditionality, which would include 
quarterly visits by Troika representatives and other features characteristic of involvement with 
the EFSF’s and ESM’s bailout facilities. Indeed, to access the OMT’s lending facilities, a 
recipient country would need to have an open line of credit with either the EFSF or the ESM. 
Particularly, given the deteriorating electoral contexts in Greece and Italy, the requisite 
conditionality of the OMT program raised questions about the program’s usefulness in a crisis 
situation characterized by substantial political uncertainty. Conceivably, in such a situation, no 
domestic policymaker would be able to credibly commit to conditional reforms. As a result, 
either the ECB would have to violate a primary, founding principle and buy bonds without 
credible commitment to reform62 or the ECB would have to wait for a credible government, 
risking financial and economic turmoil in the interim. Ironically, it was precisely this type of 
political uncertainty with detrimental financial-market implications (inconclusive May 2012 
elections in Greece that led to the highest bond-yield spreads observed in the sample) that 
compelled ECB to create the program. In March 2013, the restrictions for participation in OMT 
became more onerous, as Draghi announced that not only would participating countries need to 
be actively undergoing macroeconomic adjustment, but they would also have to be “on the 
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62 Given that the key role of the modern, independent central bank is to reduce discretionary monetary policy, and 
thereby minimize uncertainty over the path of the future money supply, violating an underlying rule would set an 
unacceptable precedent for many monetary policymakers. See Kydland & Prescott (1977) for the seminal paper on 
rules-based versus discretionary monetary policy: Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott. "Rules rather than 





market by themselves.”63 This further restricted the ECB’s ability to respond to the financial-
market consequences of a political crisis. Thus, not only would OMT-target countries need to 
have an open line of credit with the EFSF/ESM, a target would also need to be in a financially 
sound position with full access to bond markets. The OMT’s increasingly onerous restrictions 
revealed the deep political tension of fiscal union in the Eurozone, a tension dominated by the 
conservative Northern economies. 
The market-access restriction also introduced an important asymmetry with respect to 
Eurozone countries. Bond yields were lower on large countries not only as a function of 
macroeconomic productivity but also because market actors recognized that the failure of one of 
the largest economies (e.g., Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) would lead to the collapse of the 
Eurozone. Market actors knew the lengths that Eurozone leaders would go to prevent such a 
economic, and political, catastrophe. Thus, markets priced in the added willingness of Eurozone 
leaders to back large economies. This represented the sovereign analog to the systemically 
important financial institutions deemed “too-big-to-fail” by Andrew Sorkin following the 2008 
financial crisis.64 This dynamic also explained Spain’s ability, uniquely among bailout recipients, 
to sharply circumscribe conditionality. Within the context of OMT and the ECB’s policy, the 
yield advantage granted to larger economies meant that, under financial-market stress, larger 
countries such as Italy and Spain would retain access to ECB programs; smaller countries, on the 
other hand, such as Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, would be locked out of such programs. 
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Perversely, anticipating and internalizing the logic of such asymmetric program access, markets 
further drove the yields of large and small economies apart. 
Vignette #6- An additional external actor: Russia’s involvement in Cyprus 
 Two dynamics threatened to exacerbate the collective action problem facing Troika 
policymakers: the emergence of preference heterogeneity within the Troika as well as additional 
external actors. By combining the IMF with the ECB and the EC, the institutional design of the 
Troika prevented, to some degree, the collective action problems that confront multiple actors. 
Throughout Southern and Western Europe, no organizations challenged the primacy of the 
Troika. In Eastern Europe, however, the Troika’s primacy was not a given, particularly with 
respect to Russia. In December 2011, Cyprus’s AKEL party faced an increasing deficit, 
exacerbated by an explosion at a power plant that substantially reduced the country’s power 
supply.65 Having observed the Troika’s overbearing policy mandates in Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal, the Cypriot government sought alternative sources for funds. Flush with hard currency 
as a result of high commodity (in particular, oil) prices, Moscow extended funds without 
conditionality. Cypriot politicians explicitly framed aid from Russia as a less onerous alternative 
to aid from European financial institutions.66 Moscow’s interest stemmed from the geopolitical 
competition for influence in the region in addition to the large proportion of Russian deposits in 
the Cypriot banking system. These deposits would potentially be at risk if the Troika imposed 
private-sector restructuring, as was being discussed in Greece at the time. In total, Moscow 
supplied €2.5 billion.67 Importantly, while there was no explicit policy conditionality, there was 
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the expectation that the Russian creditors would have increased seniority relative to Cyprus’ 
other creditors.  
The Troika had been unwilling to manipulate seniority because of concerns over capital 
flight and the associated pressure on already strained capital-market spreads. So long as Russian 
creditor seniority was unquestioned, Moscow refrained from pressuring the Cypriot government. 
Over the next two years, Cyprus’ situation deteriorated markedly. By 2013, with its seniority in 
question, Moscow refused to extend additional funds. Without an alternative source of funds, 
Nicosia turned to the Troika. As in the negotiations over the second Greek bailout, the IMF 
repeatedly expressed concerns over Cypriot debt sustainability.68 When the ECB capitulated to 
IMF demands and insisted on the private-sector involvement of Cypriot banks, the Cypriot 
government returned to Russia as a potential creditor. Infuriated, Troika policymakers threatened 
to withdraw from discussions if negotiations between the Cypriot and Russian governments 
proceeded further.69 On the same day that the Troika threatened withdraw, the Cypriot 
Parliament voted for a proposal that would impose 7%-tax on bank deposits under €100,000 and 
10% on deposits over €100,000.70 This kind of bail-in contrasted with the private-sector 
involvement in the Greek restructuring, in which bondholders (rather than depositors) bore the 
burden of adjustment. The ECB was willing to countenance such involvement for two reasons. 
First, as the third smallest Eurozone economy, the restructuring would cause manageable 
financial-market volatility, particularly because the Cypriot banking sector lacked a financial 
institution systematically important to the Eurozone. Second, wealthy Russians seeking a stable, 
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offshore banking system constituted a large proportion of relevant depositors.71 Russian deposits 
appeared as a more attractive target than outstanding public-sector Cypriot debt, which was 
primarily held by European banks and governments. Ultimately, the deal agreed with the Troika 
taxed deposits over €100,000, with haircuts ranging between 40% and 60%.72 
The Cypriot situation reflected the weak bargaining positions of small Eurozone 
economies, despite their representation within the Troika as part of the EC. With substantial 
positions in Greek debt, Cypriot banks lobbied against the private-sector restructuring of the 
second Greek bailout. Indeed, it was unlikely that Cyprus would have required a bailout had 
Greece’s private-sector restructuring not taken place. Moreover, the limited engagement between 
Cyprus and Russia illustrated the importance of alternative external actors. Crisis countries can 
delay, if not eliminate, policy reform, if they can find an alternative external actor willing to 
extend funds. While it is outside of the bounds of this study, which runs between 2000 and 2013, 
in 2015, Greek politicians approached Russia as a potential source of funds in order to avoid a 
third Troika-financed bailout. In 2013, with the high oil prices that prevailed during Cyprus’s 
courtship of Russia, Russian creditors were unusually willing to extend credit to a risky 
sovereign. In 2015, with Greece seeking similar leverage vis-à-vis the Troika, oil prices had 
declined sharply. As a result, while much political posturing surrounded the Greek premier’s 
meeting with Putin, Russia extended no credit to Athens.
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
Organization Preference 
European Central Bank Solvency not required for disbursement; expenditure-
centric (Germany) 
International Monetary Fund Solvency required for disbursement; expenditure-
centric (prominent financial contributors; 
technocratic) 
European Commission Solvency not required for disbursement; country 
autonomy (set of 27 commissioners) 
Table A1. Preferences of the Troika’s constituent organizations. The first column lists the relevant organizations. 
The second column lists, first, whether solvency is required for the disbursement of funds and, second, the 
preference over type of adjustment. In parentheses, the primary driver of preferences is listed. 
 
 
Figure A1. The value (in millions of Euros) of assets on the ECB’s balance-sheet. Note the sharp increases at the 
onset of the financial crisis and subsequent increases with each round of LTRO. Data is taken from the European 
Central Bank: European Central Bank, Central Bank Assets for Euro Area (11-19 Countries), retrieved from FRED, 
































































































































































































Figure A2. Public-sector compensation (as a proportion of GDP) for Eurozone countries over the study’s sample 
between 2000 and 2013. Red dots indicate crisis countries: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. Blue dots 
indicate non-crisis countries. In each panel, LOWESS regression lines with a bandwidth of 0.6 show a smoothed 
average of the relevant dependent variable; the red and blue lines indicate the weighted averages for crisis- and non-


















































Chapter 6: Partisanship and fiscal policy following the 2008 financial crisis 
 
Overview of Chapters 6 & 7 
 
 The previous two chapters examined the role played by external actors in fiscal 
policymaking following the 2008 financial crisis. Chapters 6 & 7 turn to the domestic context 
and examine the roles of partisanship and consonance, respectively. The quantitative analysis in 
Chapter 3 employed a large-N framework to test the hybrid model presented in Chapter 1. The 
subsequent case studies are arranged to emphasize different elements of the proposed theoretical 
framework. To the extent possible, individual case studies hold constant the remaining 
independent variables. In Chapter 6, which examines partisanship, this means controlling for 
consonance and the pressure exerted by external actors; in Chapter 7, which examines 
consonance, this means controlling for partisanship and the pressure exerted by external actors. 
Looking ahead, the former juxtaposes analyses of Spain and Portugal; the latter juxtaposes 
analyses of Greece and Italy. The case studies emphasize variation within countries over time but 
also present a limited exploration of the variation between countries. 
To assess the model’s predictions, Chapters 6 & 7 marshal three types of evidence. First, 
measured policy differences, such as those presented in Figure 1, indicate the policy outcomes in 
different countries, under different governments, over time. Second, the two chapters present the 
preferences of political parties, measured with party manifestoes, in post-crisis elections. Figure 
2 provides the first such example, with the RILE and MODRILE scores of the parties that 
participated in Spain’s 2008 general election. Third and finally, the analysis relies on the 
coverage of the financial press to construct a political narrative. These narratives provide context 
for both the model’s key independent variables as well as an exploration of potential 




Introduction to Chapter 6 
To assess the effect of shifting partisanship, Chapter 6 examines variation over time of in 
the policies of two countries: Spain and Portugal. In Spain, between March 2000 and March 
2004, the center-right Popular Party (PP) held power in a single-party majority government. 
Following Al Qaeda’s bombing in Madrid, three days prior to the general election, Spain’s 
Socialist party (PSOE) formed a single-party government, which lasted until December 2011, 
when, following the financial crisis, the center-right PP returned to office with a single-party 
majority government. In Portugal, between March 2002 and February 2005, the center-right 
Social Democratic Party (PSD) governed in coalition with the business-conservative People’s 
Party (CDS-PP). In 2005, the center-left Socialist Party (PS) replaced the center-right coalition 
government and remained in power until June 2011, when, following the financial crisis, the 
center-right PSD/CDS-PP reformed a coalition majority government.   
In both Portugal and Spain, Chapter 6 compares policy produced under left governments 
with policy produced under right governments. Within each country, the model’s remaining 
independent variable, consonance, remained constant over the sample considered. Single-party 
majority governments were the norm on both the left and right in Spain and the left in Portugal. 
On the right in Portugal, parties closely aligned on the primary cleavage of fiscal policy formed 
coalition governments with strong parliamentary majorities. The influence of external actors 
varied between the two countries, but little within the countries over time, particularly in the 
crisis and post-crisis periods. Since Chapter 6 relies primarily on within-country variation to 
draw inferences, the between-country variation in pressure applied by external actors is 
unproblematic. The chapter notes explicitly where variation in external pressure could drive 






Figure 1. Disaggregated fiscal policies in Portugal (in blue) and Spain (in red) between 2000 and 2013. A vertical 
line at 2008 indicates the onset of the financial crisis. The top three graphs show (from left-to-right and top-to-
bottom) the tax rates on income, consumption, and corporate profits, respectively. The bottom two graphs (from left-
to-right) show spending on public-sector compensation and social benefits, respectively. 
 
Spain 
 Between April 2004 and March 2008, the PSOE governed Spain in a single-party 
majority government; in the March 2008 elections, the PSOE lost its majority in parliament and 











































































































































financial-market pressure to cut a growing deficit, the center-right PP replaced the PSOE in 
December 2011. To assess the effect of partisanship on fiscal policy, the present case study 
compares the policy produced following the financial crisis under PSOE with the policy 
produced following the PP’s election.  
Importantly, the alternative explanatory variables remained constant over the period 
under consideration. Pressure from external actors remained limited over the period, as Spain 
remained active in the sovereign-debt markets over the period. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter 4’s bond-yield analysis and Chapter 5’s exploration of external actors, external actors 
faced a key credibility problem with respect to the larger Eurozone economies. Whereas the 
Eurozone could afford to bailout smaller economies, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Cyprus, the Eurozone could not afford to let either Italy or Spain fail. Knowing this, 
policymakers in larger economies discounted the demands made by Troika policymakers. 
Because of such discounting, and because programmatic consonance remained constant over the 
period, fiscal-policy changes in Spain between the two governments can be primarily attributed 
to changes in partisanship, from the center-left Socialists to the center-right Popular Party. 
Both PSOE and PP governments were single-party majority governments and thus 
generated the highest theoretically possible scores for consonance. There were occasions where 
additional support was required in the legislature. If securing such support required 
programmatic concessions along fiscal policy, such policy-for-vote trading complicates the 
dynamics of the hybrid model. In the minority PSOE administration, the government relied upon 
the support of small regional parties.1 While the small regional parties had varying preferences 
over the different components of fiscal policy, their fiscal-policy positions, particularly those of 
                                                 




wealthier regions, such as Catalonia, were informed by a preference for fiscal autonomy. The 
first subsection explores the tensions between center and periphery over autonomy and explores 
the implications of such tensions for Spain’s post-crisis fiscal policy. 
Tension between center and periphery 
In May 2010, while the Troika negotiated Greece’s first bailout, Spain’s Socialist 
government announced an austerity package in an attempt to soothe financial markets. As 
negotiations over reform proceeded forward, a political dynamic peculiar to Spain—although 
present to some degree in Italy—among the crisis countries emerged as particularly salient. The 
importance of the autonomous regions, dating back to the political compromise between 
periphery and center that facilitated the transition from military dictatorship to parliamentary 
democracy in the 1970’s, placed Madrid’s government in a relatively weak position vis-à-vis its 
counterparts in Athens, Dublin, and Lisbon. While the proportion of spending by level of 
government varies from year-to-year, Madrid controls only about a quarter of the budget; the 
autonomous regions, responsible for health and education, spend about half of the budget with 
the remaining portion allocated to social security.2 Perversely, while regions control the majority 
of expenditure, they control only a small proportion of taxation. This produces moral hazard that 
encourages regions to approve expenditure measures and pass the bill onto Madrid. Such a 
disconnect generates higher levels of regional expenditure in equilibrium than an institutional 
context that places responsibility for expenditure and taxation functions at the same level. 
The tension between center and periphery created twin dynamics reminiscent of the two-
level games articulated by Robert Putnam.3 At the domestic level, on the one hand, Madrid 
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blamed deviations from their voters’ preferred policies on the Troika. At the international level, 
on the other hand, Spanish governments blamed deviations from the Troika’s preferred policies 
on the recalcitrant regions. The timing of political debates within Spain reflected the benefits 
potentially extracted from the Troika. In March 2012, Madrid announced measures to rein in 
spending by the autonomous regions.4 Later in the month, Madrid expressed concerns about its 
banking system to the Troika, as described in Chapter 5’s fourth vignette. When the Troika 
requested additional cuts and conditional reforms, Madrid argued that it was working with the 
autonomous regions to reduce their deficits. Without a constitutional amendment to Spain’s 
federal fiscal structure, however, Madrid possessed no tool to credibly punish regional 
overshoots. Moreover, short of civil war, such an amendment would not be forthcoming. Thus, 
either Madrid’s policymakers were being disingenuous, Brussels’s myopic, or a combination of 
the two. 
The tension between center and periphery proved important throughout the crisis, as the 
center attempted to reduce spending in the periphery; however, the lack of strong institutional 
checks sharply circumscribed the power of the center to impose fiscal reforms on the periphery. 
Following 2010, the ratings agencies listed the outlook for all 17 autonomous regions as 
“negative.”5 But with direct access to debt markets, the regions continued to borrow, with yields 
artificially depressed by the creditors’ implicit (and, as of this writing, validated) belief that 
Madrid would cover the regions’ debt in the case of default. Following the Troika’s bailout of 
Ireland in November 2010, Madrid moved to assert control over the periphery by mandating 
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quarterly updates of the financial statements of the autonomous regions. Autonomous regions 
that failed to comply, Madrid announced, would be unable to access debt markets.6 The center’s 
threat was not credible, because regions borrowed directly on debt markets, rather than through 
Madrid. Until Madrid demonstrated a willingness to let a region default, regions would continue 
to borrow freely, leaving the center to foot the bill. Catalonia, Spain’s wealthiest autonomous 
region, publically denounced the large transfer payments required to the country’s poorer 
autonomous regions. Artur Mas, the region’s premier, failed to agree to the deficit-reduction 
targets set by Spain’s center and privately negotiated loans with Spain’s largest banks.7 When 
Spain exceeded its 6% deficit target in 2011 and Madrid sought to assert increased control of the 
autonomous regions’ budgets, Catalonia questioned the constitutionality of the measures.8 While 
preparing to challenge the potential reform’s constitutionality, Artur Mas also prepared measures 
to increase the fiscal autonomy of Catalonia.9  
Figure 2. RILE and MODRILE scores from Spain’s 2008 general election. In both graphs, parties are presented 
from left-to-right on the basis of their ranked RILE scores. In both panels, negative values indicate left positions, 
and positive values indicate right positions. Abbreviations are taken from the CMP codebook; the corresponding 
party names are listed in Table A1, in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
Spain under the PSOE 
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The March 2008 general elections in Spain pre-dated the financial crisis. While the global 
financial crisis did not begin until the failure of Lehman Brothers, the domestic precursors, 
including the bursting of asset bubbles in peripheral economies, predated the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, in some cases, by as many as two years. Figure A1, in the appendix to this chapter, 
shows the housing-price indices for the set of crisis countries, for which data was available. The 
figure shows the most significant property bubbles in Cyprus, Ireland, and Spain. The remaining 
crisis countries and Germany exhibited little, if any, pre-crisis increase in housing prices. In the 
cases of Ireland and Spain, the property bubbles burst prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers; 
thus, the financial-crisis conditions that characterized the post-crisis period in other crisis 
countries appeared in Ireland and Spain, albeit in a milder form, between  the middle of 2007 and 
early 2008.  
Because of the conditions in the Spanish property market, the financial-market conditions 
in Spain’s March 2008 election approximated those in post-crisis election. The left-hand-side 
panel of Figure 2 displays the RILE measures, taken directly from the CMP. The right-hand-side 
panel extracts the economic components from RILE to produce MODRILE. The contrast 
between RILE and MODRILE suggests that much of the variation between Spain’s parties 
involves non-economic components; the strong regional preferences of many Spanish parties 
provides a political logic underlying the observed divergence in measures. Indeed, four parties 
defined by regionalist, if not secessionist, objectives—CiU, EA, CC, and UPN10—exhibit the 
largest changes between RILE and MODRILE scores. When measured in the RILE space, the 
two mainstream parties—PP and PSOE—are situated opposite one another; the intervening 
political space shrinks in the MODRILE space. The 2011 budget, organized against the backdrop 
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of Greece’s deteriorating financial situation and increasing bond spreads across the Eurozone’s 
periphery, shows how the divergent political preferences of Figure 2 manifest in public policy 
and associated debate. 
With bond yields on Spanish debt increasing in the first half of 2010, the Socialist 
government faced increasing financial-market pressure to implement reforms.11 The austerity 
package proposed in 2010 imposed reductions in public-sector pay and pensions, in addition to 
cuts in broader social spending.12 The conservative PP largely applauded such cuts, while noting, 
in some cases, that they did not go far enough. With respect to taxation, the PSOE announced 
increases in the tax rates of high-income individuals.13 Figure 1 shows a two-point increase in 
Spain’s top marginal tax rate. In addition, in September 2010 negotiations over the 2011 budget, 
the government announced increased taxation of capital gains, causing further anger within the 
PP’s ranks.14 The PP strongly opposed the increased tax burden proposed in the 2011 budget; 
this burden was particularly galling to the PP, given its targeting of key component PP 
constituencies. The parliamentary vote on the 2011 budget reflected the schism between 
mainstream parties. To consolidate support among its parliamentary allies and to secure the 
support of key regional parties, the government restored €500 million in public investment that 
had been cut as part of the May 2010 austerity package.15  The plan passed the Spanish 
parliament by only a single vote with extensive debate between the left, the right, and regional 
parties.16 Without the support of regional parties, given the PSOE’s minority position, the 
proposed budget would not have passed. The 2011 budget indicates why the stark predictions 
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12 Mallet, Victor. “Spain deepens its austerity drive.” Financial Times. 13 May 2010. 
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14 Mallet, Victor. “Tax rise on rich in Spain’s ‘austere’ 2011 budget.” Financial Times. 25 September 2010. 
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that emerge from the partisan MR model are misleading. The two mainstream parties agreed on 
significant portions of the budget, particularly those related to cuts in public-sector 
compensation. Such agreement did not prevent vigorous parliamentary debate, which gave rise to 
the impression that the government and opposition disagreed on all points. 
In the wake of the passage of the austerity package, financial markets continued to apply 
pressure on Spanish bond yields and rating agencies downgraded Spanish debt.17 In April 2011, 
Jose Zapatero announced that he would resign as the PSOE party leader prior to the general 
election, scheduled for March 2012.18 In July 2011, Zapatero brought forward the general 
election to November 2011.19 In September 2011, the PSOE introduced a wealth tax in 
Parliament, intended to target the country’s million wealthiest individuals.20 Much to the PP’s 
consternation, this resulted in the large increase in income-tax rate observed between 2011 and 
2012 in Figure 1; this increase came on top of the increase legislated in the 2011 budget. 
Notwithstanding the vituperative debate over the 2011 budget, the opposition displayed a 
willingness to work with the government, even after the announcement of general elections, if 
the proposed legislation aligned with the PP’s constituency. This cooperation become important 
when, following the passage of the Fiscal Compact in March 2012, the Troika required that 
Eurozone member states incorporate the SGP’s debt and deficit limits domestically, either as 
statute or as constitutional amendment. With strong support from both the opposition PP and the 
Troika, the PSOE passed a balanced-budget amendment to Spain’s constitution.21  
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18 Mallet, Victor. “Spain’s Zapatero to stand down at election.” Financial Times. 4 April 2011. 
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Figure 3. RILE and MODRILE scores from Spain’s 2011 general election. In both graphs, parties are presented 
from left-to-right on the basis of their ranked RILE scores. In both panels, negative values indicate left positions, 
and positive values indicate right positions. Abbreviations are taken from the CMP codebook; the corresponding 
party names are listed in Table A1, in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
A shift to the right: Spain under the PP 
In Spain’s 2011 general election, in contrast to the 2008 general election, as shown in 
Figure 3, the MODRILE ranking largely preserved the RILE order. This reflected the ascendance 
of economic policy as the dominant cleavage, occluding the regional impulse that shaped party 
preferences in prior elections. As the economic space provided the primary context for electoral 
competition, the two parties situated themselves at opposite sides of the political spectrum. This 
contrasts with the relative similarity in economic positions adopted by the PP and the PSOE in 
the 2008 elections, as shown in Figure 2. The opening up of the economic ideological space in 
Spain contrasts with the ideological convergence in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal over the 
sample period. This discrepancy reflects the differences in financial-market pressure over the 
crisis countries, a discrepancy accounted for in the hybrid model but not in any of the three 
dominant contemporary approaches. In the November election, the Popular Party won a majority 
of seats in the Spanish parliament and created a single-party majority government. Figure 2’s 
divergent preferences manifested in policy debates following the election. After entering 
government in December 2011, the center-right government announced a 2011 deficit of 8%, 












































and the Troika.22 The incoming government blamed the former administration both for failing to 
close the deficit and for failing to disclose the degree of departure from the target. In response, 
the new government announced additional austerity measures, including extensive public-sector 
cuts; the measures avoided the income-tax heavy approach adopted by the prior government.23 
Figure 1 shows the largest decline in Spain’s public-sector compensation over the sample 
between 2011 and 2012.  
 In February 2012, the new government lobbied the Troika to reduce the 4.4% deficit 
target for 2012. In step with the IMF’s evolving position, examined in Chapter 5’s second 
vignette, Spanish politicians expressed concerns over the growth-stinting effects of the cuts 
required to achieve the 2012 target.24 Politicians in Greece and Portugal expressed similar 
concerns over the austerity packages negotiated with the Troika. However, unlike with the three 
smaller Eurozone economies, the Troika granted significant concessions to Spain. Concessions 
came in two primary forms: relaxed deficit targets and unconditional financial aid with respect to 
Spain’s failing banks. In March 2012, the Troika relaxed the 4.4% deficit target for 2012 to 5.3% 
after Rajoy’s government unilaterally announced a target of 5.8% of GDP.25 In July 2012, the 
Troika further relaxed Spain’s deficit target, raising the 2012 target to 6.3% and pushing the 3% 
target to 2015.26  
By May 2012, with two years of austerity accomplished, Spanish banks began 
announcing large losses. Experts estimated the funds required to recapitalize the troubled banks 
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ranged between €50 billion and €200 billion. Rajoy’s government turned to the Troika to help fill 
the gaping hole. Initially, the Troika required extensive fiscal adjustment as a necessary 
condition for Spain’s receipt of Troika funds. In May 2012, Commissioner for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn offered to extend the 3% deficit target from 2013 to 2014 in 
exchange for credible adjustment measures. Madrid, however, brazenly rejected the extension 
and, at the same time, acknowledged that it would not be able to recapitalize its hemorrhaging 
banking sector.27 Through the end of May and early June, Madrid resisted the Troika’s repeated 
entreaties to enter a formal bailout framework, which would require that Madrid to submit to the 
quarterly visits and policy concessions present in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Madrid forced 
the Troika’s hand by continuing to issue sovereign bonds, despite their plunging prices and rising 
yields.28 The Troika29 eventually capitulated, agreeing to extend €100 billion to Spanish banks 
directly in return for Spain’s implementing austerity measures previously agreed upon. Crucially, 
the Troika required the implementation of no further austerity measures.30 In July 2012, with 
Spain and Italy pushing for further concessions from the Troika, the summer’s Eurozone Summit 
produced two important policy results: direct recapitalization of Eurozone banks, rather than 
indirectly through target governments, as well as €120 billion in measures to promote growth.31 
Chapter 5 traced the eventual backtracking from these positions that occurred as Northern 
politicians interacted with their domestic constituencies.  
All of this is not to say that financial markets exerted no pressure on Madrid’s 
policymakers, only that these pressures paled in comparison to those faced by policymakers in 
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Athens, Dublin, and Lisbon. Moreover, when Rajoy implemented adjustment measures 
following the bailout of Spanish banks, his government’s policies took on a more partisan flavor. 
Rajoy’s austerity package, included as part of the 2012 budget, increased consumption taxes by 
three percentage points, shown in Figure 1 between 2012 and 2013, and reduced unemployment 
benefits.32 Against the backdrop of increased consumption taxes and reduced expenditure, 
corporate tax rates remained constant. The terms of the domestic adjustment debate, however, 
continued to be circumscribed by Spain’s strong position vis-à-vis the Troika. The PP-
government implemented limited tax changes, in line with the preferences of its constituencies. 
This position of strength, shared by Italy, stands in contrast to the relatively weak positions of 
Portugal (examined here in the next section) and Greece (examined in Chapter 7). 
Portugal 
 The Portuguese case shares similarities and highlights differences with the Spanish case. 
As in the Spanish case, consonance remains relatively constant across the governments in 
question. Portugal’s Socialists Party (PS) governed as a single-party majority government 
between February 2005 and September 2009. After losing their parliamentary majority in 
September 2009, the Socialists transitioned into as a single-party minority government until June 
2011, when the center-right Social Democrats (PSD) entered office. The Social Democrats’ 
partner party, the conservative People’s Party was closely aligned with the Social Democrats on 
fiscal policy and thus generated effectively the same level of consonance as in the prior single-
party PS governments.  
The primary difference between the Portuguese and Spanish cases involved the pressure 
applied by external actors. In the Spanish case, Troika pressure on Spanish policymakers was not 
                                                 




credible because Spain was “too-large-to-fail.” With respect to Portugal, Troika policymakers 
could countenance the economy’s failure. In the Portuguese environment, the hybrid model 
suggests that the partisan differences between mainstream parties should converge and more 
closely reflect the preferences of external actors than in cases similar to Spain’s, with less 
credible external-actor pressure. Thus, whereas the model predicts significant differences in 
Spanish policy between socialist and conservative regimes in response to minimal external 
pressure, the model predicts limited differences between the policy outputs in Portugal under 
socialist and conservative regimes. The Socialist Prime Minister Jose Socrates expressed the 
implications of bond-market pressure when he announced that he had “no alternative” but to 
freeze pensions and cut public-sector wages in the two austerity packages announced in 2010.33 
As the head of a socialist party, the freezes and cuts mandated by Socrates threatened the party’s 
core public-sector constituency. As Figure 1 shows, the steep decline in public-sector 
compensation between 2009 and 2012 has no analog in the Spanish context, where the PSOE 
was better able to protect its core constituency. 
 
Figure 4. RILE and MODRILE scores from Portugal’s 2009 general election. In both graphs, parties are presented 
from left-to-right on the basis of their ranked RILE scores. In both panels, negative values indicate left positions, 
and positive values indicate right positions. Abbreviations are taken from the CMP codebook; the corresponding 
party names are listed in Table A2, in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
                                                 

































Portugal under the PS 
 The hybrid model suggests that policy convergence should be observed between 
mainstream parties in restrictive bond-yield environments. Prior to the September 2009 general 
elections, the PS controlled a majority of seats in parliament. The 2009 general election took 
place against the backdrop of increasing bond spreads. Despite the wide variation in RILE scores 
over the party space, the two mainstream parties are adjacent to one another. In the MODRILE 
space, the PS is adjacent to the PSD’s conservative coalition partner, CDS-PP. The ideological 
compression observed with respect to Portugal’s mainstream parties relative to Spain’s reflects 
the pressure applied by financial markets and external actors and supports a key element of 
Chapter 1’s hybrid model. While the Socialists formed a minority government following the 
September 2009 election, the subsequent two austerity budgets reflected their lack of domestic 
political autonomy. Moreover, the timing of these budgets—the first immediately following the 
first Greek bailout and the second narrowly predating the Irish bailout—underscores the 
importance of contagion and the relevance of external actors to policymaking in Lisbon. The first 
austerity package reduced the pay of senior public servants and increased income, corporate, and 
consumption taxes.34 Crucially, from the perspective of the PS, the first austerity package 
protected the pay of the majority of the public sector. 
Following the announcement of the first round of austerity measures in July 2010, 
Portuguese bond yields continued to increase, leading financial-market observers to question 
whether Portugal would require a bailout.35 Ratings firms intensified the pressure by reducing 
Portugal’s sovereign-debt rating.36 This pressure continued to intensify, as the Troika entered 
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negotiations with Ireland in late 2010. In September 2010, the second austerity package reduced 
public-sector wages and further raised consumption-tax rates.37 In contrast to the first package, 
the second unambiguously hurt one of the party’s core constituencies: the public-sector 
employee. The limited partisan debate over the substance of the austerity packages involved the 
insistence by the Social Democrats that more of burden be shifted to spending cuts rather than 
tax increases.38 Such debates, however, did not prevent the passage of the government’s budget, 
which incorporated the two austerity packages, in November 2010. At the last minute, the Social 
Democrats abstained from the vote, allowing the minority Socialists to pass the budget.39 
The Troika, however, advocated further cuts by Lisbon’s government. Olli Rhen stressed 
the importance of further reforms for Portugal’s recovery following the Irish bailout.40 As the 
pressure to cut intensified, agencies repeatedly cut the rating of Portugal’s sovereign debt.41 As 
bond yields continued to climb, international observers and domestic politicians recognized the 
impending need for financial assistance. Amid increasingly restrictive conditions, the Socialists 
again targeted their core constituencies with additional proposed cuts to state pensions, 
healthcare spending, unemployment insurance, and welfare benefits.42 In contrast to what a 
partisan MR model would predict, the Social Democrats defeated the proposed measures, leading 
to Socrates’ resignation and a snap election.43 While the PSD’s leadership framed the 
parliamentary defeat in terms of substantive policy differences, their subsequent actions 
suggested that the move reflected political opportunism, rather than policy differences. In the 
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weeks that followed, the Social Democrats did not present alternative measures to close the 
deficit. Moreover, when it eventually entered office in June 2011, the PSD’s policies 
implemented did not differ in substance from those vetoed in March 2011.  
Figure 5. RILE and MODRILE scores from Portugal’s 2011 general election. In both graphs, parties are presented 
from left-to-right on the basis of their ranked RILE scores. In both panels, negative values indicate left positions, 
and positive values indicate right positions. Abbreviations are taken from the CMP codebook; the corresponding 
party names are listed in Table A2, in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
A shift to the right: Portugal under the PSD/CDS-PP 
In 2011, as in 2009, the preferences of political parties reflected the ideological 
compression observed in the prior bargaining over austerity packages. As in the 2009 election, 
the three potential governing parties were adjacent to one another in the RILE space. In the 
MODRILE space, while the expressed differences between left and right governing parties 
intensified, they remained adjacent to one another. The joint negotiations that preceded the 
Troika’s bailout reflected the convergence in policy positions adopted by the mainstream parties 
both before and after the June 2011 elections. In April 2011, as electoral competition between 
the Socialists and Social Democrats escalated, the parties’ leaders agreed to cooperate over 
bailout negotiations that would precede the elections.44 In May 2011, the two party leaders 
agreed to terms with the Troika for a three-year, €78 billion bailout. In exchange for funds, 
                                                 






























Portugal agreed to freeze public-sector pay and pensions until 2013 and imposed additional taxes 
on pensions in excess of €1500 per month.45 In the month between the end of the bailout 
negotiations and the snap election, the opposition Social Democrats proposed a number of 
growth-friendly tax measures, including cutting employer social-security contributions.46  
In June 2011, the opposition Social Democrats secured a majority of seats in Portugal’s 
parliament.47 Despite the renewed hope in Lisbon following the election, agencies continued to 
cut the rating of Portugal’s sovereign debt amid concerns over the growth implications of 
anticipated austerity measures.48 In September 2011, the government announced its proposed 
austerity budget, which included a public-sector wage freeze through 2013, a reduction in the 
level of public-sector employment, and an increase in the taxation of corporate earnings and 
wealthy individuals.49 In October 2011, additional details emerged, including cuts to spending on 
healthcare and education and an increase in consumption taxes.50 Thus, ironically, by the end of 
2011, the budget proposed by the Social Democrats appeared similar to that rejected by the same 
Social Democrats six months earlier in March 2011. The similarity of the two budgets reflected 
the programmatic convergence predicted by the hybrid model. 
Portugal’s institutional peculiarity 
Whereas the tension between center and periphery rendered Spain unique among crisis 
countries, Portugal’s Constitutional Court played a crucial role in shaping post-crisis adjustment 
policy. The idiosyncratic impact of the Court, like the influence of Spain’s autonomous regions, 
falls outside the scope of a model seeking to generalize about fiscal policymaking across a wide 
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set of countries. That said, a discussion of Portugal’s post-crisis fiscal policy would be not be 
complete without addressing the obstinacy of the Constitutional Court, whose role both domestic 
and international actors overlooked prior to its surprising entrance onto the fiscal stage. As part 
of the first austerity packaged described above, adopted in the first year of the three-year bailout 
program agreed to with the Troika, Lisbon eliminated holiday bonuses awarded to the public 
sector. The Constitutional Court, however, declared these measures unconstitutional. In place of 
the public-sector cuts, the center-right government proposed wealth and corporate taxes.51 Thus, 
the intercession of the Constitutional Court shifted the onus of adjustment from the opposition’s 
core constituency, the public sector, onto the government’s core constituency, the middle class 
and corporate interests.  In April 2013, in the second year of the bailout program, the Court 
declared unconstitutional cuts to state pensions and public-sector wages. Economists valued 
these cuts at roughly 7% of take-home pay for public-sector employees. In their stead, the 
government committed to additional cuts on social benefits that did not specifically target public-
sector employees.52  In a final flurry of activity, the Court declared unconstitutional legislation 
related to the hiring, firing, and wages of public-sector employees.53 In each of these cases, the 
Court took issue with legislations’ asymmetric treatment of the private- and public-sectors. The 
Court declared discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional, any measure that applied only the 
public sector. The economic justification of such a move is questionable. If Portuguese public-
sector employees were particularly underpaid relative to their private-sector counterparts, the 
Court’s decision would produce an economically rational outcome. However, the public-to-
private wage ratio, about 1.5—after controlling for relevant characteristics such as education and 
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experience—in Portugal is among the highest in the Eurozone.54 To economists’ chagrin, 
political parties and judicial institutions operate according to political, rather than economic, 
logic.55 Importantly, for the context of the hybrid model, the wage disparity had increased since 
Portugal’s accession to the Euro, following which the government consolidated a core 
constituency by financing higher public-sector salaries with cheap money on sovereign-debt 
markets.  
The relevance of Portugal’s Constitutional Court, like that of the tension between Spain’s 
center and periphery, to post-crisis fiscal policy provides an important caveat with respect to 
generalizable explanations for complicated sociopolitical phenomenon. No explanation for a 
wide set of countries can explain all variation in both process and outcome. Short of applying 
elaborate scope conditions that effectively eliminate generalizability, models invariably ignore 
important variables. In this vein, the hybrid model seeks not to explain all variation in fiscal 
policy over the sample period. Instead, the model seeks to capture a significant portion; whether 
that amount is deemed sufficient ultimately depends on the modeler’s preferences and purposes. 
Portugal, Spain, and the implications for the hybrid model 
 The juxtaposition of the Spanish and Portuguese cases reveals the importance of a hybrid 
model that incorporates both international and domestic factors. With respect to international 
factors, the variation in pressure applied by financial markets explained the relative influence of 
external actors in the domestic policy of the two crisis countries. As detailed in the time series of 
Chapter 3, the initial response of both Portuguese and Spanish policymakers was expansionary. 
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Beginning in the middle of 2009, when bond yields began to price in country-specific, sovereign 
debt risk, the financial-market pressure, and therefore influence of external actors in crisis 
countries, diverged. In Spain, where bond yields remained relatively close to the German bund, 
policymakers were relatively insulated from the demands of external actors. Moreover, Spain’s 
position as one of the Eurozone’s four largest economies, introduced credibility problems with 
respect to the Troika. Financial-market observers, and Madrid’s policymakers, bet that Brussels 
would not allow Spain to default. Madrid’s negotiations of unconditional aid for its banks at the 
Eurozone Summit in the summer of 2012 attest to Spain’s strong bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the Troika. From such a position of strength, policies promulgated by Rajoy’s government 
reflected the government’s partisan preferences to a far greater extent than those adopted under 
Coelho’s PSD-led government in Lisbon. Lisbon, in contrast to Madrid, possessed little leverage 
with the Troika. Lisbon’s ability to extract concessions was limited to the period in which salient 
divisions emerged within the Troika, which date roughly to Christine Lagarde’s taking over as 
Managing Director in June 2011. The consequent space for maneuver was limited and occurred 
after Lisbon had brokered a three-year plan with the Troika in May 2011. 
 Even in Portugal, however, where external actors sharply circumscribed the policy space 
available to domestic politicians, domestic politics influenced fiscal-policy outcomes. Thus, a 
fully international model based upon the convergence approach, would elide important features 
of the Eurozone’s post-crisis fiscal policy. In Portugal, the hybrid model’s domestic component 
helps to explain why the Socialist government’s first austerity package employed primarily tax 
increases with little direct effect on the party’s core constituency: the public-sector employee. 
The pressure of financial-markets, and thus the international dimension, helps to explain why 




sector. The domestic dimension of the hybrid model, however, is more important in countries 
where financial-market conditions limit the influence of external actors in domestic 
policymaking. While bond yields in Spain increased significantly above German bunds early in 
the post-crisis period, they remained far below those of the smaller crisis countries. These 
relatively relaxed financial conditions permitted Spanish policymakers more autonomy with 
which to design austerity measures. Such autonomy is most apparent following the bank bailout 
negotiated with the Troika, after which, Rajoy’s government implemented limited cuts that 




Appendix to Chapter 6 
 
Abbreviation Party name (in English) 
IU United Left 
BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc 
PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
CQ Commitment-Q 
UPyD Union, Progress and Democracy 
ERC Catalan Republic Left 
CC Canarian Coalition 
FAC Forum Asturias 
AM Amaiur 
FY Future Yes 
PNV/ENJ Basque Nationalist Party 
CiU Convergence and Union 
PP Popular Party 
  
CHA Aragonist Council 
EA Basque Solidarity 
UPN Navarrese People’s Union 
Table A1. Party abbreviations and full party names from Spain’s 2011 elections translated into English, according to 
the CMP.  Parties are listed in their ranked RILE, starting with the leftmost party at the top. Three parties below the 





Figure A1. Housing-price indices for the set of crisis countries for which data was available. Germany is included 
for reference. Data was taken from Eurostat’s Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Abbreviation Party name (in English) 
BE Left Bloc 
PEV Ecologist Party, “The Greens” 
PCP Portuguese Communist Party 
PS Socialist Party 
PSD Social Democratic Party 
CDS-PP Social Democratic Center-Popular 
Party 
Table A2. Party abbreviations and full party names from Portugal’s 2009 and 2011 elections translated into English, 
according to the CMP.  Parties are listed according to their ranked RILE scores in 2009, starting with the leftmost 












































































































































Empirically evaluating the role of consonance is more problematic than the role of 
partisanship, primarily because of the relationship between consonance and the hybrid model’s 
remaining two independent variables (external actors and partisanship). For reference, Equation 
1, which reproduces Equation 1 from Chapter 2, shows how consonance is calculated. 
𝑪 = 𝟏 −  (𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 − 𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌𝑳𝒐𝒘)/𝑴𝒂𝒙(𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌)  (Equation 1) 
Equation 1 shows that there are two means by which to change consonance. First, the MODRILE 
rank of either party can change, as reflected in the numerator. Second, with respect to the 
denominator, a shift in the number of parties changes consonance. From the perspective of 
separately identifying the effects of partisanship and consonance on fiscal policy, these 
conditions have a problematic implication. A shift in consonance requires, by definition, a 
change in the partisanship of a government.1 As a result, to evaluate the effect of a change in 
consonance, the chapter tracks the experience of individual parties in governments that differ in 
their level of consonance. In doing so, the chapter explores how changes in consonance influence 
the role of particular parties and thereby drives the mix of fiscal policies produced.  
The chapter is divided into two case studies. The first examines the post-crisis politics of 
Greece; the second examines the post-crisis politics of Italy. The first case study compares 
PASOK’s role as the sole member of a single-party government between October 2009 and 
November 2011 with PASOK’s role as a member of a grand coalition between June 2012 and 
January 2015. The second case study compares People of Liberty’s (PDL’s) role in the center-
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right coalition in power at the onset of the crisis with PDL’s role as a member of the post-crisis 
grand coalition. In addition, the case study considers PDL’s relationship with the technocratic 
government, which intervened between PDL’s time in power. The chapter closes with a 
discussion of the relationship between the case studies and Chapter 3’s large-N findings for the 
hybrid model proposed in Chapter 1. The closing section discusses endogeneity concerns over 
























































































Figure 1. Disaggregated fiscal policies in Greece (in blue) and Italy (in red) between 2000 and 2013. A vertical line 
at 2008 indicates the onset of the financial crisis. The top three graphs show (from left-to-right and top-to-bottom) 
the tax rates on income, consumption, and corporate profits, respectively. The bottom two graphs (from left-to-right) 
show spending on public-sector compensation and social benefits, respectively. 
 
Greece 
 In September 2007, New Democracy won a two-seat majority in Greece’s parliament. In 
October 2009, following the onset of the financial crisis, George Papandreou’s PASOK unseated 
New Democracy (ND). PASOK remained in power until, under pressure from both 
constituencies within PASOK as well as external actors, Papandreou ceded power to a 
technocratic administration in November 2011. In the May 2012 general elections, after ND’s 
failure to form a grand coalition and Syriza’s rejection of PASOK’s offer to form a left-coalition 
government, June 2012 polls produced a grand coalition of ND, PASOK, and the Democratic 
Left. This coalition remained in power until January 2015, when Syriza and Alexis Tsipras rode 
to power on an anti-establishment, anti-austerity platform. At the time of writing the CMP had 
not analyzed the manifestoes from post-crisis Greek elections. As a result, in analyzing Greece, 
the case study considers only the policy outputs in Figure 1 and the accounts in the press (both 
domestic and international). 
Greece under PASOK 
In October 2009, George Papandreou’s PASOK party defeated the incumbent 






































































promised stimulus spending of €2.5 billion, in contrast to the austerity advocated by New 
Democracy.2 With bond yields increasing in the wake of the PASOK’s election victory and the 
government’s 2009 deficit estimated at 12.7% of GDP—driven by the large increase in 
expenditure between 2008 and 2009, shown in the bottom two panels of Figure 1—Papandreou 
committed to a 3% budget deficit by 2013. The plan included a commitment to reduce the 2010 
to 8.7% of GDP. At the time, it was unclear how PASOK would achieve such a target.3 
PASOK’s commitment to a stringent deficit target reflected a wider pattern of commitments to 
fiscal targets in the Eurozone’s peripheral countries, in which governments set ambitious targets 
accompanied by little or no detail on a realistic path.  
To reduce the fiscal deficit, the government announced a number of measures in 
December 2009. These measures included a freeze on monthly public-sector wages in excess of 
€2000 and a 10% cut in public-sector allowances.4 In February 2010, the government announced 
a monthly limit of €5000 in salary for executives at state-controlled companies in addition to 
increased consumption-tax rates on gasoline.5 While Troika officials expressed support for the 
adopted measures, they encouraged further cuts to public-sector compensation and further 
increases in consumption taxes.6 As in other crisis countries, the rating agencies exacerbated 
bond-yield pressure by downgrading Greek debt as a result of concerns over Greece’s fiscal 
sustainability.7 In March 2010, the Greek parliament passed additional measures, which included 
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further increases in consumption taxes, cuts to public-sector wages, and a pension freeze.8 The 
top-left and bottom-left panels from Figure 1 show the large increase in consumption-tax rate 
and reduction in public-sector compensation between 2009 and 2010. 
Figure 2 in Chapter 4, and the subsequent analysis, showed that these measures 
temporarily halted increasing bond spreads in late 2009. By early 2010, bond spreads had 
resumed their upward trajectory, as financial-market participants began to question the 
credibility of Greece’s proposed fiscal path. In April 2010, with the Greek government 
negotiating the first Greek bailout—for €110 billion—PASOK announced additional measures, 
worth roughly €30 billion, that focused on cutting public-sector compensation. The PASOK 
government instituted a three-year public-sector wage freeze and cut end-of-year bonuses for 
public-sector employees.9 In addition, on the tax side, Athens levied a one-time corporate tax on 
2009 profits and increased valued-added taxes by 10 percentage points.10  
Following the bailout’s announcement, bond yields fell and financial-market pressure 
temporarily receded. In this space, PASOK policymakers announced no additional reforms. Had 
the external environment remained calm, it is an open question whether the Greek situation 
would have deteriorated further. Hitherto, as documented in Chapter 4, financial markets had not 
yet priced in country-specific, sovereign credit risk as they would later in the crisis period. As a 
result, turbulence in Ireland, which received a Troika-financed bailout in November 2010, sent 
Greek yields upwards once again, forcing the hand of policymakers in Athens. In crafting the 
2011 budget, the Greek government implemented another round of austerity measures. 
Emergency measures passed in December 2010 cut public-sector compensation and produced 
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splits in PASOK, with four Socialist MP’s voting against the measures; notwithstanding the MP 
rebellion, the measures passed parliament by a wide margin with 156 for and 130 against.11 
Later, in debates over the 2011 budget, despite urging of party unity, ten Socialist legislators 
threatened to bring down the government by voting against the budget.12 Despite their threats, 
the budget passed parliament. The threatened dissidence, however, foreshadowed the debilitating 
internal tension within PASOK that would ultimately bring down the party and usher in a 
technocratic government headed by Lucas Papademos in November 2011.  In May 2011, cabinet 
members divided publically on the pace of reform, with Andreas Loverdos, the Health Minister, 
explicitly criticizing the slow pace of reform.13 By late May 2011, with bond yields above 
sustainable levels, it was clear that Greece would need either a bailout, debt-reduction, or both, 
in order to avoid bankruptcy. Policymakers in Athens advocated extending the maturity of the 
2010 bailout, on top of the interest-rate reductions achieved in the March 2011 Grand Bargain.14 
One of many grand bargains brokered in the post-crisis period, as discussed in Chapter 5, the 
March 2011 Grand Bargain expanded the lending power of the EFSF in exchange for 
commitments from debtor countries to execute additional reforms.  
Increasing political pressure within creditor countries guaranteed that additional relief 
would only occur in exchange for extensive and deep conditionality. Within the Troika and 
creditor governments, the primary debate revolved around the extent of private-sector 
involvement in the second bailout. The German government advocated extensive private-sector 
involvement, while the ECB, in particular, sought to shield private bondholders, out of concern 
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over the financial-market implications of “voluntary” negotiations.15 Prior position, emphasized 
by the hybrid model as a relevant supply-side dynamic for external actors, explained Germany’s 
position. German banks held small positions in Greece’s private debt. This was not the case, 
however, with sovereign debt, whose restructuring was not considered because of the large 
positions of the Eurozone institutions and governments. In these negotiations, as elsewhere, 
France occupied a middle ground between creditors and crisis-country governments. The French 
government introduced a proposal for a debt-reducing bond-swap, modeled on Brady bonds. 
Chapter 5 discussed this scheme and the problematic analogy between Eurozone economies and 
1980’s Latin American economies operating with independent currencies. In June 2011, the 
ECB’s view largely prevailed and limited the private-sector involvement in the second Greek 
bailout.16 On the Greek side, Papandreou faced pressure from both within his own party and the 
opposition. About 30 PASOK legislators threatened to derail the required austerity legislation by 
voting against party lines. In addition, Antonis Samaras, the opposition New Democracy’s 
leader, called for a renegotiation of the first Troika bailout.17 How such a renegotiation would 
proceed remained unclear, but the broad-based rejection of past terms threatened to destabilize 
an already tenuous financial and political situation. Despite the threats, the government’s four-
year austerity package passed parliament, with extensive cuts to public-sector employment, a 
freeze in pension payments, increased consumption taxation, and extensive privatization of state-
owned assets.18 Amid continued public dissent within PASOK, particularly among the far left, 
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Papandreou appointed Evangelos Venizelos, as part of a wider cabinet reshuffle that elevated far-
left PASOK members, as Finance Minister.19  
The Greek experience under PASOK’s single-party government reveals an important 
shortcoming of the measure of consonance proposed by Equation 1, as it related to the hybrid 
model’s vision of political capacity. Consonance reflects differences between, rather than within, 
parties. In the Greek case, with single-party governments in the pre-crisis and immediate post-
crisis periods, the most important fiscal-policy tensions occurred within parties. Papandreou 
faced a difficult task in managing these tensions, particularly between the preferences of the far-
left members of PASOK, the more pragmatic, office-seeking center of PASOK, and the hard line 
taken by Greece’s creditors. Importantly, the importance of within-party tensions varied across 
the sample, even within the sample of single-party governments. Mass defections of the kind of 
observed in Greece were observed in neither Portugal nor Spain. On a smaller scale, however, 
they were observed in post-crisis Ireland. The concluding section of this chapter and Chapter 8 
return to the problems posed by consonance as the exclusive measure of political capacity 
adopted in the present study. 
A technocratic shift: Greece under Papademos 
Shortly after PASOK’s cabinet reshuffle in June 2011, Greek politicians expected Troika 
approval of the second bailout. However, Troika discussion over bailout terms stalled as a result 
of further debates over the extent of private-sector involvement in debt reduction.20 In September 
2011, as European politicians sought to gain domestic parliamentary approval for the second 
Greek bailout, the Troika warned Greece over its expected fiscal deficit of 9% compared with a 
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target of 7.6% of GDP.21 With growth declining in an already-recessionary context, the Troika 
called for additional credible austerity measures, increasing the pressure on recently appointed 
Finance Minister Venizelos. Lagarde threatened to withhold the IMF’s next tranche if the pace of 
Greek reform slowed further.22 In response, the Greek parliament passed a property tax that 
would be added to citizens’ electricity bills.23 After passing additional structural reforms, 
Papandreou faced increasing resentment from members of his own party and the wider public. 
With increasingly strident and violent protests, Papandreou declared a popular referendum on the 
terms of the second Greek bailout.24 Troika policymakers reacted angrily and argued that, with a 
popular referendum, Papandreou abdicated responsibility at a critical moment for Greece. As a 
result, for the first time, Sarkozy and Merkel openly questioned Greece’s future in the Eurozone 
and explicitly referred to the possibility of a Greek exit.25  
In November 2012, Papandreou acquiesced to extreme pressure from both the Troika and 
the domestic political opposition and announced his intention to step down as Prime Minister.26  
The possibility of a grand coalition entering government to implement the terms the second 
bailout evaporated when talks between ND and PASOK stalled. Instead, the parties agreed to 
instate Lucas Papademos as Prime Minister presiding over a technocratic government until the 
February 2012 general election.27 In late 2011, the widespread financial-market contagion 
analyzed in Chapter 4 produced a political analog, as governments across the Eurozone’s 
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periphery collapsed in the face of increasing bond yields. In Italy, Mario Monti took over as 
Prime Minister of a technocratic government in Italy. At the same time, Spain’s conservative 
Popular Party entered government with a majority in Parliament. The strong position of Spain’s 
Popular Party, however, contrasted strongly with the incoming governments of both Greece and 
Italy. Whereas in Italy, the autonomy of the technocratic government was threatened by an 
overbearing predecessor (Berlusconi), in Greece, the Troika restricted the government’s 
autonomy and directed the policy agenda. As occurred prior to Portugal’s bailout in May 2011, 
the Troika required that both mainstream parties agree on the implementation of detailed 
austerity measures, prior to the disbursement of additional funds.28 While such leverage likely 
paved the way for the short-term implementation of Troika demands, it also threatened the 
legitimacy of an already-embattled government.  
Without legitimacy, it proved difficult for the Papademos government to pass either 
wider or deeper reforms than its democratically elected predecessor. In office for three months, 
the technocratic government began in a weak domestic position that only deteriorated further. As 
additional cuts became nearly politically impossible to implement, the technocratic government 
shifted its efforts to reducing tax evasion and improving collection. Estimates of foregone 
revenues as a result of tax evasion amounted to €6 billion annually, which would provide a 
potential windfall for a government able to achieve meaningful reform.29 While commendable, 
such measures typically were not seen as a credible way to reduce the fiscal deficit. If credible, it 
was not clear why they would not be among the first measures implemented. As a last resort, 
they appeared almost as an admission of defeat. Moreover, progress on other fiscal fronts 
remained slow. Through the end of 2011, the planned privatization of €50 billion in state-owned 
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assets had generated only €1.3 billion.30 As with combating tax evasion, the Greek government, 
in step with other crisis governments, frequently heralded privatization as a means of closing the 
fiscal deficit. Notwithstanding their widespread popularity, at least as measured by proclamation, 
privatizations were a problematic means by which to close the deficit for three primary reasons. 
First, the value of assets were typically overstated, as they had not been marked-to-market, since 
prior to the financial crisis. Second, privatizations were a one-off measure that reduced the year’s 
deficit but did little to affect the structural deficit. Third, selling these assets, as revealed by the 
slow trickle of sales in Greece, were politically difficult propositions, with significant, 
entrenched interests organized in opposition. 
Against the backdrop of a deteriorating political context, the external environment 
remained unforgiving. Despite the Troika’s approval of a second bailout for Greece, none of the 
€130 billion had been disbursed because of stalled discussions among creditors with respect to 
the restructuring of Greek debt. The debate revolved around the tension inherent in implementing 
a sufficiently large haircut on the outstanding €200 billion in Greek debt that would improve 
Greece’s debt sustainability while ensuring the voluntary participation of all private 
bondholders.31 The one bright spot from the external environment involved Draghi’s 
implementation of LTRO’s (with two rounds occurring in December 2011 and February 2012), 
which facilitated the ECB’s purchase of peripheral sovereign bonds and depressed yields.32 In 
February 2012, Papademos and the Troika agreed to additional austerity measures that centered 
on public-sector pay cuts in addition to the implementation of those measures already agreed 
upon in exchange for a second bailout. The Greek parliament passed the austerity package, 
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which Papademos sold as the better of two bad options. In a sign of the increasingly widespread 
dissent and deterioration of political consensus, 43 legislators from ND and PASOK voted 
against the bailout and were thus expelled from their respective parties. In addition, six cabinet 
ministers resigned from their positions following the vote.33 Following the approval by Greek 
parliament, private bondholders reached an agreement for a haircut worth slightly more than 
50% of the €206 billion in debt. Participation exceeded 95% of private-sector bondholders; the 
high level of participation largely reflected the generous incentives granted to the private 
bondholders by the ECB.34  
The Papademos provides an unenviable means of avoiding the implementation of 
austerity measures in the near term: appoint a government with no domestic credibility. Figure 1 
displays the fiscal-policy implications of the debilitating political context, characterized by 
parties and governments without credibility. Even against the back drop of strong external-actor 
pressure, measures of disaggregated fiscal policies remained flat between 2011 and 2012, as 
shown in Figure 2012. For anti-austerity advocates, however, delayed austerity does not mean no 
austerity, as indicated by the package approved at the end of the technocratic government.  
A botched election, surging Syriza, and grand coalition 
The policymaking power of the Papademos government was further undercut as the two 
primary parties (PASOK and ND) competed to position themselves as marginally anti-austerity. 
Both parties announced strategies to circumvent parliamentary approval and Troika 
conditionality for austerity-relief measures.35 With the credibility of both PASOK and New 
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Democracy waning, in a dynamic that prefigured similar shifts in other post-crisis Eurozone 
countries, voters increasingly turned to parties on the edge of political spectrum: from the far-
right Golden Dawn to the far-left Syriza. As a result, in the run-up to the May general election, 
PASOK and New Democracy, combined, polled at less than 40% of Greece’s voting 
population.36 In May 2012, the electorate failed to provide PASOK and New Democracy with a 
sufficient majority to implement the second bailout.37 With Syriza, the second-leading vote 
recipient, unwilling to enter a left coalition with PASOK that would approve the second Troika 
bailout, Greece prepared for a second general election in June. In the interim, bond yields 
continued to climb, as political uncertainty rendered Greece’s fiscal trajectory and future in the 
Eurozone uncertain. 
The June 2012 election produced a grand coalition of three parties: Democratic Left, 
PASOK, and New Democracy. With the parties negotiating to enter government, the EC and the 
ECB approved a €100 billion bailout of Spain’s banks, with limited conditionality, in stark 
contrast to the past bailouts of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Seeking analogous flexibility from 
the Troika, New Democracy, the leading vote recipient in the June election, requested a two-year 
extension to reach the fiscal targets required by the bailout program.38 Junior coalition partners 
PASOK and Democratic Left voiced concerns about the social implications of continued 
austerity and concomitant economic contraction.39 As the uncertainty continued into August 
2012, debate increasingly revolved around Hollande’s France, which advocated a relaxation of 
terms, and Merkel’s Germany, which sought to protect the interests of creditors.40 Both leaders 
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appeared to be appealing to their respective domestic constituencies, the socialist base in France 
and the conservative base in Germany. In September, Jean-Marc Ayrault, France’s Prime 
Minister, explicitly expressed support for the extensions requested by Athens.41 The IMF 
provided additional support for such a position.42 Debate within the IMF went a step further, 
beyond an extension of debt and on to the restructuring of official debt (from the IMF, the ECB, 
and creditor countries).43 The March 2012 restructuring of Greek debt had involved only private-
sector bondholders. The pressure for heterodox reform dissipated, as documented in Chapter 5, 
with Hollande’s shift squarely into the Northern camp. 
The 2013 budget44 reflected the pressures of external actors, who remained relatively 
unified programmatically, despite the IMF’s intellectual dissent. Such pressures produced strains 
in the governing coalition. In November 2012, the leader of the Democratic Left, Fotis Kouvelis, 
publically repudiated the governing coalition’s proposed budget, in protest of the implications of 
the budget for workers’ rights.45 This put the government in an untenable situation. Such 
behavior would have been unthinkable in the strong parliamentary contexts of other continental 
regimes. Even in countries in similarly dire financial straits, coalition partners exercised restraint 
with respect to the government’s primary-cleavage platforms, as occurred in Ireland with both 
the Green’s departure from the FF-PD-Green coalition in January 2011 as well as Labour’s 
discontent throughout its participation in the post-crisis coalition with Fine Gael. Following the 
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vote, Greek policy employed water cannons to dispel protestors,46 and party leaders in the 
governing coalition expelled seven legislators who voted against the budget.47  
 Greece’s experience with post-crisis governments illustrates two important points related 
to the hybrid model that are explored in greater depth at the end of this chapter. First, the present 
study’s emphasis on the operationalization of political capacity as consonance between coalition 
partners elides within-party tensions crucial to a complete understanding of fiscal policymaking. 
Second, the at-times direct relationship between pressure applied by external actors and domestic 
tensions in Greece’s political context illustrates the problematic endogeneity between external 
actors and domestic political developments. Pressure from financial markets and the dictates of 
external actors drove both the appointment of Papademos’ technocratic administration as well as 
the May 2012 electoral stalemate. If these political developments influence fiscal policy, as the 
hybrid model asserts, external actors provide ultimate cause driving change in fiscal policy in 
contrast to the proximate role played by low-consonance governments.  
Italy 
 The politics of Italy’s crisis and post-crisis periods can be roughly divided into three 
parts. In the first, running from April 2008 to November 2011, Berlusconi’s People of Liberty 
led a center-right coalition in parliament. In November 2011, Mario Monti’s technocratic 
government took over and remained in power until April 2013. In April 2013, Italian voters 
elected a grand coalition, which included both right and left parties.  
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Figure 2. RILE and MODRILE scores from Italy’s 2008 general election. In both graphs, parties are presented from 
left-to-right on the basis of their ranked RILE scores. In both panels, negative values indicate left positions, and 
positive values indicate right positions. Abbreviations are taken from the CMP codebook; the corresponding party 
names are listed in Table A1, in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
Berlusconi’s center-right coalition 
 Figure 2 reveals a number of important characteristics of Italy’s 2008 general elections. 
First, the dramatic left-right variation in the RILE space was driven largely by non-economic 
factors, as the large differences in the RILE and MODRILE spaces indicate. In the RILE space, 
the center-left Democrats (PD) appeared to the right of the center-right People of Liberty (PDL).  
From an economic perspective, the PD and PDL were more closely aligned and to the right of 
the country’s regional parties. Second, in contrast with Figure 3, which shows party positions in 
Italy’s 2013 general election, the small number of parties in Figure 2 reveals the dominant 
tendency towards pre-electoral coalitions in Italy’s political system. Many of the parties that later 
ran as independent parties in 2013 coalesced in the pre-electoral coalitions shown in Figure 2 in 
2008. Such fracturing provided the Italian manifestation of the rejection of mainstream parties 
observed across the Eurozone’s periphery. 
In April 2008, Berlusconi’s conservative coalition came to power on a campaign to 
restart Italy’s economic growth by cutting taxes. The top three panels of Figure 1 show that 
Berlusconi had a specific variety of taxes in mind. Between 2007 and 2008, consumption and 






























With a larger economy than either Portugal or Greece, Italy, like Spain, entered 2010 in a strong 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the Troika. From the onset of the financial crisis, it was unclear 
whether the Troika would be able to bail out Spain, the Eurozone’s fourth-largest economy. A 
fortiori, similar logic applied to Italy, the Eurozone’s third-largest. As in the case of Spain, the 
interdependence of bond yields in the Eurozone, however, meant that Italian policymakers were 
not entirely isolated from the politics and economics of the Eurozone’s smaller peripheral 
economies. As in Madrid, Berlusconi announced adjustment packages that coincided with the 
bailouts of Ireland and Portugal. In the weeks following the first Greek bailout in May 2010, 
with increasing pressure on Italian bond yields, Berlusconi reversed his expansionary campaign 
position. The Prime Minister announced cuts to public-sector compensation and increased 
taxation.48 Figure 1 demonstrates a clear distributional basis for the tax-related adjustment. 
Income-tax rates increased between 2009 and 2010; corporate-tax rates, reduced in the previous 
year, remained constant. Moreover, the bottom-left panel shows the reduced expenditure on 
public-sector compensation.  
As in post-crisis Spain, where autonomous regions disproportionately contributed to the 
rising deficit and debt, Italy’s decentralized political structure meant that the burden of 
adjustment fell disproportionately on particular regions. Whereas in Spain, Catalonia resented 
fiscal transfers to less fiscally sound autonomous regions, economic conditions differed 
dramatically across Italy. In the North, strong manufacturing and financial bases drove growth; 
the South relied on a large public-sector and transfers from the north to maintain one of the 
Eurozone’s highest standards of living. The Italian political landscape thus resembled Spain’s, in 
the proliferation of regional parties. However, unlike in Spain, where the mainstream parties 
                                                 




remained ideologically unified, Italy’s system of loose pre-electoral coalitions generated strong 
tensions within parties akin to those observed in Greece’s mainstream parties. This combination 
of regionalism and weak mainstream parties created an unstable electoral and political context, 
one particularly susceptible to financial shocks. In July 2010, following the announcement of 
Berlusconi’s austerity package, the volatile combination produced strong dissent within the PDL, 
following a week in which two ministers resigned in the face of corruption allegations. To force 
the hands of the within-party dissenters, Berlusconi declared the austerity vote a vote of 
confidence, the thirty-fifth such occurrence during his two-and-half-year tenure as Prime 
Minister beginning in April 2008, warning that the government would fall if the package did not 
pass.49 The frequent resort to the vote of confidence underscored the weak positions of Italian 
Prime Ministers, even those with parliamentary majorities. 
Two days after the lower house approved the austerity package, Gianfranco Fini, co-
founder of the PDL, departed from the governing coalition, along with 32 members of the lower 
house and ten members in the Senate. This dramatically reduced Berlusconi’s parliamentary 
majority.50 Since coming to power in 2008, Fini’s business conservatism had co-existed uneasily 
with Berlusconi’s pragmatic populism and political alliance with the xenophobic Northern 
League. Fini’s departure dramatically reduced the odds of Berlusconi’s government surviving an 
additional three years to the end of its term. This was particularly the case, given the loss of the 
governing coalition’s majority in the lower house coupled with Berlusconi’s penchant for 
pushing through controversial legislation with votes of no confidence. As a result of Fini’s 
departure, negotiations over the 2011 budget included handouts to independents that reduced the 
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severity of planned reductions.51 In December, Berlusconi barley survived a vote of no 
confidence in the lower house, by a count of 314-to-311, with two abstentions.52 
 Yields on Spanish and Italian debt continued to climb through middle of 2011, as the 
Troika’s negotiations over the second Greek bailout stalled. By May 2011, Berlusconi had hinted 
that he would not stay in office beyond the current term. The Prime Minister indicated, at various 
times, support for Justice Minister Angelino Alfano and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti as 
favored successor candidates.53 Each prospective successor proved controversial for different 
reasons. Alfano, on the one hand, had worked to shield Berlusconi from prosecution in cases 
related to sex with a minor, tax fraud, and corruption. Tremonti, on the other hand, had 
implemented the first extended period of austerity in Italy since that which had accompanied 
Italy’s accession to the Euro in the late 1990’s. Berlusconi’s support for each candidate 
vacillated, depending on popular perceptions and political conditions. At times, exacerbating the 
political, and thus financial, uncertainty, Berlusconi intermittently expressed an intention to 
continue as Prime Minister. 
In June, Berlusconi clashed with Tremonti over how to finance a proposed growth plan, 
which included income-tax cuts, particularly among the wealthiest Italians.54 Tremonti argued 
that, without compensating cuts in spending, the government could not afford the tax break. In 
response, Berlusconi announced a new round of cuts to expenditures. Adding €7.3 billion in cuts 
to the €25 billion already scheduled, the new plan included an additional €40 billion in 
adjustment over 2013 and 2014. The cuts concentrated on public-sector compensation, pensions, 
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and tax evasion.55 With these measures implemented, the government projected that it would 
eliminate the fiscal deficit by 2014. In addition, the Prime Minister’s involvement in the austerity 
package took on a more-than-political interest. Berlusconi, with the help of Justice Minister 
Alfano, attempted to shield the Prime Minister’s media company Fininvest from paying court-
ordered damages of €750 million. Only after public furor arose and President Giorgio Napolitano 
personally intervened did Berlusconi withdraw the shielding clause.56 Notwithstanding such 
personal involvement, critics questioned the feasibility of the austerity program, which relied on 
secondary legislation to implement €23 billion in cuts.57 Particularly in the context of a system 
with weak coalition governments dependent on small parties to pass legislation, the effect of 
controversial, fiscally conservative legislation is frequently watered down, as the government 
gathers sufficient legislative support. The requirements for such secondary legislation 
corresponded to calls in Greece to reduce tax evasion and to privatize state-owned assets. These 
praiseworthy, but ultimately unfeasible prescriptions, temporarily satisfied crisis-country 
creditors, until, for economic and political reasons, they proved impossible to implement. 
Whether crisis-country made such proposals in good faith or as a ploy in a context resembling 
Putnam’s two-level game remains an open question and likely varies across cases.  
With declining popularity in polls and a defendant in three separate trials—for alleged tax 
fraud, corruption, and sex with an underage prostitute—Berlusconi lashed out at his Finance 
Minister. A Berlusconi-owned newspaper quoted the Prime Minister describing Tremonti as a 
“socialist” intent on designing a “mamma state.”58 In doing so, Berlusconi undercut an emerging 
                                                 
55 Dinmore, Guy. “Italy to rule on €47bn savings drive.” Financial Times. 30 June 2011. 
56 Dinmore, Guy. “Mystery clause fuels attacks on Berlusconi.” Financial Times. 6 July 2011. 
57 Dinmore, Guy. “Italian austerity; Cuts must be accompanied by reforms to boost growth.” Financial Times. 8 July 
2011. 




rival in the party and consolidated support among economically conservative coalition partners. 
In the weeks following the accusations against Tremonti, the government used a vote of 
confidence to force through the three-year, €45 billion austerity plan.59 Pressures on Berlusconi 
to resign continued to intensify through the late summer. This pressure exacerbated internal 
tensions within the governing coalition, with party elites increasingly calling for the Prime 
Minister’s resignation. These calls intensified as it became increasingly clear that the recently 
passed austerity package would not be sufficient to eliminate the budget deficit by 2014.60 After 
the ECB announced that it would buy sovereign bonds in exchange for conditional reforms, 
Berlusconi announced an ambitious schedule of reforms. Without substantial accompanying 
detail, the embattled Prime Minister announced that the government would reduce the deficit to 
zero by 2013, rather than the 2014 target in the recently approved austerity package.61 In the 
subsequent days, the government announced an emergency budget, which would add €45 billion 
to the €45 billion in adjustment approved by parliament in mid-July. The proposed budget would 
increase the income-tax rate on individuals earning more than €90,000, increase the tax rate on 
capital gains from 12.5 to 20%, and reduce the spending on local governments by €10 billion.62 
Berlusconi’s government, however, could not survive while taxing its core constituencies. 
Umberto Bossi, leader of the Northern League, threatened to withdraw parliamentary support 
from Berlusconi’s government if the emergency budget proceeded without amendment.63 
Two weeks after announcing the emergency budget, in a nationally televised speech, the 
Prime Minister criticized the income-tax increases and cuts to spending on local governments. 
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Berlusconi retracted key amendments, in a move of political capitulation that paralleled the 
referendum called by the PASOK government over the second Greek bailout.64 Jean-Claude 
Trichet expressed reluctance to continue with purchases of Italian bonds as part of the Securities 
Market Programme after the Prime Minister’s retraction. Trichet encouraged “absolutely 
decisive” reforms from Rome’s governing coalition.65 In response, the Prime Minister 
announced an increase in the VAT rates, a move that would become politically contentious under 
the subsequent administration.66 Trichet’s urgings betrayed an ignorance of Italy’s political 
context; under duress, Berlusconi’s coalition in particular and the Italian political system in 
general was incapable of decisive action which required reforms with strong distributional 
implications across broad swathes of voters. 
Monti’s technocratic government 
By October 2011, the combination of internal voices calling for political change and 
external pressure created a political crisis that Berlusconi was forced to confront. That month, the 
governing coalition lost a parliamentary vote on the revised emergency budget.67 In November, 
Berlusconi announced his intention to resign following the passage of additional austerity 
measures required by the European Union in exchange for continued bond purchases.68 Later in 
the month, the Prime Minister reluctantly agreed to the formation of an interim technocratic 
government, which would be headed by Mario Monti with the parliamentary backing of the PDL 
and its allies. From the start, Monti’s political independence was questionable, at best. Less than 
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a week into the life of the technocratic government, Berlusconi threatened to “pull the plug” on 
the nascent administration.69 Berlusconi’s support for the technocratic government remained 
crucial because of the People of Liberty’s plurality in parliament, a plurality that would likely be 
required to pass any significant legislation. To underscore his ongoing importance, Berlusconi 
recommended that members of his party not support Monti, if the technocratic Prime Minister 
proposed a version of the wealth tax abandoned by the previous government.70 
The composition of the technocratic government constituted a key difference between the 
technocratic governments in Greece and Italy. Whereas in Greece, politicians included in 
Papademos’ 100-day administration were unelected, Monti’s cabinet drew on elected politicians. 
This increased the democratic legitimacy of Italy’s government but also reproduced some of the 
crippling political dynamics that initially brought the technocratic government to power. In 
initial negotiations between the largest right and left parties—Berlusconi’s People of Liberty and 
Bersani’s Democratic Party—senior politicians expressed reluctance to join Monti’s cabinet, 
fearing that inclusion in the cabinet would hurt their prospects in the April 2013 general 
election.71 The revised emergency budget reflected the political uncertainty facing the 
government. On the spending side, the package drew heavily on that designed by Berlusconi’s 
government, reducing pensions as part of a larger envisioned shift from a defined-benefits to a 
defined-contributions system.72 With respect to taxation, much to Berlusconi’s and the Northern 
League’s chagrin, the package relied on increased property taxation. Before passing Italy’s lower 
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house, however, the PDL managed to dilute reforms related to both property taxes and 
pensions.73  
Some room for maneuver was opened by the easing of external conditions. Merkel 
praised the early reforms implemented by Monti, declaring them “extraordinarily important and 
remarkable” in both “speed and substance.”74 With Draghi taking over at the ECB, as 
documented in Chapter 5, the ECB cuts interest rates in consecutive meetings in addition to 
expanding the bank liquidity programs started under Draghi’s predecessor, Jean-Claude Trichet. 
At the end of 2011, with bond yields on Italian debt responding positively to Monti’s young 
administration, Monti called for a more robust European response, backed by a larger bailout 
fund75 and a reduction in the interest-rate burden76 of peripheral Eurozone countries. Monti’s 
focus on debt sustainability mirrored the shift then occurring in the IMF. By February 2012, 
periphery bond yields had declined sharply and pundits around Europe celebrated the two Super 
Marios, referring to Mario Monti and Mario Draghi.  
By April 2012, with Europe’s attention increasingly turned towards the state of Spain’s 
banks, Monti announced that his government would delay the goal of a balanced budget from 
2013 to 2014. Monti also ruled out additional austerity measures in the intervening period.77 
Monti’s statements reflected the anti-austerity shift in Eurozone opinion that accompanied 
Hollande’s election to the French Presidency in May 2012. Despite these statements, Monti’s 
government announced a €4 billion decrease in public spending. The government justified the 
cuts as being more growth-friendly than the planned VAT increases that had been originally 
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scheduled.78 While the economic justification for such a shift is debatable, the political logic is 
clear. The Northern League and other PDL allies in Parliament strongly supported lower taxes. 
Cutting spending was thus a way to satisfy Parliament’s conservative constituencies while 
simultaneously meeting the deficit targets required to keep the European creditors satisfied.  
The Northern League remained a key constituency for the technocratic government. With 
its boss and a number of senior members under investigation for corruption, the Northern League 
faced a loss of credibility akin to that faced by the mainstream parties replaced by the 
technocratic government. Filling in the electoral void, much like Syriza in Greece in 2012 and 
then again in 2015 and Ciudadanos and Podemos in Spain in 2014, an Italian anti-establishment 
party gained momentum. Headed by a comedian, Beppe Grillo, the Five Star Movement polled 
between the high single digits and mid-twenties in local contests throughout the first half of 
2012.79 In June, faced with declining popular support, Monti admitted that he “could have done 
more and better.”80 By mid-June leading into the summer’s Eurozone Summit, yields on Italian 
and Spanish debt had started to creep upwards for two primary reasons. First, both Italian and 
Spanish banks came under scrutiny, as the value of assets obscured since the financial crisis 
received increasing attention from financial-market participants. A €100 billion bailout of 
Spain’s banking sector sent tremors through Italian financial markets. Monti, however, insisted 
that Italy was not next in line.81 Second, PASOK’s fumbling of the second Greek bailout and the 
indecisive May 2012 general election in Greece fueled financial-market uncertainty. Italian 
yields remained elevated even after a grand coalition came to power in Greece. In Italy, 
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observers began calling for early elections, rather than an extended period of political uncertainty 
that would last through the general elections scheduled for March 2013. 
In May 2012, Renato Brunetta, the former minister responsible for public-sector reforms 
under Berlusconi, encouraged Monti to negotiate a separate growth compact with Eurozone 
officials at the summer summit dedicated to the fiscal compact.82 Without such a compact, 
Brunetta implied that the Italian parliament would not ratify the fiscal compact.83 At the 
Eurozone Summit, Monti, negotiating from a position of relative strength, rejected the offer of 
€120 billion in growth-enhancing measures. To go with such measures, Monti, with Rajoy’s 
backing, insisted on debt relief. Eager to return with a result to placate his Socialist supporters at 
home, Hollande emerged as a cautious backer of the Italian and Spanish position.84 Following 
the Summit, as discussed in Chapter 5, the establishment of the ESM and OMT initially appeared 
as significant and magnanimous concessions from the Northern to the Southern economies. As 
additional details emerged concerning the exclusion of legacy assets and the indirect mechanism 
of recapitalization, however, the policies appeared more akin to grudging concessions which 
would have limited financial-market impact.  
Such conservative realities emerged gradually. With the initial announcement of Spain’s 
bailout, the ESM appeared as a victory for the Southern economies. With its ostensibly new-
found clout, and in light of lower-than-expected growth numbers, Monti’s government reduced 
the income-tax rates in the draft 2013 budget.85 In addition, the technocratic Finance Minister, 
Vittorio Grilli, argued that future cuts in expenditure should be coupled with reductions in 
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taxation to offset to the cuts’ negative growth effects.86 While some observers speculated that the 
brief respite in tax policy foreshadowed Monti’s running in the March general election, the 
technocratic prime minister insisted that he would not run for an additional term. Support 
continued to migrate away from the traditional parties on the left and right and towards anti-
establishment parties in general and Beppe Grillo’s Five-Star Movement in particular.87 With the 
election months away, the fractured center-left had not decided on a candidate, although focus 
had shifted to Matteo Renzi and Pier Bersani. Bersani ultimately won the PD’s nomination in a 
December runoff with Renzi.88 On the center-right, Berlusconi’s camp announced, 
unsurprisingly, that Berlusconi planned to run again. At the time of his announcement, the 
former PM withdrew the PDL’s parliamentary support for the technocratic government.  
Monti recognized the impossibility of governing without the parliamentary support of the 
PDL. Monti thus agreed to elections after the passage of the 2013 budget.89 Berlusconi 
announced an anti-austerity platform, similar in substance to the party’s 2008 platform. The 
populist appeal reflected the political logic underscoring the departure of voters away from 
mainstream parties intent on implementing Troika policy. As a party led more by an individual 
than by an ideology, Berlusconi’s People of Liberty was able to move around the policy space 
without losing voters. Other parties in Italy, with weaker and less wealthy personalities, 
struggled to maintain their core of supporters as they moved throughout the policy space. In 
contrast to Berlusconi’s anti-Berlin platform, Bersani proposed a pro-European platform that 
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relied on cooperation with Germany in exchange for the Troika’s commitment to more growth-
friendly measures.90  
 
Figure 3. RILE and MODRILE scores from Italy’s 2013 general election. In both graphs, parties are presented from 
left-to-right on the basis of their ranked RILE scores. In both panels, negative values indicate left positions, and 
positive values indicate right positions. Abbreviations are taken from the CMP codebook; the corresponding party 
names are listed in Table A1, in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
An indecisive election and Enrico Letta’s grand coalition 
As Syriza’s anti-European, anti-establishment position would take it to the top of Greek 
polls in 2015, Grillo’s Five Star Movement gathered momentum, polling as the third largest 
party by late February.91 With Grillo’s strong showing, the possibility of a weak, center-left 
government with a majority in the lower house but a minority in the Senate became increasingly 
likely. Such a government would be unlikely to have the political capital required to implement 
controversial reform. The opening negotiations to form a coalition government confirmed these 
concerns and foreshadowed the limited room for policy maneuver that would be inherited by the 
subsequent government. Bersani’s opening move of negotiating a minority government with 
Berlusconi’s People of Liberty on the basis on a minimal five-point, anti-austerity framework 
received a weak response from Angelino Alfano, in his new role as the Secretary of the People of 
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Liberty.92 With more than 160 seats between the two houses and collecting more than a quarter 
of the popular vote, Grillo’s Five Star Movement occupied a key position within the electoral 
landscape. Following Syriza’s lead after May 2012’s election, Grillo repeatedly denounced the 
failures of the mainstream Italian parties and rebuffed the PD’s offers to form a minority 
government.93 In mid-April, after repeated failed attempts to form a coalition government, the 
leadership of the Democrats resigned. In their stead, Enrico Letta emerged as a viable leader of a 
coalition government to include his center-left Democrats, Monti’s centrist Civic Choice, and 
Berlusconi’s center-right People of Liberty. In his first speech as a leading candidate, Letta 
rejected the sustained policy path mandated by Brussels, saying that “Europe’s policy of 
austerity is no longer sufficient.”94 A couple of days following the speech, Letta was sworn in. 
From the beginning of the administration, the tensions produced by a grand coalition were 
apparent. The People of Liberty insisted on the abolition of a housing tax repealed under 
Berlusconi that had been reinstated under Monti’s administration. Berlusconi also wanted 
property-tax payments made under the Monti government to be reimbursed to property owners.95 
Bowing to pressure from the PDL, Letta announced that it would not collect the Monti 
administration’s property tax and that it would not raise the value-added tax later in the year. 
Importantly, Letta’s government did not announce offsetting measures.96 In late May 2013, the 
EC gave its implicit approval of the Letta government’s program, releasing it from the Excessive 
Deficit Program (EDP). At the same time, the EC allowed France and Spain an additional two 
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years to reach the EDP-mandated targets.97 In September, however, with increasing concern that 
Italy would exceed the 3% deficit target required under the EDP, Letta caved to EC pressure and 
announced a rise in the VAT.98 This infuriated the PDL, one of whose conditions for coalition 
government, was the repeal of proposed VAT increases. After the rate hike went into effect, 
Berlusconi announced that PDL legislators would no longer participate in the coalition’s 
cabinet.99 The paralysis of the government persisted through the end of Letta’s administration in 
February 2014, when Matteo Renzi took over leadership of the coalition government.  
The policy paralysis of Letta’s governments reflects the culmination and combination of 
tensions present throughout Italy’s post-crisis governments. With prominent regional parties and 
strong ideological differences both within and between parties, the low-consonance environment 
sustained minimal controversial legislation. Even in the relatively high-consonance context of 
the center-right coalition led by Berlusconi’s PDL early in the post-crisis period, the government 
was able to implement only limited fiscal-policy adjustment. Throughout the period, Italy 
produced structurally low levels of consonance that threatened the policymaking viability of any 
government. In such a setting, individuals dominated the political context, in a sense foreign to 
stronger-party parliamentary systems. Indeed, across crisis countries, no politician assumed the 
individual importance of Berlusconi, who, in a very tangible sense, was an Italian institution. 
This is problematic for a theories of policy, like the hybrid model and all of the dominant 
contemporary approaches discussed in Chapter 1, that are predicated on parties as the primary 
vehicle of policymaking. To the extent that an individual transcends the importance of his or her 
party, political competition tends to center more on personality than on the programmatic 
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cleavages emphasized in contemporary models. More broadly, this may pose a problem for the 
application of the hybrid model to weaker party systems and presidential systems without strong 
parties as institutions to structure debate and outcomes. 
Greece, Italy, and the implications for the hybrid model 
 The juxtaposition of the Greek and Italian cases reveals the importance of a model that 
incorporates an understanding of domestic politics beyond partisanship. In the coalition politics 
that characterized post-crisis policymaking in Eurozone governments, tension between coalition 
partners played an important role in shaping the type and depth of fiscal-policy reforms 
implemented. As in Chapter 6, external actors played in important role in conditioning the 
autonomy of domestic actors. Financial markets imposed more serious restrictions on 
policymakers in Athens than in Rome. In the immediate post-crisis period, PASOK’s single-
party majority government, constrained by financial markets, implemented through extensive 
fiscal-policy adjustment. However, the political consensus underlying PASOK’s dominance 
gradually deteriorated. This trend corresponded to one observed across all crisis countries, with 
the exception of Portugal, of electoral support shifting from mainstream parties towards fringe 
parties which touted anti-establishment and anti-European responses to the volatile status quo. 
The deteriorating political consensus undermined the efforts of the short-lived technocratic 
government headed by Lucas Papademos and then the grand coalition between PASOK, New 
Democracy, and the Democratic Left. Ultimately, unsatisfied with its voice in the grand coalition 
and the government’s failure to produce viable alternatives to austerity, the Democratic Left 
withdrew from government. Greece’s restricted autonomy contrasted with the relative freedom 
afforded to Italian governments by financial markets. To some extent, the added autonomy 




this case in the immediate post-crisis period with Berlusconi’s center-right coalition. However, 
Italy’s political landscape, riven by regional parties and dominated by a single individual, limited 
the ability of governments to implement the controversial reforms. As in Greece, this dynamic 
was exacerbated by the shift of voters from mainstream parties to the electoral fringe, dominated 
by Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement. The subsequent grand coalition between the PDL and 
the Democratic Party suffered from a similar and debilitating lack of legitimacy as was faced by 
Greece’s grand coalition. 
Alternative operationalizations of political capacity 
 The case studies of post-crisis Greek and Italian governments highlight two obstacles to 
evaluating the role of political capacity in general and consonance, the operationalization of 
capacity adopted here, in particular. The first, borne out in the case studies, emerged in Chapter 
3’s large-N analyses and related to the specific operationalization of consonance as a measure of 
political capacity. Table 3 in Chapter 5 suggests that, within the high-consonance context, 
partisanship has little effect on fiscal-policy outcomes. This counters the prediction of the hybrid 
model, which suggests that the limited need to appease coalition partners should increase the 
differences observed between different types of governments in high-consonance settings 
relative to low-consonance settings. Instead, Table 3 suggests that differences between parties 
are more salient in low-consonance contexts than in high-consonance contexts. There are a 
number of potential explanations for this finding, each with serious implications for theories of 
fiscal-policy change. The first alternative explanation, discussed in the next section, involves the 
endogeneity between financial markets and fiscal policy. The second alternative relates to the 
specific operationalizations of political capacity adopted here. Chapter 1’s initial presentation 




tensions between parties in coalition government. The case studies suggest a number of other 
potential operationalizations, two of which are discussed here. First, as referenced in Chapter 3’s 
discussion of the large-N analysis, tensions within, rather than between parties, may drive fiscal-
policy outcomes. The cases studies of single-party governments most clearly illustrate this 
dynamic. In the immediate post-crisis period, PASOK’s single-party majority government and 
Berlusconi’s center-right coalition suffered primarily as a result of tensions within the dominant 
governing parties. In the Greek case, the departure of deputies produced the technocratic 
government headed by Papademos. In the Italian case, the departure of Fini and his allied 
deputies from the People of Liberty ushered in Monti’s technocratic government. In each case, 
the disintegration of mainstream parties produced governments with limited domestic legitimacy. 
Notwithstanding marginal increases in legitimacy with respect to external actors, these 
governments faced nearly insurmountable political obstacles to implement a sustained regime of 
reforms. Second, an alternative operationalization could emphasize the distinction between 
strong- and weak-party systems, as in the framework of Carey & Shugart (1995).100 
Problematically, from the perspective of explaining variation in fiscal policies adopted following 
the financial crisis, the relative strength of party systems, as envisioned by the present literature, 
does not change over the life of the crisis. Such rigidity, however, does not reflect the realities of 
Greece and Italy, in which the structure of political institutions are largely endogenous to the 
preferences of incumbent governments.  
In principle, these alternative versions of political capacity are not mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, the myriad varieties of political capacity suggests a final point regarding potential 
heterogeneity in the effects of different dimensions of political capacity across the sample. 
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Different dimensions of political capacity—consonance, within-party tensions, and strength of 
party systems—may have different effects both within and between crisis countries. Thus, an 
important avenue for future research involves evaluating the relative explanatory power of these 
different dimensions of political capacity. All could be included in a single model; however, as 
discussed in Chapter 1’s introduction of the hybrid model, an important tension in modelling 
revolves around the tension between parsimony and generalizability.  
Fiscal policy, financial markets, and endogeneity 
The second obstacle to evaluating the role of consonance in the hybrid model relates to 
the endogeneity between financial-market pressure and political conditions in general and 
consonance in particular. The hybrid model proposes a direct link between consonance and 
fiscal-policy outcomes, with causality running from the former to the latter.  The case studies 
however reveal a complicated relationship between financial markets, consonance, and fiscal-
policy outcomes. In the cases of Greece and Italy, in particular, the financial markets and 
external actors restrict the set of feasible domestic coalitions. In the former, external actors 
lobbied heavily for a grand coalition of mainstream parties in May 2012’s general election. 
Syriza’s platform that demanded a renegotiation of the terms of the two prior bailouts rendered it 
unacceptable to the Troika. The low-consonance grand coalition that emerged following the June 
2012 election thus resulted, in part, from the pressures applied by external actors. In Italy, the 
Five Star Movement’s unwillingness to negotiate with the Troika produced a grand coalition 
between mainstream parties that ignored the preferences of a significant and growing proportion 
of the Italian electorate. The policy malaise that emerged from grand coalitions with limited and 
deteriorating domestic legitimacy stemmed in only a proximate sense for the low-consonance 




The case studies thus reveal important heterogeneity related to the effects of external 
actors. Their direct effect through a variety of measures, with varying degrees of conditionality, 
is to increase the extent of adjustment in crisis countries. Moreover, to the degree that supply- 
and demand-side factors favor the Troika, fiscal-policy adjustment in crisis countries mirrors the 
preferences of the Troika’s dominant actors. The indirect effect of pressure from external actors 
is mediated by consonance and limits the extent of fiscal-policy adjustment in crisis countries. 
Financial-market pressure circumscribes the set of viable parties in power and thus governing 
coalitions. This tends to both reduce the consonance of incoming governing (through, inter alia, 
encouraging the formation of grand coalitions) and undermine the domestic legitimacy of the 
subsequent government. These twin dynamics severely limit the subsequent government’s ability 
to implement controversial reforms. In revealing the nuanced role of external actors in 
influencing policymaking in crisis countries, the case studies emphasize the limited, independent 
role played by consonance in shaping fiscal-policy outcomes. Importantly, the same conclusion 
does not necessarily apply to political capacity more broadly; alternative operationalizations of 





Appendix to Chapter 7 
 
Abbreviation Party name (in English) 
M5S Five Star Movement 
RC Civil Revolution 
SEL Left Ecology Freedom 
APF Autonomy Progress Federalism Aosta 
Valley 
PD Democratic Party 
3L Labour and Freedom List 
SC Civic Choice 
PdL People of Freedom 
LN Northern League 
SVP South Tyrolean People’s Party 
FDI-CDN Brothers of Italy-National Centre-
Right 
CD Democratic Centre 
UDC Union of the Center (prior to 2008, 
Union for Christian and Center 
Democrats) 
  
IdV Italy of Values 
Table A1. Party abbreviations and full party names from Italy’s 2008 and 2013 elections translated into English, 
according to the CMP.  Parties are listed according to their ranked RILE scores in 2013, starting with the leftmost 
party at the top.  IdV, listed below the black cells, participated in the 2013 but not as an individual party in the 2008 





Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Introduction 
 Chapter 8 is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the alternative 
approaches to explaining fiscal-policy outcomes introduced in Chapter 1. In particular, the 
section discusses the shortcomings of these models and how the hybrid model contrasts with 
such approaches. The second section discusses the core results that emerge from the quantitative 
and qualitative analyses in Chapters 2 through 7. Subsections address each component of the 
hybrid model. The third section summarizes a number of empirical and theoretical challenges 
confronting both the present application of the hybrid model in particular and studies of fiscal 
policy in general. The fourth and final section discusses applications beyond the Eurozone 
presented in the present study. 
Alternative approaches 
Chapter 1 introduced three alternative approaches in the political science literature that 
purport to explain variation in fiscal policies adopted following financial crises. The first, 
partisan Meltzer-Richard models, emphasizes the domestic context and competition between 
parties on the left and on the right. While an important step in evaluating the role of domestic 
politics in fiscal policymaking, these models fail to provide a convincing explanation for center-
right policies adopted by center-left parties, and vice-versa. The second and third approaches, in 
the convergence and varieties of capitalism (VoC) literatures, emphasize the fiscal-policy 
consequences of pressure applied by financial markets. These two literatures take as their point 
of departure the notion of footloose capital developed by Rodrik.1 In an international 
environment characterized by capital mobility, parties on the left and right converge on a 
                                                 





trivially low corporate-tax rate in order to prevent capital from departing for low-tax localities. In 
the convergence literature, these pressures generate a single equilibrium, in which all countries 
converge on a similar, low-tax equilibrium. In the VoC literature, these pressures generate two 
equilibria, differentiated on the basis of the relationship between state and market in each. In 
liberal-market economies (LME’s), market forces dominate and coordinate the behavior of 
economic actors. In coordinated-market economies (CME’s), the state plays a larger role in 
coordinating such behavior. As a result, in LME’s the state is minimal and characterized by a 
laissez-faire approach; in CME’s, the state is more expansive and characterized by institutions 
that foster cooperation and resolve conflict between groups in the economy, such as employers 
and employees. 
Shortcomings of the alternative approaches 
Each of the dominant approaches faces important challenges in explaining fiscal-policy 
responses to the 2008 financial crisis. The partisan MR approach fails to provide an explanation 
for a number of political strategies and policy outcomes observed following the crisis. In Ireland, 
parties across the political spectrum, with the sometimes exception of Sinn Fein, supported 
Ireland’s Eurozone-low 12.5% corporate-tax-rate. More broadly, center-right parties 
implemented ostensibly center-left policies, and center-left parties implemented policies 
traditionally associated with the center-right. That said, despite the empirical shortcomings, 
important elements of the MR approach, including the basic tension between left and right, are 
preserved in the hybrid model. To varying degrees, particularly in the absence of pressure from 
external actors, partisan conflict proceeds as conventionally conceived in the MR approach.  
The convergence literature faces different but similarly significant problems. The most 





rate—is not observed across the Eurozone. Neither does the corporate-tax-rate trend down 
universally. Instead, it is the object of political contention, increasing in some countries and 
decreasing in others. As with respect to MR, despite the empirical shortcomings of the 
convergence literature, the approach produces important insights into fiscal policymaking, 
particularly during periods of economic dislocation and financial stress. In particular, the hybrid 
model internalizes the financial-market pressures emphasized in the convergence approach. In 
contrast to past approaches, however, such convergent pressures vary over space and time. 
Importantly, the hybrid model explicitly theorizes the dynamics underlying such variation. 
The VoC approach predicts two equilibria, within which there should be trivial variation. 
While the Eurozone’s countries vary in extent to which they conform to Hall & Soskice’s vision 
of CME’s,2 their relative similarity within the VoC typology should induce similar fiscal-policy 
regimes. While a reasonable interpretation of the typology would permit variation, the wholesale 
differences between and within crisis countries under different governments implies a broad-
based under-specification of the VoC framework. As with the MR and convergence approaches, 
the hybrid model draws important lessons from the VoC literature. In particular, the present 
model incorporates the VoC’s coalitional logic for why parties diverge and how governments 
resist financial-market pressure.  
Comparison with the present model 
The present model, and empirical operationalization, builds on the dominant approaches 
in three important ways. First, on the empirical side, the model disaggregates the dependent 
variable of fiscal policy. Contemporary approaches to the academic study of austerity, including 
empirical applications of all three dominant approaches, employ highly aggregated measures of 
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austerity. At their most aggregated, these studies analyze the fiscal deficit as a proportion of 
GDP. This approach ignores the important distributional consequences of revenue-driven versus 
expenditure-driven adjustment. A second set of studies, more disaggregated than the first, 
considers government adjustment as a function of expenditure and revenue. Even these more 
refined approaches, however, elide the political conflict surrounding specific tax-and-spend 
measures. Chapter 1 develops a theory to account for the distributional implications of specific, 
disaggregated tax-and-spend measures. In addition, Chapter 2 presents the refined data required 
to test the more nuanced model. In contrast to past studies that consider deficit, expenditure, and 
revenue as proportions of GDP, Chapter 2 presents four tax measures (consumption, corporate, 
income, and social security) and two expenditure items (public-sector compensation and social 
benefits), with distinct distributional, and therefore political, implications in the context of the 
Eurozone’s complicated coalition politics. Chapters 3, 6 & 7 show that Eurozone governments, 
in both crisis and non-crisis countries, respond with these disaggregated measures, rather than at 
the level of the deficit. Importantly, however, the model restricts that the variation at the levels of 
both the independent and dependent variables. As noted in Chapter 1, a more realistic model 
would develop a more sophisticated domestic politics, both within and between parties; a more 
complicated model might also incorporate a richer institutional context, which would include 
employer organizations and unions, a la Hausermann. Moreover, a deeper approach would 
consider a wider and further disaggregated set of tax-and-spend policies. As a first 
approximation, building on the incomplete models offered by contemporary approaches, Chapter 
1’s model offers an important but incomplete step towards understanding how countries employ 





Second, on both empirical and theoretical sides, it builds on the rudimentary domestic 
political contexts offered in the MR and VoC approaches. On the empirical side, Chapter 2 
presents a more nuanced measure of preferences over fiscal policy than is adopted in the wider 
literature. In the MR approach, domestic political competition consists of parties on the left and 
right competing against one another. According to this vision, parties exhibit preferences with 
respect to expenditure and revenue; the left favors high levels of both, and the right favors low 
levels of both. The CMP’s RILE measure, the dominant measure of right-left partisanship 
employed by the literature, includes a large number of non-economic measures, as shown in 
Table 1 of Chapter 2. MODRILE, the original measure of economic-policy preference adopted 
here, also shown in Table 1, extracts the economic-policy dimension from RILE. Chapters 6 & 7 
show that important divergence between MODRILE and RILE measures across crisis countries. 
Following periods of financial crises, when economic policy is particularly salient, MODRILE 
more accurately captures the relevant variation in political preferences. The hybrid model 
advances present approaches and accurately captures the coalition dynamics common in 
Eurozone governments. On the theoretical side, Chapter 1’s model incorporates a more 
sophisticated model of coalition government that accounts for tension between coalition partners, 
absent from the single-party governments envisioned by the MR approach. The measure of 
political capacity adopted here captures the tension between parties in coalition governments. As 
discussed in Chapters 3 & 7, expanding the present to model to incorporate tensions within 
political parties provides an important extension of the present study. 
Third, on the theoretical side, the hybrid model integrates the domestic political logic of 
the partisan MR approach with the international economic logic of the convergence and VoC 





explores if and how external actors influence domestic policymaking. The approach, in contrast 
to the ubiquitous pressure posited by the convergence and VoC approaches, suggests that the 
influence varies over time and space as a function of both supply and demand factors. The hybrid 
model emphasizes the importance of financial markets as mediating between external actors and 
domestic politics. Chapter 4 explores how such mediation evolved between 2000 and 2013, as 
financial markets increasingly priced in country-specific, sovereign-credit risk. In the immediate, 
post-accession period, yields on peripheral bonds converged to the German bund and effectively 
eliminated credit risk. Such a permissive environment provided external actors with little 
influence in the policymaking of Eurozone member countries. With the emergence of sovereign-
credit risk, first as a systemic phenomenon and later as a more differentiated country-specific 
phenomenon, external actors gained increasing leverage in the affairs of member-states. The 
three primary innovations of the present approach, which feature a combination of theoretical 
and empirical nuances, contribute to a richer model of fiscal policymaking following financial 
crises. The results, presented in Chapters 2 through 7, both highlight the importance of added 
elements and underscore the importance of further refinement, with respect to both theory and 
empirics. 
Results and their theoretical implications 
 The time series of disaggregated fiscal policies, presented in Chapter 3, display a 
characteristic pattern across the Eurozone. Figure 1 of Chapter 3 shows that deficits increase, 
then decrease, following the financial crisis. Importantly, obscured by the aggregate deficit, crisis 
countries exhibited larger declines in both expenditure and revenue compared with non-crisis 
countries. Such results provide a first impression of the importance of external actors, whose 





visible in the context of highly aggregated measures of fiscal policy. Moreover, the bottom two 
panels of Figure 1 show that the post-crisis increase in deficit stemmed from collapsed revenue, 
rather than the increased expenditure characteristic of Keynesian response. This contrasted with 
the predominantly Keynesian narrative produced by the financial press.  
 Further disaggregated, expenditures and revenues generate clear patterns that pose 
important challenges for the convergence approach. Figure 2 of Chapter 3 shows that, following 
the crisis, as predicted by the convergence approach, expenditure on public-sector compensation 
and social benefits declines. Problematically, however, for the convergence approach, both 
components of expenditure increase in the post-accession, pre-crisis period. Moreover, in the 
post-crisis period, both components of expenditure continued to increase among non-crisis 
countries. In the aggregate, both components of expenditure decline across the Eurozone; Figure 
2 demonstrates, however, that the aggregate effect is driven by large declines in crisis countries 
contrasted with steady increases in non-crisis countries. Disaggregated components of revenue, 
displayed in Figures 3 through 6 of Chapter 3, generate similar problems for the convergence 
approach. Across the sample, in contrast to the homogeneous low tax-and-spend equilibrium 
predicted by the convergence approach, substantial heterogeneity emerges. By integrating the 
preferences of external actors, mediated by financial-market pressure, with the domestic politics 
of fiscal policy envisioned by a domestic MR approach, Chapter 1’s hybrid model—and the 
subsequent chapters’ empirical applications—provide better explanation for the time-series, 
cross-section variation. 
Partisanship 
Chapter 3 employs t-tests and fixed-effects regressions to explore the role of partisanship 





series analysis. The t-tests provide the broadest test of the partisan hypotheses implied by the 
hybrid model and characterize effects on the basis of both between-country and within-country 
variation. Fixed-effects regressions identify effects on the basis of only within-country variation 
but control for a wider set of covariates than t-tests, including those implied by the hybrid model. 
The large-N inferential methods reveal consistent and significant effects with respect to the 
deficit, revenue, and expenditure. When disaggregated, due to limited within-country variation 
and the lack of associated power in fixed-effects regressions, coefficient estimates are rarely 
statistically significant, less frequently in than in the case of t-tests. Broadly, however, the 
substantive findings coincide with the predictions of the hybrid model.  
Large-N inferential methods suffer from two related shortcomings. First, in an attempt to 
reduce unobserved heterogeneity, fixed-effects regressions limit the amount of exploitable 
variation. Second, because of such limited variation, regime effects are difficult to characterize. 
The findings with respect to corporate-tax rates provide an example of the inferential problems 
introduced by these shortcomings. Left governments tended to be in power in the pre-crisis 
period, which was characterized by financial-market conditions that allowed crisis countries to 
fund large fiscal deficits without raising taxes. Under this regime, governments reduced 
corporate-tax rates, as described in Chapter 3’s analysis of Figure 2. Right governments entered 
power after the anti-incumbent elections in the post-crisis period. With tighter financial-market 
conditions, right governments employed fiscal measures to cover the growing fiscal deficit. In 
this environment, right governments held corporate-tax rates constant while increasing income- 
and consumption-tax rates. When viewed in the aggregate, the left governments appeared to treat 
corporate interests more favorably than right governments. Thus, ignoring the regime effects 





These difficulties underscore the importance of qualitative approaches, which inform and 
refine the understanding of political context required to sensibly interpret large-N analyses. 
Chapter 6 develops qualitative case studies that juxtapose analyses of Spain and Portugal. These 
analyses provide detailed context that inform the application of the hybrid model. With Spain’s 
relatively permissive, financial-market conditions, governments on the left and right operated 
with significant latitude. The autonomy of policymakers in Madrid contrasts with the straitened 
circumstances faced by Lisbon’s, who, because of climbing yields were unable to fund the fiscal 
deficit on capital markets. Lisbon’s politicians thus produced policy that corresponded more 
closely to the preferences of external actors than that produced by Madrid’s.  
Consonance 
 Chapter 3’s large-N analysis reveals a more limited impact of consonance than is 
predicted by the hybrid model presented in Chapter 1. Consonance appears to have a limited 
effect on fiscal-policy outcomes. Table 5 of Chapter 3 shows that the effect of partisanship is not 
intensified in high-consonance contexts. Indeed, partisan differences are statistically significant 
only in the low-consonance context.  
 Chapter 7’s case studies of Greece and Italy suggest a number of reasons for the limited 
significance of consonance, the first statistical and related to the presence of endogeneity in the 
proposed model, the second empirical and related to alternative operationalizations of political 
capacity. As with respect to partisanship, concerns about endogeneity between consonance and 
the remaining explanatory variables (partisanship and external actors) present inferential 
difficulties. As presented in Equation 1 of Chapters 2 & 7, the statistical relationship between 
consonance and partisanship is, in part, structural. A shift in consonance requires a 





impossible. Chapter 7 shows that, in contrast to the direct line of causality from consonance to 
fiscal-policy outcomes implied by the hybrid model, financial-market pressures tend to reduce 
the consonance of governments and coalitions that emerge from the electoral context. Thus, 
consonance appears to mediate the effects of financial markets on fiscal-policy outcomes, rather 
than directly influencing outcomes. While a problem for statistical identification, the dependence 
of consonance is not necessarily a death knell for the hybrid model. The hybrid model can 
accommodate mediating variables with limited direct influence on fiscal-policy outcomes.  
 It is important to the note that, in the initial presentation of the hybrid model, Figure 1 in 
Chapter 1 presented political capacity, not consonance, as an explanatory variable added to the 
partisan politics of an unreformed MR model. Chapter 2 thus presents consonance as one 
manifestation of political capacity. The weak results with respect to consonance do not nullify 
the effects of political capacity more broadly. Indeed, Chapter 7 suggests a variety of different 
dimensions of political capacity, including internal party tensions and party-system strength, 
which may drive the depth of fiscal-policy reforms. Ultimately, the particular drivers of political 
capacity may vary across crisis countries to an extent that any single operationalization will 
explain variation in a small, and statistically insignificant, subset of the broader sample. As a 
modeler, seeking to generalize beyond the individual case studies of journalists, such variation 
presents an important challenge, particularly if the model is going to apply without 
extraordinarily refined scope conditions.  
External actors 
 Chapters 4 & 5 explore the role of external actors, the final explanatory model presented 
in the hybrid model, in shaping fiscal-policy outcomes in crisis countries. Chapter 4 employs 





reveals three distinct periods of bond-market behavior. In the pre-accession period, bond yields 
of prospective Eurozone members converged to the German bund. In the post-accession, pre-
crisis period, spreads remained low, as financial markets failed to price in country-specific, 
sovereign-credit risk. In the final period, strong correlation among crisis countries persisted, with 
increases in Greek yields driving up yields across the sample of crisis countries. Only late in the 
period, after the second Greek bailout and associated restructuring of Greece’s debt, did 
significant differences in bond yields emerge among crisis countries. 
 The gradual pricing-in of country-specific, sovereign debt risk reflected the increasingly 
refined tools employed by the Troika over the period, as explored in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 
considers the set of policy interventions employed by the Troika, including conventional and 
unconventional monetary policies, bailouts, and EU-wide legislation. One broad way to interpret 
the evolution of Troika tools is from general measures that targeted the Eurozone as a whole 
towards tools capable of targeting specific crisis countries. Early in the crisis, the ECB relied on 
cuts to the nominal interest rate; such monetary policy applied across the Eurozone and thus had 
no differential effect either within or between crisis- and non-crisis countries. Moreover, bond 
purchases in the pre-crisis and immediate post-crisis period occurred through the Securities 
Markets Programme which required little conditionality. The Greek bailout began a trends 
towards increasing conditionality and the Troika’s increasing involvement in the affairs of the 
individual Eurozone member countries. The Greek bailout, along with all subsequent bailouts 
with the exception of Spain’s, required substantial fiscal adjustment, with ongoing, intrusive 
monitoring provided by Troika observers. Bond purchases, first coordinated through the SMP, 
later occurred as part of Outright Monetary Transactions and the European Stabilization 





evolution demonstrates the increasing and refined reach of Troika technocrats into the affairs of 
Eurozone member states. As a result of such refinements, financial markets increasingly priced 
in country-specific, sovereign-credit risk. 
 Notwithstanding the increasingly refined reach of the technocrats, the Troika confronted 
significant obstacles to collective action throughout the crisis period. The hybrid model proposes, 
and Chapter 5 explores, three such dynamics: emergent preference heterogeneity, prior position, 
and the arrival of additional external actors. Preference heterogeneity first emerged as the IMF’s 
non-European member countries resented what they saw as preferential treatment granted to 
Europe’s crisis countries compared to that granted to Latin American countries in the 1980’s and 
East Asian countries in the 1990’s. Exacerbating this split, particularly following the first three 
bailouts between May 2010 and May 2011, IMF technocrats expressed increasing concern over 
the debt sustainability of crisis countries. These officials clashed with ECB technocrats who 
viewed the crisis as one motivated by liquidity risk rather than solvency risk. Prior position, the 
second supply-side dynamic emphasized by the hybrid model, increased in importance as 
Eurozone governments amassed positions in the sovereign debt of crisis countries. The large 
positions explain the unwillingness of the Troika to impose restructuring on Greece’s publically-
held sovereign debt following the second Greek bailout. Moreover, because of its small positions 
vis-à-vis the remainder of the Eurozone, Cyprus, the country most affected by the restructuring 
of Greece’s privately-held sovereign debt, was unable to alter the decisions shaped by the 
Eurozone’s largest economies. The third and final supply-side dynamic emphasized by the 
hybrid model, the arrival of additional external actors, played a role later in the sample period. 
Cyprus, in order to avoid the extensive conditionality required by the Troika, sought funds from 





manner, the Cypriot government was able to avoid the Troika-imposed reforms until April 2013, 
when it entered a Troika program. The relationship with Russia thus delayed, but did not 
eliminate, the imposition of Troika-mandated reforms in Cyprus.  
Challenges for fiscal-policy research 
Two primary challenges confront studies of fiscal-policy research in general and the 
Eurozone crisis in particular. With respect to the former, the strategic revelation of preferences 
by political actors makes it difficult to measure the true preferences of political actors. With 
respect to the latter, the complicated relationship of the Troika’s various actors makes attribution 
of responsibility for policy evolution difficult. To an extent, the theoretical framework and 
empirical methodology in the preset dissertation have addressed these problems; however, even 
ameliorated, they continue to pose significant inferential difficulties. 
As a large literature documents, measuring the preferences of any actor poses significant 
problems. This is particularly the case in a strategic setting, as in the present case, where actors 
have incentives to appeal to constituencies whose preferences are either unknown or known to 
diverge from the actors’ true preferences. Several methods have arisen to deal with this 
challenge. First, researchers ignore the problem and treat the policy outcome as revealed 
preference. Second, researchers employ a number of sources of information that emerge prior to 
the observed policy outcome. These sources include politician and party statements, manifestos, 
and other miscellany. Third, survey experiments of politicians and constituents allow for an 
accurate identification of preferences among listed choices. Fourth, relatively nascent approaches 
in the literatures linking political psychology and neuroscience may provide a means to 






The present study adopts the second approach. In this vein, it follows Hausermann 
(2010). Whereas Hausermann employs a variety of documents, the present study analyzes 
manifestos written prior to the election. Unfortunately, particularly in the context of prospective 
coalition governments, manifestos reflect the strategic consideration of political parties vis-à-vis 
potential coalition partners. Notwithstanding such shortcomings, deriving preferences from 
manifestoes marks a significant improvement upon deriving preferences from policies adopted. 
An important venue for future research involves further study of the preferences of political 
parties. The third and fourth options listed above, survey experiment and mapping via 
neuroscientific methods, provide two opportunities. Gaining access to, and the willingness of, 
senior politicians to submit to such intrusive methods will likely be difficult, if not impossible. 
Rather than trying to measure the preferences of actors directly, a separate approach might focus 
on assessing the preferences of constituents. The preferences of constituents can then be taken as 
a proxy for the preferences of politicians. Using census data and an original job-type 
classification, Hausermann presents one way to do this. Scaling up Hausermann’s attempts to 
include the wider set of Eurozone economies. The proxy method is not without its problems, 
particularly in the context of party systems with complex coalition governments. In systems 
where the link between voter and representative is attenuated by extensive bargaining, as is the 
case in many of Europe’s continental governments, it is unclear to what degree accountability 
exists between voter and politicians. Such attenuation poses a problem, because the inferential 
strength of proxying constituent preferences for party and politician preferences relies on 
accountability as the linking mechanism.  
The second inferential problem partially ameliorated by the present empirical framework 





Gallagher, demonstrate that understanding how preferences and change within a single 
organization, the IMF, are complex and difficult to understand. A more thorough study of the 
role of external actors would more carefully examine preference change within and the policy 
influence of the European Central Bank and the European Commission. In the present 
dissertation, the preferences of the European Central Bank are largely treated as static, and the 
European Commission is treated as a veto point paralyzed by the collective action problem that 
emerges from a large number of actors, none of which are dominant, that display large variation 
in preferences.  
The recent and emerging literature on the preference change within the IMF describes an 
important, and often oversimplified, dynamic in understanding policy responses to the 2008 
financial crisis. Unlike in response to past financial crises, where a single organization or country 
dominated the policy response, three separate organizations—the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—coordinated the response to the 
financial crisis. To varying extents, each of these organizations maintained independent 
relationships with both debtor and creditor countries. As Chapter 5 explores, and contrary the 
conventional wisdom ensconced in the financial press, the Troika did not exist prior to the crisis. 
Informal and increasingly formal lines of communication only emerged well into the crisis 
period. As a result, based on the Troika’s recent creation and disjointed evolution, it may be 
more appropriate to treat it as three separate institutions working together on an ad hoc basis. 
These complex, and to some degree informal, relationships make it difficult to assess which 
organization drives changes in outcomes. Future research should more carefully consider how 
preferences change within each of the constituent organizations and how such change drives the 





Applications and further research 
 The present dissertation develops and evaluates the hybrid model in the context of 
Eurozone economics, politics, and policy. Most obviously, the hybrid model applies to current 
and future currency unions. However, the hybrid model applies more widely, particularly in the 
low interest-rate environment that has characterized developed economies since the financial 
crisis and Japan since the late 1990’s. In these countries, central banks responded to the financial 
crisis and sluggish real conditions by cutting nominal rates, in many cases, to zero. Once at the 
zero-lower bound (ZLB), at least one of two conditions must be satisfied for the hybrid model to 
apply: either the country must have a floating exchange rate or, in the case that it does not have a 
floating regime, a country must have limited foreign-exchange reserves. In the former case, even 
it has the requisite resources in the form of foreign-exchange reserves, a government has made a 
commitment not to interfere in foreign-exchange markets; in the latter case, a governments lacks 
the resources to intervene. Where a government can no longer resort to the conventional 
monetary policy (as at the ZLB) and cannot displace adjustment externally (by interfering in 
foreign-exchange markets), a government’s situation resembles Eurozone member countries 
following the financial crisis.  
 This history of economies with fixed exchange-rate regimes bears important lessons for 
the applicability of the hybrid model to the Eurozone. Financial-market participants and political 
observers discuss membership in the Eurozone, once attained, as an exogenous and fixed 
constraint. For all the talk about the Eurozone as a historically unprecedented institution, from a 
financial perspective, the union is a group of countries pegged to a single exchange rate, in this 
case, the Euro. In all probability, Eurozone membership may be treated as fixed in the short-run, 





ultimately politically naïve, to treat Eurozone membership as exogenous in the long run. The 
history of fixed-exchange rate regimes underscores the tremendous political pressure that stems 
from the economic and financial pressures to displace adjustment outside of the domestic 
context. While outside the scope of the present study, the negotiations over the third Greek 
bailout underscore that participation in a currency union is function of endogenous political 
choices that must be periodically, if not continuously, reaffirmed by domestic political actors. 
Incorporating such pressures, possibly as a limit condition on the interaction between 
consonance and the influence of external actors, provides an important next step for the hybrid 
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